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ABSTRACT
DWELLING IN TIME, DWELLING IN STRUCTURES:
DISINTEGRATION IN WORLD POLITICS
Jan Adam Nalaskowski
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. Kurt T. Gaubatz

This dissertation aims to propose a general theory of disintegration. This subject
is not treated directly by some theoretical accounts and mistreated by others. European
integration theories are fashioned to explain the greater integration process while gametheoretic approaches to withdrawals and secessions, even if treating disintegration
directly, fail to include critically responsible factors. This dissertation offers a
constructive criticism of both accounts. Since neither turning integration theories
symmetrically around nor direct, game-theoretic assessment of disintegration help to
provide sufficient explanation, it is suggested that the problem of symmetrical reversal
and rational conduct must be revised.
Disintegration fails to follow the rules suggested by symmetrical reversal of
integration. Therefore, it requires independent theoretical account which would pay
attention to new, unique factors. Many withdrawal and secession games include these
factors but at the price of paralysis of conduct. This dissertation’s argument is that these
new factors should be identified and described narratively in order to understand why this
conduct becomes troublesome. It is suggested that the problem is located in uncertainty
about payoffs’ value and nature. Since actors of disintegration game bargain over
different issues rather than upon integration and since these issues often assume nonquantifiable values, disintegration becomes qualitatively different from integration,

integration theories prove to be unfit, and game-theoretic accounts need more cautious
application. Case studies introduced in three structures of analysis – states,
intergovernmental organizations and the European Union – aim to test and confirm
subsequent elements of the proposed theory. The constructive criticism of both
integration theories and withdrawal/secession games aim to make the general theory of
disintegration applicable to many different forms of political structure.
As a conclusion, this dissertation points out strengths of this new account on
disintegration and encourages researchers to further extend its framework. The theory can
help policymakers to understand negotiations better and to learn how to accommodate the
risk. Academic researchers should be able to provide reliable analyses so that public
opinion is not be shaped by the fear of the unknown and misinterpreted.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: ABSOLUTE TIME AND OBSOLETE STRUCTURES
By conventional definition, “disintegration” means breakage into pieces through
destruction, loss of cohesion or strength.1 In the political world, the term has been applied
to describe the break-up of states, loss of coherence on international regimes level, or
reversal of European integration process. However, the literature has largely treated
disintegration as a process opposite to integration and thus relies on qualitatively the
same, though reversed, factors. It has usually been the lack of something rather than the
presence of something responsible for potential withdrawals or secessions. The
shortcomings of these accounts point out the need for a separate, positive theory of
disintegration. Combining and fixing existing accounts helps to extend this theory to
many political structures. Thus, even though there has been no example of exit from the
European Union, researchers might be able to explain why this is the case. Neither
European integration theories nor withdrawal games are by now sufficiently able to
answer this question.
In this dissertation “disintegration” is used to explain the facts of decomposition
precisely in positive terms. Its essence is thus not the failure of cooperation or integration,
where the lack of these qualities induces negatively-understood disintegration, but rather
viewing this concept as decision resembling any other decisions. Following this logic,
disintegration is no longer an abstract to which some political entities may become
subject due to unfortunate developments. These units themselves may “disintegrate,”

1

"Disintegrate," in Oxford Dictionaries(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/2015); "Disintegrate," in
Merriam-Webster(http://www.merriam-webster.com/2015); "Disintegrate," in Cambridge Dictionaries
Online(http://dictionary.cambridge.org/2015).
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choosing to cease a specific union they have been dwelling in. Surely this use of the term
means breakage to smaller pieces. It is probably also an outcome of certain changes in
cohesion and strength of an original unit. But since “disintegration” here is understood as
withdrawal from certain political arrangement, it can occur without the total break-down
of the arrangement itself. For example, there can be many “disintegrations” from the
European Union, performed by its particular member states. None of them, however, has
to be necessary nor sufficient for the collapse of the Union as a whole. Integration
theories are not suited to make this distinction.
In short, political units are expected to decide, under some circumstances, whether
exiting from a currently-functioning structure benefits them more than continued
membership. A structure, if it has enough acting power on its own, can try to take its own
stand in this bid, possibly inducing constraints for withdrawing unit. Finally, both actions
– of disintegrating unit and a “structure” – are subject to certain externalities which can
seriously influence their choices.
The rigor of this thinking compels researchers to focus on certain concrete
political organisms which can experience or perform disintegration. These must by
necessity be unions consisting of smaller parts. This dissertation proposes three such
structures: states, intergovernmental organizations and supranational organizations,
currently represented only by the European Union.

3

The Building Blocks
Even if disintegration requires a separate account, it currently does not exist in
theoretical vacuum. The existing approaches differ from the one sought here but they also
point out important mechanisms and variables that cannot be ignored.
In the narrow sense, integration is usually associated with the European Union
and other intergovernmental organizations. Major theoretical approaches indeed aim to
explain “European integration,” suggesting that this particular phenomenon is exceptional
or even principal over other cases. Integration is often seen as a gradual process where
global super-state is the last stage of development. In a broader sense, integration can be
perceived as a special case of cooperation where particular political units decide to form a
body beyond their traditional governance to achieve certain goals. In this understanding
the term “integration” can be used to explain the formation of states by subnational units,
membership in intergovernmental organizations, as well as participation in supranational
entities. Here, integration is not considered horizontally as a stage process with a global
super-state being an ultimate outcome. Rather, a vertical approach helps to understand
why particular political units decide to form or join a higher body of governance, taking
into account time and space conditions and resulting costs-benefits analysis.
Building on these two approaches, the understanding of “disintegration” can take
two major forms. On the one hand, it may become a reversal of established theories of
European integration. The lack of conditions for integration pointed out by these
approaches should thus result in decomposition or at least a stalemate of supranational
entity. On the other hand, regardless of European integration’s potential exceptionality,
an understanding may focus on the costs-benefits analysis, applicable vertically to
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different forms of governance: state, intergovernmental organization, supranational
entity. The second approach makes it easier to search for a general theory of
disintegration. It helps to avoid conceptual, theoretical and methodological problems
often associated with the first approach. Conceptually, it acknowledges different forms of
integration and thus creates space for vertically studying many regional phenomena.
Theoretically, it does not put European integration as a benchmark for studying other
forms. Methodologically, it focuses attention on a pluralism of ways to approach
integration.2
Since researchers of a potential break-up of the European Union have only
theories of European integration at their disposal, the natural way of thinking is trying to
reverse these accounts to capture the idea of how disintegration of the EU might look.
The scientific conduct present in this reversal assumes extracting main mechanisms
responsible for integration process and suggesting an environment in which a
symmetrical lack of these conditions leads to disintegration:

𝐴 + 𝐵 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡
−𝐴 + (−𝐵) = −𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠.

This statement holds only if disintegration is understood as negative integration.
The main argument of this dissertation is however that this is not the case. If integration
was an origin function of A and B, then disintegration would not possess rotational
symmetry of odd function with respect to its origin:
2

Philippe De Lombaerde et al., "Problems and Divides in Comparative Regionalism," in Comparative
Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, ed. Finn Laursen, The International Political Economy of New
Regionalisms (Burlington, VA: Ashgate).
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𝑖(𝐴, 𝐵) + 𝑖(−𝐴, −𝐵) ≠ 0
−𝑖(𝐴, 𝐵) ≠ 𝑖(−𝐴, −𝐵).

Similar fallacies are present in virtually all approaches to European
disintegration. Building on realism and offensive realism, potential disintegration of the
European Union would take place after American military withdrawal from Europe and
after the fall of NATO. In short, security issues would constitute the spur for the Union’s
decomposition. According to institutionalism, the European Union may lose the rationale
for its existence without hegemonic dominance or a common interest shared among
member states. The former assumes American support as well as Franco-German
cooperation.
Historical institutionalism goes a step further and claims that European integration
is virtually irreversible, also pointing out emerging gaps between member states’ capacity
to control supranational authorities and de facto autonomy of these bodies. The nature of
the European Union’s treaties, the time factor contributing to solidification of
supranational organs, densification of European polity and narrowness of decisionmakers’ anticipative capabilities all together contribute to expansion of these gaps. For
historical institutionalists, these are only external crises that are able to tear apart
solidified international organizations.
Neofunctionalism assumes that member states are locked in European polity with
rules and bodies created as a response to growing transnational exchange. The process of
institutionalization is self-sustaining and initiated by functional spillover. Even under
crisis circumstances, the reversal of this process is very unlikely since the decline of
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transnational exchange and a build-up of identity would have to occur. In its essence,
neofunctionalism portraits European integration are unidirectional and do not introduce
any theoretical basis for its reversal.
Both neofunctionalism and historical institutionalism assume that the longer
integration lasts, the harder it is to reverse, but it is still a reversal we are talking about.
Neither account offers compelling examples of possible disintegration which is assumed
to take place only when the whole integrative structure decomposes: either step by step or
through the collapse of its fundaments. This logic doesn’t help in explaining individual
decisions but instead forces us to surrender freedom of action to an abstract.
Finally, the logic of liberal intergovernmentalism places the weight of integration
on the bargaining outcome between major European Union member states. Prospect
reversal of the process can result from divergence of policies pursued by these players,
augmented by negative externalities and differences in formulated interests. However,
Andrew Moravcsik points out that crises experienced to date only strengthened solidarity
among member states and led to solidification of European Union’s constitutional
settlement. With other important force in play - economic interdependence, for example pursuing individual policies seems unlikely. Here, liberal intergovernmentalism agrees
with neofunctionalism in that the growing international exchange makes disintegration
improbable.
Theories of European integration provide important insights for understanding of
underlying processes: most importantly, they sensitize researchers to complexities and
variables. However, viewing disintegration as a process symmetrical to integration has
serious shortcomings. Apart from placing European developments in the center of

7

research, it also does not assume the difference in nature of possible disintegration
processes. All we learn from reversing these theories is how to fill in the disintegration
function with more and more domains, still expecting that it would be rotationally
symmetrical to integration function:

−𝑖(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 … 𝑛) = 𝑖(−𝐴, −𝐵, −𝐶 … − 𝑛)

The review of disintegration theories applicable to other political units helps in
breaking this vicious cycle. It is more about how particular actors internalize domains of
integration function and how the essence of decision makes integration and disintegration
asymmetrical and different in nature.
Game-theoretic and decision-theoretic accounts on secessions and withdrawals
from international organizations supply our reasoning with this critical focus. State size is
often pictured as an outcome of trade-off in economic efficiency. Thus, both benefits and
costs connected with maintaining the current size or reducing it are considered. Benefits
include, for example, lower costs of public goods, larger economies and markets, regional
insurances and redistributive schemes. The costs associated with large states assume
diverse preferences, cultures and languages. Thus, more people mean more heterogeneity
and less satisfaction when it comes to the provision of public goods.3 If there is an
equilibrium which keeps expansion and secession in check, it assumes trade-off between
economies of scale, resources and power on the one hand, and distribution of wealth
among population, and loyalty on the other.

3

Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, The Size of Nations(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003).
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The significance of these theoretical accounts lies in the common denominator for
understanding disintegration as a general phenomenon: rationality and induced decision.
There are virtually no obstacles to extend this reasoning to include intergovernmental
organizations, the European Union or even agglomeration of cities.4 Whatever unit is
chosen, as long as it is considered rational and autonomous enough to perform political
action, and as long as it dwells in some union-like structure of governance, the general
theory of disintegration should be applicable.
But just like reversed theories of European integration may be complex yet
symmetrical, the RCT approaches to secessions and withdrawals may be neat yet
simplistic. For example, what explanatory power is contained in the statement that
economic integration facilitates political disintegration by reducing costs of international
transactions and thus decreasing the benefits of state’s size? Secession appears in
equilibrium in a world of growing integration and yet Europe has not been facing any
wave of separatisms under conditions set by the EU. Going further, an institutional
setting makes democratic states more eager to disintegrate because a margin voters are
then able to achieve public goods distribution closer to their preferences. 5 Yet secession
does not prove to be empirically overwhelming tool to achieve fair distribution of payoffs
for citizens of democratic states. S2z3x
In short, theoretical neatness and a decision-centric approach of game-theoretic
accounts induces simplicity which proves to be too vast. Benefits of size may include
other variables omitted in these simple models, just like citizens’ preferences pictured on
a unidimensional scale may not capture the whole complexity of other factors in play.
4

Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "City-State Redux: Rethinking Optimal State Size in an Age of Globalization," New
Global Studies 3, no. 1 (2009).
5
Michele Ruta, "Economic Theories of Political (Dis)Integration," Journal of Economic Surveys 19, no. 1.

9

The general theory of disintegration must become sensitized to these factors and
variables.

What Constitutes Structure?
The argument developed in this dissertation considers Rational Choice Theory to
be the biggest common denominator for presented approaches. Even if the results of a
costs-benefits analysis is overshadowed by uncertainty and confusion, the sole thinking in
costs-benefits terms constitutes a clear and elegant point of departure. As a common
denominator, this analysis can furthermore unite three levels of interest (structures):
states, intergovernmental organizations and supranational units.
In contrast to theories of European integration, the approach presented here
perceives disintegration in positive terms. This account has received limited attention
among European integration scholars. The obvious reason is the lack of case studies to
support the theory. The shortcoming of one-N data has already been acknowledged by
critics of integration theories. When one bases their research on zero-N data of
supranational disintegration, the effect is obviously a purely hypothetical prognosis.
Therefore, this dissertation proposes extending analysis on other political structures,
looking for underlying mechanisms and explaining why disintegration occurs on a state
level, among intergovernmental organizations, and why it does not occur in the case of
the European Union. The positive account helps to avoid theoretical, conceptual and
methodological constrains of European integration theories. Acknowledging the
existence of various forms of integration facilitates extraction of common mechanisms,
with perception of the European Union as a benchmark to be avoided.

10

The account presented here considers three primary structures of analysis with
their corresponding constituting parts. States are comprised of subnational entities,
international organizations and supranational organizations. Thus Catalonia, Andalusia
and Basque Country are subnational entities contained in the first structure of analysis:
the Spanish state. India, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia are states operating within the
second unit of analysis: the International Grains Council organization. Poland, Slovakia
and Hungary are member states of the third structure of analysis: supranational European
Union.
This distinction is based on the difference of quality rather than quantity of
integration. Assuming that international organizations are the least integrated, and that
supranational constructs are a step further with states being the final stage of integration
leads to conclusions which are meant to be avoided in this dissertation. Viewing
integration as a stage process across the structures of analysis will induce once again the
one-N data problem. In turn, the focus on qualitative differences between three structures
of analysis helps direct attention to particular mechanisms themselves. That is not to say
that there is no pattern of gradation between these structures in terms of integration, but it
is necessary to conduct the process of reasoning in an inductive and vertical manner.
The three structures of analysis are not mutually exclusive. The Conference of
Peripheral Maritime Regions is an international organization which consists of
subnational units. The European Union is a member of the International Grains Council.
One part of Basque Country is located in Spain, the second part - in France. Through the
Committee of the Regions, subnational entities influence policymaking of the European
Union. These aspects are not directly addressed in this dissertation, though it might be
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interesting to see, for example, under what conditions subnational entities decide to leave
international organizations.
The choice to use three structures of analysis was based on policymaking-related
characteristics of the units in question. States are attributed with sovereignty, and
governance is exercised by country-specific authorities. Intergovernmental organizations
consist of states and cover designated agendas. Supranational organizations exercise
sovereignty in certain issue-specific areas. Subnational entities hold policymaking powers
in the form and scope delegated by their parent-states.
It is important to clarify what types of entities are not considered in this
dissertation. First, subunits of a state may, for example, include counties, regions, cities
or economic sectors6. Here, subnational entities mean territorial and populated areas
which formulate their own policy goals, pursued by their representatives through the
political process. In most cases, these will include administrative divisions and federal
units and regions with ethnic, historical or linguistic divergence from a parent-state. They
are usually attributed with some autonomy in local governance by a central government.
Subnational entities do not include non-state and transnational actors, terrorist
organizations or economic sectors. Second, the condition for statehood is generally set by
membership in the United Nations and by the instrument of international recognition.
Third, only intergovernmental organizations are considered. The main reason for
exclusion of nongovernmental organizations is to highlight the costs-benefits dynamics
occurring at the state level and resulting from membership in an organization. Fourth, the

6

Richard Snyder, "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method," Studies in Comparative
International Development 36, no. 1 (2001): 95.
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term “supranational organization” can be used interchangeably with the term “European
Union” as it constitutes the only case,7 which is given a separate chapter.
Since actors and their choices subject to various constraints are the fundamental
building blocks of the proposed disintegration theory, the scope of explanation must be
limited to clearly specified players exercising their actorness via possession of autonomy
of action. The most significant autonomy would belong to states. Subnational entities and
supranational organizations would possess semi-autonomous characteristics. Other
intergovernmental organizations would generally have very limited scope of autonomous
action.

The Limits to Freedom of Choice
Secessions and withdrawals are much rarer than equilibria of economistic games
would suggest. Exits from the European Union are unexplainable by the framework of
integration theories. Why is that? If equilibria are not right, then clearly there is
something wrong with how the games are set. If reversals of integration theories do not
work, then disintegration is a different phenomenon which requires separate explanation.
The argument of this dissertation is that the costs-benefits setting of secession and
withdrawal games needs major revision to assume much more constraints on actors’
choices. These choices, in turn, should replace thinking in process terms inherently
induced by reversal of integration theories. The interplay of two critical characteristics –
greater autonomy of actors coupled with increasing constraints on their choices – is
expected to supply disintegration theory with desired explanatory power.
7

Rainer Bauböck, "Why European Citizenship? Normative Approaches to Supranational Union,"
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8, no. 2 (2007): 453.
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The historical institutionalism of Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank
Longstreth8 shows a particular interest in the critique of Rational Choice Theory: goals,
strategies and preferences are shaped by institutional context, and decisions may become
non-Pareto-optimal. This dissertation does not fully endorse this idea. However, the
account presented here distances itself from rational choice orthodoxy and aims to benefit
from historical institutionalism’s sensitivity to self-sustainment of certain institutional
practices. These are sometimes taken for granted because of actors’ limited cognitive
capabilities. This attitude helps to reveal what exactly actors value, why they prioritize
certain goals over others and when this prioritization happens. Another area of interest is
historical institutionalism’s view on institutional dynamism and change. These are mainly
attributed to exogenous developments.
According to integration dynamics, subnational entities join states and states join
intergovernmental or supranational organizations. The mechanism is the same: to
delegate more or fewer prerogatives in order to achieve better overall performance. This
costs-benefits calculation occurs according to Rational Choice Theory. Disintegration
builds on the same logic but is not necessarily symmetrical to the integration process.
That is, even though a structure of integration may cease to provide obvious benefits
within its agenda, the disintegration might not occur. It doesn’t imply that units are not
rational. Rather, rationality sensitizes them to the fact that disintegration may not lead to
restoration of status quo before integration but rather to the significant costs. Asymmetric
consequences assume that, for example, by quitting a structure, one does not simply
resign cooperation in specific issue areas covered by an integration treaty. Due to

8

Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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additional and latent links that emerged during this cooperation, an exit may bring
decomposition of these extra channels and costs may exceed those initially calculated.
This uncertainty about exit costs constitutes the core of actors’ reasoning when it
comes to disintegration. According to historical institutionalism, the longer one dwells in
an institution, the higher the number of additional links should emerge. These include, for
example, informal rules and practices which are developed over time, patterns of
behavior leading to quick gains, and a sense of appropriateness and obligation in order to
win the favor of others. Disintegration may thus lead to confusion about future policies,
damaged reputations or deconstruction of forums for negotiations in other issue areas.
These costs may not be worth bearing, even if initial expectations about particular
structure of integration are no longer met.
There is probably no linear pattern between the duration of membership in a
structure and exit costs posed by additionally-emerged links. This relation would once
again suggest some form of symmetry as it is subject to actors’ decisions, consent and
creativity to decide which of the agreed links are endorsed, replicated and extended.
Theoretically, more initially-agreed upon issues under an integration scheme should have
a tendency to reproduce more of these “extras”. But this relation is likely nonlinear and
subject to one’s choices, strategies of others, and international developments.
The decision-theoretic component of this dissertation looks more closely at the
question of exit costs. The main premise is that the more links emerge between an unit
and a particular level of analysis, the more confused decision-makers will be about
possible exit costs. Thus the greatest uncertainty will apply to entities dwelling within the
framework of unitary states, then to federal entities, supranational organizations, multi-
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issue intergovernmental organizations and the least to issue-specific organizations. The
time factor can change this calculation and it can therefore be easier for a subnational
entity to separate from federal state after five years of dwelling than for a state to exit
after one hundred years of membership in multi-issue intergovernmental organization. As
it was mentioned, this calculation can also be changed by the selective endorsement of
particular integration links, subject to consent given by integrating partners.
In sum, internalities, strategies of other players and external developments on
regimes level all contribute to a perception of disintegration costs. It is difficult for
disintegrating units to contrast the payoffs matrix of withdrawal with the one present
upon integration to determine whether a structure ceased to provide desired benefits and
whether exiting would be desired. The main problem such units face is to determine how
exactly how new payoffs matrix looks. This problem is magnified exactly by changes in
internalities, strategies and regimes coupled with endorsement of additional links
emerging during the time of cooperation. More links induce different quantities, but if
new links are non-material, symbolic and non-quantifiable, the change in nature takes
place.
This central argument of the proposed framework is deeply rooted in philosophy
of time, creativity and evolution which makes moments in t0 and t1 not only
quantitatively different but also different in nature. A Bergsonian approach to these
developments is used to justify this account.
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The Impact of Time
Disintegration and integration are likely two qualitatively different phenomena,
and a relation between the two cannot be understood in symmetrical terms. It has so far
argued that actor’s decision rather than its mere subordination to process of any kind
should be given primary importance. This cognitive conduct must take into account
internal conditions, strategies of other players, and the external environment. The
decision takes place in a specific moment of time, but the whole baggage of occurrences
cumulated during this period influences the cognitive calculus. Many additional links
which emerged in that moment really show how integration issues evolved themselves,
also nonlinearly, expanding to include often non-material, non-quantitative, symbolic or
informal issues. Since decision still remains in the center, it is not routine, which makes
actors dwell in structures. An actor may be rather reluctance to disintegrate because a
rational mind is unable to visualize the matrix of payoffs.
Bergsonian “abstract time” must enter our speculations on artificial systems,
created to simplify this complex reality. This isolation is always a tendency, never a
complete picture.9 Intelligent action requires ordering the matter in a way convergent
with utilitarian purposes. But the problem here is exactly with finding out where this
utility is located. “The essence of mechanical explanation, in fact, is to regard the future
and the past as calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim that all is given. On
this hypothesis, past, present and future would be open at glance to a super-human
intellect capable of making the calculation.”10 Indeed, there is inherent Platonism in
rational thinking, with abstracts preceding real objects and movement being seen as a
9
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degradation of non-movement. The need to manipulate objects forces us to reduce quality
to quantity, time to space and exceptions to rules. Rational minds must compare the
incomparable, that is: it has to quantify qualitative differences. 11 The visible struggle of
an actor in a game to proceed with this conduct often collides with the cognitive inability
to quantify everything and come up with comparable payoff matrices. This is because the
political and social world is located somewhere on the Popperian continuum between
chaotic and deterministic systems. Modern natural sciences’ shift from Newtonian
mechanisms to quantum leaps influenced the social sciences to build on clock-like
assumptions of social interactions with proper attention paid to indeterminism and
probability of occurrences.12 If one feels that certain developments took place over time
and “behind the scenes,” uncertainty may indeed lead to paralysis of action.
Bergson was very explicit in his criticism of determinism. Just like his rejection of
mechanisms produced by intellect aimed to reveal the shortcomings of analysis deprived
from time factor, his disagreement with the teleology of final cause reinforced this
argument. If, like Leibniz claimed, things and beings fulfill a scenario already arranged,
there is nothing unforeseen and there is no room for time-induced creativity. Time
becomes obsolete when evolution is viewed as mere tendency towards perfection.13
Similarly, in the case of disintegration, if this phenomenon is viewed as lack of certain
quality experienced on the road towards greater integration, withdrawals and secessions
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are symmetric and predictable when cost-benefits analysis suggests so. But as real-world
developments show, this is usually not the case.
Evolutionary creativity embedded in time drives world developments away from
determinism but simultaneously doesn’t let them approach chaos. In fact, Bergson can be
viewed as the most philosophically robust among early 20-century evolutionary
thinkers.14 Whereas Darwinism puts the dynamics of object’s emergence in internal
relation between structure and the use of structure, for Bergson the critical role should be
assigned to vital impetus which constantly overcomes the constraints of nature. This
tendency acting through its counter-tendency cannot be fully explained with the
mechanism of natural selection. While adaptation explains sinuosity of the movement, it
fails to justify the movement itself. Like Nietzsche, Bergson is interested in activity of
life and, like Darwin, he sees developments as a future based on surpassed resources of
the past.15 “Evolution implies a real persistence of the past in the present, a duration
which is, as it were, a hyphen, a connecting link.”16 Coming back to the actual topic of
this dissertation: initial, past links agreed upon integration become trespassed over time
with rational actors existing freely and under external constraints, which have to be
overcome and which constantly shape actors’ choices. This combination of freedom and
control leads to “plastic control” in agreement with Popperian evolutionary solution.17
These insights inspired by Bergsonism should not drive the discussion away from
political reality. It is not the goal of political actors to contemplate the duration of time
metaphysically with no other purpose than pure existence. “We don't think real time. But
14
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we live it, because life transcends intellect.”18 Actors need to act, even if it means slicing
the real time into abstract fragments and viewing duration in spatial manner. However,
the whole recollection of Henri Bergson’s philosophy should justify the importance of
time and the constraints its progress puts on cognitive process. It should explain why
comparing static moments is challenging. Rational actors try to extract differences of
degree, which are measurable, but often differences in kind make this logic flawed.19 This
point will be recalled later in this dissertation, where different types of uncertainty in
game-theoretic conduct will be explained. For Bergson, it is impossible to quantify
sensation: is sadness muted mourning and happiness intensified joy? The same logic
applies to political actors’ attempted distinction between more or less costly states of the
world.20
In sum, “real duration is that duration which gnaws on things, and leaves them the
mark of its tooth. If everything is in time, everything changes inwardly, and the same
concrete reality never recurs. Repetition is therefore possible only in the abstract: what is
repeated is some aspect that our senses, and especially our intellect, have singled out
from reality, just because our action, upon which all the effort of our intellect is directed,
can move only among repetitions.”21 Cognitive processes and decisions are heavily
influenced by history, learning, problem solving and goal seeking abilities.22 The everpresent tension is between overcoming uncertainty induced by the creative evolution of
the world and actor’s limited cognitive abilities, and action set on utilitarian goals and
repetition in a simplified, abstract world.
18
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Disintegration in World Politics
This dissertation aims to challenge currently-functioning, more or less direct
accounts of disintegration. It is believed here that the lack of a general theory coupled
with unsuccessful attempts to generalize either with symmetric reversals or with orthodox
Rational Choice Theory have led to theoretical stalemate. Examining the phenomenon of
disintegration in world politics requires sensitivity to complexities combined with a
robust, formal setting.
First, considered structures include states, intergovernmental and supranational
organizations. Second, actors in disintegration games are comprised mainly of states, but
also of subnational entities and organizations themselves. The scope of “actorness” is
regulated by possession of nominal autonomy. Third, actors act in utility-maximizing
manners and, as such, they always try to visualize the payoffs matrix connected to their
choices. Fourth, while this matrix is more or less clear at the moment of integration, it is
often heavily blurred upon disintegration. Fifth, time progression leads to changes in
internal conditions, strategies and international settings. Initially-agreed issues become
trespassed, constrained, extended, transformed, and often are assumed to include nonmaterial or otherwise non-quantifiable elements. Sixth, the resulting uncertainty about
payoffs matrix makes disintegration much less likely than integration. Seventh,
disintegration is qualitatively different from integration and as such is not subject to the
same laws. The structure of this dissertation proceeds as follows.
The next and following chapter aim to propose theoretical framework for studying
disintegration, which is then applied to case studies across three structures of analysis.
Chapter II provides a detailed overview of existing accounts on disintegration. Since
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many policy opinions tend to portray the European Union as more volatile than the
integration theories would suggest, part of this chapter devotes much attention to
understanding why symmetrical reversal of these accounts cannot suffice to predict and
explain potential European disintegration. The analysis is conducted within three themes
of crucial importance: political and sovereignty-related, economic and welfare-oriented,
and the spillover and self-enforcement process. It is revealed that a process with greater
focus on unitary choices and less focus on guiding processes is better suited to explain
potential withdrawal choices; even so, the action-centrism, especially represented by
liberal intergovernmentalism, proves to suffer from its negative perception of
disintegration and thus it identifies no clear causal conditions.
The analysis of withdrawal games is an occasion to introduce Rational Choice
Theory with subsequent debates on its application scope. Accounts on exits from
international organizations often point out non-material and non-policy costs have to be
kept in mind upon disintegration. While negotiations over integration treaties can be
largely explained with game-theoretic framework due to clear bargaining points,
withdrawals are much more difficult to formalize. The extensive-game-form example
shows that non-policy costs and beliefs are critical in identifying potentially perfect
subgame Nash equilibria.
Economistic approach to secessions puts much emphasis of tradeoff between
benefits of size and costs of heterogeneity. It is revealed that one of the problems with
applicability of this account is the aggregation method which considers individuals as
unitary actors. Resulting distribution of preferences must be misleading because, for
analytical purposes, it has to be simplified to one or two dimensions. Depending on

22

assumptions, secessions are likely to appear in all equilibria of such settings. This
dissertation postulates acknowledgement of unitary representation on subnational, state
and organizational levels, so that proper politicization and negotiations may take place.
Moreover, historical context has to be studied in order to assign preferences into an order
of importance when disintegration games take place. Adding complexity should not lead
to paralysis of conduct but rather to understanding why actors experience problems with
decision-making.
Chapter III summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of disintegration accounts
pointed out in Chapter II. European integration theories acknowledge the complexities of
developments but they lack the axis around which the reversal bid would make sense.
Rational-Choice-Theoretic approach offers actor-centric and decision-centric accounts.
However, non-quantifiable factors often have to be taken into account in order to
determine equilibria of secession and withdrawal games. Adding complexities makes
these games unsolvable. Without an acknowledgment of complexities, the general
disintegration theory would share the fate of common game-theoretic accounts while an
orthodox adherence to these approaches would deprive the game of its application to
particular cases. The desired solution is thus to balance complexity with universality of
application. This quality should make the general theory sensitive to time factors. Its
progression makes payoffs matrices murky, but this uncertainty should be placed in the
center of theoretical explanation. Starting with this assumption, Chapter III scrutinizes
the main elements of the proposed theory: actors and their decisions, differences between
integration and disintegration, costs, significance of time progression and additional
links. Since problems with the quantification of payoffs structure lies in the heart of
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analysis, researchers are advised to become sensitized to these developments in recalled
Analytic Narratives fashion. Escaping this fact and adhering to orthodox formal methods
would not increase the explanatory power. The proposed conduct should analyze
moments at t0 and t1 separately with distinction over internal conditions, strategies and
international environment. The qualitative change magnified by emerging links should be
deducted and resulting research outcomes should be used to explain actors’ choices
disintegration-wise.
The following three chapters apply proposed theoretical framework to case
studies: two within each structure of analysis. Chapter IV examines disintegration choices
within the framework of the state. Montenegro’s and Quebec’s games are proposed. It is
revealed that the former case experienced many additional links emerging over time due
to largely consensual nature of Serbia’s union with Montenegro. These connections
between social, economic and political areas have a tendency to replicate and fixate
within changing internal, strategic and international conditions. This case shows how a
gradually dissolved union led to the mitigation of uncertainty of independence, with the
ultimate decision being based on a largely revealed payoffs matrix. Most importantly,
economic, security and political costs were revealed to Montenegro’s advantage.
The case of Quebec tells a different story. The foundation of union was not agreed
and subsequent concessions towards Quebeckers made them accustomed to favorable
conditions. When the confederation with Ontario was formed, there was no room for
political and social links to connect and replicate. The only real connection existed in the
economic sphere. In a sovereignty referendum, Quebec almost disintegrated and was
willing to risk bearing huge economic costs, even after international developments
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suggested these costs would be even greater. Canada understood this case post factum
and introduced additional political costs by making unilateral secession unlawful.
Chapter

V

scrutinizes

two

disintegration

games

in

intergovernmental

organizations structure area. Chilean withdrawal from the Andean Pact demonstrates how
initially-agreed integration issues became neglected by selective and particularistic
attitude of member states. These links had the potential to replicate but internalities,
strategies and international developments helped Chile to decide otherwise, thus not
letting them evolve. Upon disintegration, the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet had to
break really only one policy issue with potential consequences for non-material and
informal channels of communication with its partners. The change of quality between
integration and disintegration was constrained by a fairly short membership period, the
decisions of other players, and international developments favoring different solutions.
What is more, the payoffs matrix was strongly influenced by aggregated preferences of
non-democratic Chile.
Fiji’s contemplated exit from Pacific Islands Forum constitutes a radically
different picture. The organization was launched with the forerunner role played by a
strong Fiji, which lost its privileged position by the time of disintegration. International
conditions compelled island states to adopt open economies and the Fijian authoritarian
government relied on performance legitimacy; that is, the provision of a sense of strength
to its citizens. However, other member states of the Forum proved to be strong as well,
thus depriving Fiji of its membership status. What is more, they rejected Suva’s offer to
form alternative regional organization. Emerged links included a wide range of issues and
the initial integration themes became extended and replicated in numerous ways. In the
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end, Fiji was about to break so many ties that the potential costs of disintegration would
have been tremendous. All bids to mitigate these costs and to make payoffs matrix more
quantifiable failed and Fiji returned to democracy and full membership in the Forum.
Chapter VI looks at disintegration in the third structure of analysis: the European
Union. Since no cases of actual exit occurred by the time this dissertation was written,
Greenland had to suffice as the closest approximation of withdrawal. In formal terms, the
island indeed disintegrated, but since it was an autonomous part of Denmark, it doesn’t
meet the condition of actorness set by the framework proposed here. Nevertheless, there
were many important factors playing a role in Greenland’s exit. In general, the island’s
inhabitants did not agree to join the EC in the first place, combined with an isolated
geographical location and constrained additional links on social and symbolic levels from
emergence. The only real point of connection was constituted by economic matters,
specifically – fishing. Greenland, via Denmark, was able to secure favorable conditions
of withdrawal, even if concessions had to be made to other member states. Many
potential costs were mitigated. Politically, Greenland was still linked to Copenhagen, but
economically it still cooperated with the EC, and socially it had room to embrace its
desire for autonomy. Strategies of other actors proved to be open to negotiations and
international conditions favored self-determination. In this very specific case, with the
vast majority of variables controlled for, Greenland was able to disintegrate by weighing
its costs and benefits only in one issue area.
The case of Greece is utterly different. Time progression saw the emergence of
additional links and internal changed at strategic and international levels. Strategically,
the European Union’s bodies had much more say than during the time of Greece’s
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accession. While then the exit from the EU was not codified in the treaties at all,
currently the Lisbon Treaty allows such a possibility; however, it is the EMU-withdrawal
which interests Athens the most, and this particular case is not codified which adds
uncertainty: if one plans to exit, they must exit from the Union as a whole. Now member
states reveal much stronger attitudes than upon Greece’s accession, both fearing breaking
the taboo of withdrawal and playing the fear card with Athens. Internally, the Greek
government must provide a sense of strength to its citizens, demonstrate favorable
conditions won in negotiations, and provide traditional welfare state solutions. This fact
collides with the reality of what Athens is actually able to do. Since Greece integrated
fully with the EU, additional links emerged and replicated on virtually all possible
codified and uncodified levels. An integration scheme did not assume a monetary union
and yet this powerful “extra” developed and solidified. The payoffs structure of Greek
disintegration is highly unknown. If an exit from EMU alone is not possible, Athens will
have to “bear it all,” not knowing what “all” is.
Finally, Chapter VII provides a summary of research outcomes reached in this
dissertation. It encourages researchers to build on conclusions, to become aware of the
prospects the new theory gives, and to acknowledge the limits of its scope.
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CHAPTER II
EXISTING ACCOUNTS ON DISINTEGRATION
The discussion of prevailing trends in studies of disintegration provided in this
chapter is organized around three levels of analysis: the European Union, international
organizations and states. This particular order was chosen because available approaches
can be grouped along the spectrum of theoretical address. First, the potential breakdown
of European integration is mostly perceived as a reversal of established integration
theories. It is also comprised of loosely dispersed political analyses which are usually
rooted in historical and comparative reasoning. In other words, the general theory of
European disintegration is non-existent. Second, there is much more compromise about
how to assess disintegration of international organizations. Though not addressed directly
as an overarching theory, the existing accounts consider individual units’ decisions to
withdraw from treaty provisions and the associated exit costs. Third, the disintegration of
states has gained more theoretical attention as such. The notion of public goods provision
with constraints set by size and heterogeneity prompted scholarly discussion about
optimal secession rules or desired level of decentralization.
The overview of existing direct and indirect accounts on disintegration constitutes
a crucial step towards the search for a general theory addressing all three levels of
analysis. Approaches to European integration point out important flows and concessions,
which result in certain constraints placed on states’ individual actions. The discussion on
costs of exit from international organizations adds game-theoretic and decision-theoretic
rigor, allowing for the model’s further formalization. Finally, an economistic approach to
optimal state size deals not only with individual unit’s decision to secede but also looks at
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the broader picture, namely: what does a decision to seceded mean for the parent-state
unit and subnational unit respectively.

The European Union
Virtually every crisis faced by the European Union has resulted in raised concerns
about the survivability of this particular integration project. The theoretical spectrum
stretching from neorealism to neofunctionalism offers various explanations of
troublesome occurrences and their respective impacts. Similarly, political analyses
unaffiliated with mainstream integration approaches provide their own conclusions.
The Eurozone crisis, which started in the late first decade of 2000s, was
prevailingly attributed to mismanaged integration projects with a monetary union being
adopted far too soon and before full implementation of political and financial union.
Many political analysts suggested that the crisis may become a harbinger of the
integration project’s failure. Historical comparisons to the economic collapse of the
1930s predicted the rise of political extremism, erosion of democracy, a rise of populist
parties and general social unrest.1 Others perceived the crisis as a spur for member states
to rethink and possibly renegotiate certain arrangements including the euro, energy
market, free movement of persons, and leadership.2 The logic of interstate bargaining
points out that negotiated terms of the monetary union have been, from the very
beginning, set by Germany and that the outcome of this bargaining was failure-inducing
since no provisions were made for fiscal transfers or bailouts among European states.
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Germany’s goal to establish the European Central Bank, which would be more
independent that Bundesbank, was not met and the adoption of euro kept imposing high
risk on European governments.
Just like in the case of previous crises, the European project seems to have
adapted and survived. The reason would be that even though certain developments are
perceived unbeneficial by the member states, an overall goal of maintaining economic
cooperation is prevailing.

An ultimate exit from the European Union and its

disintegration are therefore unlikely.3
Established theories of European integration don’t address disintegration directly.
One can thus assume that potential dissolution of the European Union may occur if some
of the integration-inducing factors pointed out in theories were non-existent. Theorizing
about European disintegration must, for now, be qualitatively symmetrical to integration:
it must assume its reversal. This fact does, however, pose a serious problem:
disintegration of the European Union did not occur even though integration theories in
some instances would suggest this happening.
Three major themes of crucial importance are addressed by integration theories.
They are the most salient for integration and thus, if violated, they should become the
spur for break-up. The first sphere is political and sovereignty-related. Member states are
said to either delegate some portion of their autonomy to supranational institutions in
negotiation rounds or to lose control over integration process as such. In economic and
welfare-related areas, the pressure issued by domestic constituents can compel
governments to pursue more or less integration. On the other hand, the multiplicity of
transactions and the depth of interdependence can seriously constrain member states’
3
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freedom of action. The third sphere assumes spillover or self-enforcing mechanisms in
general. The integration process can be more or less automatic and path-dependent.
Disintegration may follow if self-enforcing mechanism stops working or, quite contrarily,
if European decision-makers put too much emphasis on process rather than outcomes.4
All three spheres are interconnected and cannot function separately.
Sovereignty is critical and probably the most debated issue in integration studies.
Different branches of federalism considered different speeds of nation-states’
subordination to the higher federal authority, but they all believed this process was
necessary and inherently political rather than economic.5 Straightforwardly, the European
project could clash if states failed to establish and obey federal authority. On the other
side of the spectrum, early functionalists led by David Mitrany assumed that states are
not able to politically maximize peoples’ welfare. Instead of leaving integration in charge
of states, functionalism advocated for proliferation of task-oriented organizations. Human
needs served in some issue areas should take over the causal mechanism and induce
spillover to different spheres. The process of integration should then rely on departure
from statehood.6 With nation-states playing pivotal roles and without the loyalty shift
away from governments, integration could not proceed.
As we know today, both accounts failed to explain reality and to influence actual
developments. European Communities did not collapse even though partner states lacked
political will to form a federation on the one hand, and politicization followed deepening
unity against functional premises on the other. The sphere of sovereignty and politics
4
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remains nevertheless salient. States may not need to negotiate federation in order to push
the European project forward, but any bargaining clash may theoretically provoke
disintegration. Similarly, abandonment of statehood may not be a condition for
integration but supranational institutions may be more fitted to govern in some issue
areas while nation-states remain active in other, depending on the level of transnational
exchange taking place. Either the following statement or its opposite represents the
modern understanding of European integration: “the distribution of preferences and the
conduct of bargaining among the governments of the member states broadly explain the
nature, pace, and scope of integration, and neither supranational organizations nor
transnational actors generate political processes or outcomes of seminal importance.”7
For neofunctionalists, the self-sustaining process of institutionalization makes
member states’ governments become locked within dense rules which need supranational
clarifications. Since the domain of transnational exchange expanded, the need for
European-level decision-making revealed costs of maintaining national rules that pushed
states to integrate. Limited capacity of response to pressures created by growing
transnational exchange, ambiguity and emergence of European-level institutions make
disintegration very improbable. The potential mechanism responsible for a reversal
process would be decline in transnational exchange and trans-societal links coupled with
demise of supranational bodies. States no longer need to disappear and peoples’ loyalties
don’t need to shift away from their respective nation-states.8 Interestingly, these premises
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allow the European Union to exist even while Euroscepticism is present among citizens
of the member states.9
The big question is then what other easily measurable factors exist to forecast the
growing peril of disintegration. For sure, the rise of nationalisms and non-compliance
with supranational rules should be harbingers of declining trans-societal links and the
erosion of European institutions. Retrenchment of nation-states resulting from
domestically and internationally-induced preferences may thus lead to the disintegration
of the European Union. The example of France in 1960s proved, however, that the
European project has been somehow crisis-resilient. The fact that integration sometimes
slows down and does not reverse apparently reinforces the statement that theories of
integration should be used only to explain this particular phenomenon but not
disintegration.
On the other hand, states may simply have much more freedom of action than
neofunctionalism attributes them. It is probably more compelling to repeat after liberal
intergovernmentalism

and

complex

interdependence

that

states

are

virtually

unconstrained but still tend to comply with their domestic and international pressures.10
In other words integration has always been in member states’ long-term economic and
geopolitical interest even if short-term adjustment costs sometimes overshadow these
calculations.11 Andrew Moravcsik puts great emphasis on individual states’ perception of
costs and benefits resulting from integration. They derive from domestic conditions and
9
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international developments and by necessity are country-specific, which is reflected in
different national interests and bargaining power. There is potentially room for
governments to pursue their own policies - not necessarily converging with greater
integration scheme. However, to date, crises faced by the European Union proved to
strengthen rather than weaken cooperation. Interdependence limits states from pursuing
isolationist policies12 and states seek technocratic coordination, planning, and more
credible commitments.13
Negotiated transfer of sovereignty is more suited than neofunctional reasoning to
explain why the European project proved to be crisis-resilient. But liberal
intergovernmentalism is still a theory of integration. It thus shows an uneven path
towards greater cooperation with stalemates and steps back being parts of the process. It
is doubtful that the theory would be able to identify a disintegration-inducing factor
without confusing it with an element of a winding integration path.
The economic sphere is strongly tied to political and sovereignty-related areas.
First, the European project started as a customs union and the common market for coal
and steel. Supranationalism was from the very beginning the crucial element of
management. Second, cooperation developed most rapidly in single market and related
areas. Member states found it beneficial to remove barriers for trade and transactions
resulting from sovereign privileges. Third, economic and welfare-related motives are
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virtually the most salient for citizens and thus influence heavily preference formation on
the national level.14
The importance of economically significant areas of low politics relied, according
to Haas, on their ability to induce functional pressure. People perceive the improvement
of their wellbeing and want to secure it by growing demand for institutionalization. The
pressure thus starts from economic sphere and spills over to political area.15 Regardless of
whether citizens shift their loyalties to the new supranational level of governance or not,
the salience of the economic area is profound.16 This reasoning suggests that as long as
supranational institutions meet their performance criteria in managing economically
significant areas, disintegration is virtually impossible.17
Not only does neofunctional spillover assure the importance of the economic
sphere,

but,

together

with

geopolitics,

this

area

is

considered

by

liberal

intergovernmentalism the main source of preferences in European integration. The logic
lies in the transmission of externalities via international markets and to mutual benefits.
Positions taken by individual countries vary by issue: states tend to favor liberalization in
agriculture and trade, while in monetary policy the conflict between strong and weakcurrency countries seems to play an important role. Moravcsik suggests that over time
and due to rising interdependence, trade liberalization and exchange-rate stabilization
should strengthen.18 National interests result from state-society relations and as such may
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theoretically grow profoundly differently among member states. If this becomes true
especially for France and Germany, the European Union could disintegrate. However, it
has to be remembered that economic interdependence makes isolationist policies
unbeneficial for nation-states and therefore the total dissolution of European economic
cooperation is virtually impossible. What might happen is reduction of integration back
to a free market area. Liberal intergovernmentalism as a positive theory of integration
couldn’t however assess this phenomenon as disintegration but rather would hope for
increased cooperation to reemerge after these turbulence-induced adjustments were
implemented.
The spillover in particular or the question of automatism in general constitutes the
third

sphere

addressed

by

European

integration

theories.

For

liberal

intergovernmentalism, there is nothing automatic in integration apart from preferences
and relative power which determine member states’ bargaining position. In the long term,
integration is perceived as being beneficial and therefore the constant leaning towards
greater cooperation can be assumed. Neofunctionalism puts much greater emphasis on
automatism of spillover mechanism, suggesting that national governments gradually lose
control over this process and aren’t able to reverse it without serious harm to prosperity
and wealth generation.19 “The European Union becomes enmeshed in domestic
politics.”20
Automatism as a necessary condition for integration is a dangerous assumption. It
adds unnecessary brittleness to the mechanism of integration and suggests that a theory
can assess disintegration as well. It can thus make supranational officials indifferent to
19
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preferences of individual member states by focusing on concepts rather than real
performance. The introduction of the euro is usually pointed out as an example of such
policies. As a result, the euro crisis has been named, probably prematurely, a harbinger of
the European Union’s collapse. This case demonstrates that disintegration needs separate
theoretical account from integration theories, especially from neofunctional account.
The problem with the application of theories of European integration to
disintegration is that the latter can in fact be qualitatively different from the former.
Intergovernmental and neofunctional theoretical families seem to have built much on
Lakatosian auxiliary hypotheses in defense of their “hard cores” and both of them are
able to explain integration quite well. The failure to predict or assess disintegration
should not be perceived as falsification of either theoretical branch but rather should
point to the direction of positive theoretical assessment of disintegration.

Intergovernmental Organizations
States enter international treaties in order to secure gains from cooperation.
Theoretically, small states should join more organizations because by doing so they
access certain public goods produced internally by larger states. As Thomas J. Miles and
Eric A. Posner show, this is not necessarily the case. What is more, the membership
sponsored by the United Nations regime assumes universal participation regardless of
country size.21 The question of treaty-entering is challenging for purely rational-choice
analysis, and so is the topic of member states’ withdrawals.
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Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore name two broad theoretical
approaches to international organizations. The economistic approach highlights issues of
rationality, efficiency and competitive environment. Neorealism and neoliberalism
generally follow economistic reasoning, viewing organizations as instruments to serve
member states. In regimes theory, organizations can play the role of intervening
variables, influencing the opportunities and constrains structure. The second approach is
sociological and points out the possible non-materiality of interests, cultural forces,
legitimacy, categories creation and meanings fixation.22
The authors’ interest in the puzzling phenomenon of international organizations’
dysfunctional performance and straying from efficiency goals is crucial for assessing the
problem of disintegration. Barnett and Finnemore noticed that in spite of sometimes clear
materialistic inefficiency, many organizations continue to function and member states
keep dwelling within. They give an example of multilateralism which, though not
completely efficient, gained much legitimacy and as such provides rationale for
cooperation. In the vein of culturalism, international organizations can mirror and
reproduce certain contradictions or develop routinized behavior even if it leads to
dysfunctional performance.23 Even economistic explanations provide some room for
dysfunction; however, in this case, withdrawal of member states should be more
common. Thus if international organizations cease to respond to interests of their
members or competition over material resources takes place, the cooperation should
disappear.24
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While the first part of this chapter aimed to show that an understanding of
integration mechanisms is not sufficient to theorize about disintegration, this section
strives to demonstrate that up-to-date assessments of withdrawal from international
organizations leaves more questions than answers. Here, a similar fallacy is revealed and
it lies in symmetric reasoning. Treaty-formation accounts are usually useful to explain
why states decide to participate in international organizations, especially those of
economistic profiles. Their shortcomings are, however, revealed when withdrawal is
debated. When pivotal variables by necessity become qualitative, the rational choice
reasoning shows its limits.
The great body of literature on withdrawal from intergovernmental organizations
uses game-theoretic framework. The notions of exit costs, secured right to withdrawal,
and threat of suspending cooperation are thus understood as elements of a strategy in
which the maximization of member states’ utility is at stake. Game-theoretic depiction in
the case of treaty-entering is quite straightforward but becomes more challenging when
withdrawal is considered. There are thus certain elements of these exit games which are
easy to include. However, the problem with inclusion of other vital elements makes
rational-choice framework too weak to predict when states decide to disintegrate from
intergovernmental organizations.
The elements of exit and negotiation games can belong to one of two categories.
First, some of them make a game both depictive and solvable. Their usefulness relies
mainly on prediction and as such helps to construct a broader theory. Second, some of the
elements force a game to become mere depiction. Due to their elusiveness, a game is
insolvable. The first category includes elements as incentives for integration, veto power
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of negotiation partners and policy-related gains and losses. The second category includes
the value of outside options, uncertainty, cognitive limits of actors, learning process,
formal treaty provisions including withdrawal clauses and non-policy-related payoffs.
In spite of its simplicity25 unidimensional space of single-peaked preferences
helps to visualize and even solve negotiation games. Figure 1 shows both the situation
where states will enter a treaty and the one where compromise is not possible. The
unidimensional space can represent either a general integration project or issue-specific
international organization.

Figure 1: Unidimensional Negotiation Game

The upper axis shows a situation where countries A and B have not yet entered
into treaty and thus status quo equals 0. State A desires preference point 0.3, whereas
25
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state B prefers 0.9. The increment value is 0.1. Because country A is distanced from its
ideal position by 3 points, it is better off negotiating entering into treaty with country B.
Any place between 0.1 and 0.5 is more valuable for state A than the current status quo
and thus the equilibrium point could be established on 0.5. This is the maximum the
country B can obtain through negotiations and the greatest concession that state A can
give. In the lower axis country A is distanced from its ideal location by 2 points. It would
like to decrease the distance, whereas state B would prefer anything above the status quo.
Here compromise and treaty entrance is not possible.
Once again, this setting makes sense when an organizational foundation is
considered. The upper axis could theoretically be used for renegotiation of treaties and
subsequent amendment of existing compromise. But the lower axis poses some problems.
If the compromise is not possible, the existing treaty might be terminated by exercise of
an actor’s veto power,26 thus leading to disintegration. Here the unidimensional
simplification reveals its limits because there are many additional variables to be
considered upon an organization’s dissolution.
The policy-related outcomes of the presented bargaining game may look as
follows. If, for example, states A and B in the upper space of Figure 1 agreed to enact a
treaty based on point 0.5, state A would lose potential 2 points of distance from its ideal
position, limiting however the total distance from 3 to 2 points with the balance equaling
1 point of gain. If, on the other hand, they agreed to locate the outcome on state A’s
preferred position 0.3, state B would lose 2 points belonging to bargaining range but it

26
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would gain 3 points. If we consider the lower space of Figure 1 to be a renegotiation
scheme for an existing treaty, due to lack of agreement the international organization
becomes resolved: status quo is pushed back to 0 point. State A would gain 1 point and
state B would lose 3 points, thus bearing the costs of disintegration. These policy-related
costs of both successful and unsuccessful negotiations are easily extractable but they
don’t constitute the full picture.
The second category of elements of exit and negotiation games undermines
straightforwardness of game-theoretic framework. Defenders of rational choice approach
could object, claiming that there is nothing innovative in pointing once again to
uncertainty, cognitive limits and the learning process as challenges to the game-theoretic
reasoning. The debate between different methods’ defenders and its contestants is indeed
ongoing27 and it is not the role of this dissertation to support either side. However, these
arguments coupled with importance of unquantifiable outside options, non-policy-related
and reputational loses make the Rational-Choice-Theoretic approach to disintegration
flawed.
The illustrative example is John Slapin’s extensive-form-game framework
showing under what conditions withdrawal from international organizations may occur in
equilibria.28
In this game state 1 is agenda-setter, desiring greater policy change or integration
(position I). State 2 responds to the initial move with its preferences being set at point L
27
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(laggard position). In unidimensional space I > L > SQ so even a laggard position favors
greater integration than the current status quo. In addition 2*|L-SQ| < |I-SQ|. In its first
move state 1 decides whether to initiate Voice Regime or Exit-Exclusion Regime action.
The former empowers both states with veto rights. Payoffs picture respective policy
losses associated with the distance from ideal points. The discount factor δ represents the
importance of maintaining the regime while z pictures each player’s beliefs about future
losses associated with this agreement. If state 2 doesn’t accept the Voice Regime
proposal, both players bear the non-policy costs C2 and C1 respectively.
By initiating the Exit-Exclusion Regime move, state 1 tries to obtain its ideal point
I and restrict state 2 from exercising veto power. If state 2 doesn’t agree and demands
veto, state 1 responds with either upholding its initial position or backing down. The
former move may be understood as exclusion threat towards player 2, the latter action
upon state 2’s acceptance leads to Voice Regime solution. Slapin considers this subgame
to apply only to the current negotiations and therefore costs associated with the future are
not included. Table 1 summarizes five possible subgame perfect equilibria,29 depending
on underlying conditions.
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State 1

State 2

Equilibrium 1

Voice Regime, Back
Down

Accept, Demand Voice, Accept’’,
Exit’’

Equilibrium 2

Voice Regime, Back
Down

Accept, Demand Voice, Exit’ ,Exit’’

Equilibrium 3
Equilibrium 4
Equilibrium 5

Voice Regime, Stand
Firm
Exit Regime, Stand
Firm
Exit Regime, Stand
Firm

Accept, Demand Voice, Exit’, Exit’’
Accept, Accept’, Accept’’, Accept’’’
Accept, Demand Voice, Accept’’,
Accept’’’

Table 1: Equilibria in the Voice-Exit Game30

Conditions
|I −L|>C2
>L+δ2z2,
and C2 >L,
and C1>|I −2L|
L+δ2z2< C2 < L,
and C1>|I
−2L|+δ1z1
L+δ2z2< C2 < L,
and C1>|I
−2L|+δ1z1
C2 >|I–L| ,
and C2>L+δ2z2
C2 >|I–L| ,
and C2>L+δ2z2

Withdrawal from an organization is a viable choice taken by state 2 in equilibrium
1, 2 and 3. In the first setting, costs C1 are greater than |I-2L|, therefore state 1 will back
down if state 2 demands voice in Exit-Exclusion Regime. If discount factor δ1 = 0 and z1
< 0 state 1 will chose to initiate Voice Regime. In the second and third equilibrium state, 1
initiates Voice Regime to avoid costs C1 which are greater than the outcome |I −2L|+δ1z1.
In the fourth and fifth subgame, equilibrium costs C2 are so magnificent that player 2
accepts every offer. State 1 initiates Exit-Exclusion Regime and holds on to its offer
throughout the game. Exit from Voice Regime is never a part of subgame equilibrium,
while withdrawal from Exit-Exclusion Regime becomes part of equilibrium when nonpolicy costs for state 2 are either smaller than difference between state 1’s and state 2’s
ideal points (equilibrium 1) or smaller than state 2’s preferred position (equilibria 2 and
3).
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The framework illustrates dilemmas of partners renegotiating treaties and captures
the logic behind motives of disintegration. It is, however, hardly applicable to real-world
problems. Non-policy costs C1 and C2 play pivotal roles in determining conditions for the
choice of strategy which falls within a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The same
problem applies to factor δ (discount coefficient for further cooperation) and z (belief in
future losses resulting from the agreement). These elements are qualitatively different
from policy-related outcomes (L, I and their difference) and it is virtually impossible to
locate them on the same unidimensional space in order to solve inequalities laid down in
conditions for each setting.31
To be sure, non-policy-related costs are also difficult to identify for states
themselves. Signatories of treaties usually try to raise C factor artificially by imposing
various legal clauses. Violation of these provisions equals a breach of international law
and thus brings about costs imposed by mechanisms of reciprocity, retaliation and
reputation.32
The discount coefficient for further cooperation may result from changes in the
bargaining power of treaty partners. If a state observes the rise of its significance in the
international system, it can conclude that current agreements provide fewer benefits than
those available under new circumstances. Flexibility mechanisms used upon construction
of treaties are designed to deal with uncertainty about the state of the world.
Consequently, exit clauses aim to reduce this uncertainty when an arrangement proves
not to be Pareto-improving. What is more, member states can use designated tools to
31
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temporarily escape the burden of cooperation if domestic uncertainties are salient. 33
Countries also update their information about the state of the world and adjust existing
agreements accordingly.34
In an ideal world, this mechanism should lead to Pareto-satisfying outcomes, but
the truth about the cognitive limitations of actors seems to play an important role. Yoram
Z. Haftel and Alexander Thompson analyze bilateral investment treaties and show that
many developing countries tended to enter these agreements hastily, without thorough
assessment of implications and understanding of costs/benefits interplay. These
limitations are usually mitigated by learning processes and renegotiation schemes.35 The
probit models introduced by the authors show high significance of time’s positive impact
on odds of renegotiation. Given the difficulty with assessing δ factor, one can assume that
time itself could be used as a strong predictor. Furthermore, the declining gap between
the economic development of member states increases the chances of renegotiating a
treaty. This finding confirms the significance of bargaining power factor and the
abovementioned z coefficient.36
For now, the discussion on disintegration from intergovernmental organizations
leads to three main conclusions. First, states may disregard further cooperation if they
believe that their “outside options” change. They can notice when their own position in
the international system changes or when their domestic pressures rise. The two-level
game framework is in play here. Second, they may become convinced that future losses
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from cooperation exceed benefits when their bargaining power improves. If the factor is
sufficiently strong, states may decide to push for renegotiation or withdraw in pursuit of
more Pareto-improving solutions. Third, costs not associated with issue-specific roles of
an intergovernmental organization may assume reputation, reciprocity and retaliation if
the exit provisions are violated. When it comes to reputation, “if a state fails to comply
with its treaty commitments, other states will be reluctant to enter into future agreements
with that state or will demand additional assurances or concessions before doing so.”37
Costs will also most probably include the breakage of existing additional links developed
during cooperation such as monitoring, consultation or information-sharing.

States
So far, the proposed accounts on disintegration in the European Union sphere as
well as intergovernmental organizations area reveal the shortcomings of perceiving this
phenomenon as symmetrical to the integration processes. While the former calls for
general revision and qualitative change, the latter needs inclusion and assessment of
many crucial variables. Since the existing accounts on the break-up of states are deeply
rooted in rational-choice and economistic reasoning38 the problem with these approaches
lies, just like in the case of intergovernmental organizations, in oversimplification that
undermines the predictive power of these theories. It is difficult to understand why states
disintegrate if crucial political and systemic factors are not included.39
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Drawing an analogy from accounts of intergovernmental organizations, states can
be understood as union of thousands or millions of units (citizens) without veto power.
That is, they have to comply with the central government’s provisions even if it
contradicts their immediate interests. Secession would occur if a group of citizens
decided to leave the union and form its own country in search for better provision of
public goods. The reality reveals however that separatisms are rather unusual and lastresort solutions to bargaining problems. Variables like cyclic elections, international
system’s configuration, emigration, autonomy, trade unions’ activity or patriotism are
only the few among wide range of factors that undermine straightforwardness of
economistic account.
In its simplest form, a state can be understood as the product of a tradeoff between
the heterogeneity of peoples’ preferences and the benefits of size. Given that
governments decide upon certain schemes of public goods provision, there is potentially
a higher number of dissatisfied individuals or regions. Benefits include more taxpayers
and thus smaller per capita expenses of public goods provision. The tradeoff and resulting
equilibrium are based solely on economic efficiency and the “size of the pie” reasoning.
If this situation is presented on unidimensional, single-peaked preferences space, every
citizen is located somewhere within the range of possible policy outcomes. Depending on
respective government’s position, residents bear the disutility cost resulting from a
distance from their ideal points and this position. If a country breaks into several
independent entities, this interval becomes divided respectively.
In sum, there are two main groups of factors playing a role in secession games:
benefits of size and costs of heterogeneity. Both of them include quantifiable variables
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but also unquantifiable ones. Considering the former makes it possible to solve the games
but yet again, without including the latter, one cannot get the full picture of the logic of
disintegration. Variables interconnected with benefits of size encompass, for example,
trade openness, tax rates and resulting wealth accumulation, costs of public goods
provision and various political costs. On the costs side, variables include income
inequality, tax burden imposed on citizens, cultural heterogeneity, and redistributive
schemes. This setup can be implemented as a game with one or more stages, with the
possible role of uncertainty and Bayesian logic introduced.
It can be assumed that in a world of trade protectionism, larger states have better
conditions for wealth accumulation and the subsequent provision of public goods for their
citizens. The main reasons lie in higher tax revenues and access to resources. It is also
fair to assume also that certain political costs remain more or less the same, regardless of
state’s size: that is, every independent country has to bear the costs of government
formation and maintenance. It is logically easier for bigger states to overcome these costs
as decision-makers have more revenue at their disposal. If two independent states
contemplate unification, they must weigh the joint exploitation of economies of scale in
provision of government against the costs of weaker political influence of their citizens in
newly unified state. Turning this statement around, a secessionist region will increase the
policy-making-related payoffs of its population but will have to bear the costs of
government formation on its own. The implication of these assumptions is that gains
from unification increase for small regions and decrease for large regions as the small
region becomes smaller. Unification occurs thus only if costs of government are high and
regions are about the same size. What is more, due to political gains’ reliance on
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government’s location, if preferences are clustered around median voters in large regions,
its citizens will be eager to form union. The reverse is true for residents of small regions
if their preferences are not dispersed.40 At some point, the growing cooperation among
regions induced by high government costs may outweigh secession incentives. Thus,
separation can be prevented if cooperation results in positive gains and if an allocation
mechanism assures proper distribution of these gains.41
The costs of government formation and maintenance may obviously not be
constant for every state. The differences may lie in the type and nature of political system
(republic versus monarchy, democracy versus authoritarianism) or in the size of
administration, which should be greater for big and territorially extensive states. Another
problem is with assuming the world of trade protectionism, which does not hold today, if
taking into account ongoing globalization and economic interdependence.
Adding trade openness modifies the benefits side of the equation to the point
where the advantages of state size are minimal. If resources can be imported and some
public goods can be contracted with other states,42 more and more groups of citizens
should demand separation in order to maximize their policy-related utilities. Indeed,
certain scholars have pointed out the positive correlation between economic integration
and political disintegration, since “the size of the market influences productivity. In a
world of trade restrictions, the political boundaries of a country influence the size of the
country's market, and therefore its productivity level. On the contrary, with free trade, the
40
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size of countries is irrelevant for the size of markets, so the size of a country is unrelated
to its productivity.”43 But this reasoning faces serious empirical challenges. One can
perceive the European Union as an economically integrated area with no trade barriers,
an unconstrained flow of people and capital, with public goods of human rights, currency,
citizenship and even defense provided externally for the member states. Yet the outbreak
of separatisms has not followed. Ironically, the most serious separatist attempt – the
Scottish referendum in September 2014 - occurred within the sphere excluded from
Schengen area and the Eurozone.
Even though the benefits of size may diminish with trade openness, people don’t
necessarily strive to redesign the unidimensional preferences space in their favor by
seceding. One reason is that there may exist additional constrains such as a constitutional
setting imposed by a parent-state or international instrument of recognition.44 The other
reason lies in the unidimensionality of preferences space itself. It is virtually never the
case that only one public good is decisive when secession is contemplated. Citizens may
thus feel that a sense of national pride and cultural identity will be better provided when
they secede from a parent-state, but economic viability of their newly independent
country will be questionable. Or they can feel economically ready to secede, but concerns
may arise around post-secession security issues.45
The introduction of two public goods to this economistic model is sufficient to
seriously change the whole picture. Incentives for secession can often be successfully
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mitigated if a union of states decides to provide two public goods within one country,
even if these two states differ in size.46 The introduction of additional dimensions adds
complexity to the model and doesn’t help much in assessing the nature of separatisms.
Reaching the point where either games are too complex to be solved or unification results
as an outcome in all equilibria is unhelpful and disappointing. One of the solutions to this
problem could be focusing on particular cases rather than abstract models: on specific
situations and concrete public goods.47
The second main group of factors playing role in secession games includes
heterogeneity: tax, income and cultural, and redistribution schemes aiming to directly
mitigate cost-inducing properties of heterogeneity. One can picture heterogeneity as a
dispersion of preference points along unidimensional space. It is easier for a central
government to introduce certain policies when ideal points of its citizens are clustered
around some median. However, this is rarely the case. The question here is once again:
what policy or public good provision do we have in mind? Moreover, taxes and income
redistribution are easily measurable but implications of cultural fragmentation are rather
unclear.
Central governments are in power to redistribute income financed by tax schemes
chosen through voting with equilibrium determined by the median voter. The logic of
separation is to allow for redistribution policy closer to voters’ preferences. It thus applies
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to cases where rich regions don’t want to pay transfers to poorer regions. 48 If we consider
two regions united within one country, a tax rate scheme is preferred by unified nation’s
median voter. If an agent receives a higher payoff from income in a potentially
independent region than in a unified country, then it will support secession. In other
words, all agents with income above the median in a region will favor independence.
Separation appears in equilibrium when the median voter in a region prefers
redistribution policy after secession. The problem with this kind of model is that if there
are no efficiency losses, and even when there are no transfers between regions, separation
will always occur in equilibrium.49 The picture is thus incomplete and it is useful to
enrich it with costs of provision and government-society relations, including the
composition of a ruling coalition.50
The inclusion of cultural heterogeneity into an economistic model can take the
form of a discount factor that diminishes the utility a particular citizen obtained from
private consumption and provision of a public good. The level of consumption is
obviously determined by tax rate and satisfaction with governmental provisions is
determined by the distance on preferences space.51 Empowering cultural heterogeneity
with a property to decrease citizens’ utility is a way to include this rather unquantifiable
factor into economistic equation. However, even though a negative correlation between
these two can be intuitively assumed, it is hard to say how strong this relation is and
whether it demonstrates linear properties. Since the cost of cultural heterogeneity is
48
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usually different for agents living in different regions of the same country, “finding the
preferred tax rate of a coalition of regions forming a country becomes more laborious
than just finding the preferred tax rate of the median income agent.”52
Presented approaches to the heterogeneity/benefits of size setup have their
culmination in an actual game where two partners negotiate entering and remaining
within a union. Enriched by a Bayesian updating of beliefs, the game constructed by
Massimo Bordignon and Sandro Brusco aims to approach the nature of political
contracts. The logic is largely similar to that of the intergovernmental bargaining process.
In the first period of a two-stage game, the federation is either formed or not
formed by two countries. They thus may decide to jointly produce a public good without
knowing what their preferences would be about this production in the second stage. In
order to mitigate this uncertainty, authors introduce utility enjoyed by countries in the
first stage, which is an increasing function of the probability that the federation would
last. Upon the first period’s agreement, countries decide whether they constitutionally
allow secession or not. This provision has a direct impact on exit costs. In the second
stage, the state of the world is revealed either to both countries or just to one of them. If
renegotiation is allowed, partners may decide to rewrite the constitution and amend
income redistribution rules or secession provisions. Both countries then decide whether to
comply with second stage’s developments or to exit cooperation, with specific payoffs
assigned to each of these outcomes.53
Under complete information and no renegotiation clauses, federation constitutions
should contain provisions assuring some positive benefits from duration. These should be
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able to mitigate ex post participation constraints resulting from the revealed state of the
world. The example given by the authors assumes transfers made to the disadvantaged
partner. If the revealed state of the world is unbeneficial for both states, the optimal
constitutional design may involve a secession clause. If renegotiation is allowed, in order
for a federal constitution to matter, it has to assume certain situations which cannot be
modified even under the lack of ex post optimality. In other case, if the state of the world
is unbeneficial for both partners, it is not possible for countries to credibly commit to
maintain the federation. On the other hand, if the state of the world is beneficial for only
one country, the net social utility minus transfer costs for that country must be higher
than the net social utility of dissolving the federation: the transfer received by the
disadvantaged country. Authors find that, in general, the renegotiation mechanism
“reduces the set of states in which the federation can be maintained”. The asymmetric
information setup assumes that the countries may lie about the true state of the world in
order to affect constitutional rules to their advantage. According to the Bayesian
revelation game, partners have incentive to declare the truth given that they expect others
to do the same. There is no incentive to pretend that a country’s state of the world is
beneficial if it isn’t, simply because it would have to pay taxes rather than receive
subsidies. Authors prove that a modification of transfer schemes is unfeasible for
changing incentives to lie, with limitation of secession rules being probably the only
useful provision to keep the federation alive.54
This particular implementation of the economistic setup has certain important
contributions. It can be used to assess dynamics of renegotiation between subnational
entities and parent-states. The Bayesian process can account for the international
54
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system’s dynamics perceived by both players. It also touches upon domestic conditions
determining transfers of revenues. Finally, it concludes that constitutional provisions are
pivotal in maintaining the union of states, which can be confirmed by the cases of
Catalonia or Quebec. The shortcomings of this implementation are, however, too vast to
successfully use as a predictive tool. First, there is a problem with the assessment of exit
costs, already explained in detail in the previous section. Second, considering only one,
abstract public good does not help to reveal all of the actors’ motives. Third, it is difficult
to assume that the state of the world is unknown to one of the players in the era of
globalization and information abundance. It is more important to look at the cases where
both players face some crisis and how the assumption about non-credibility of
commitments converges with real-world data.
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CHAPTER III
TOWARDS THE GENERAL THEORY OF DISINTEGRATION
The overview of existing accounts on disintegration reveal the strengths and
weaknesses of each approach within its respective level of analysis. We have thus come
through the virtual nonexistence of European disintegration theory, apart from treating
this phenomenon as symmetrical to integration, through Rational-Choice-Theoretic
accounts on exits from international organizations, and finally through the economistic
approach to secessions. The universal account on disintegration applicable to all three
levels of analysis should build on the strengths of these approaches while simultaneously
improving certain flaws they reproduce. It would thus be fair to ask what mixture of these
existing accounts provides the best theoretical solution to the phenomenon of
disintegration.
European integration theories seem to be well-fit to deal with complexity, but as
positive approaches to integration, they are unable to identify the reverse process without
attributing emerging factors to the winding path towards greater integration. If diverging
interests and preferences of the member states may in fact lead to greater integration
rather than disintegration, then there is some qualitative change and asymmetry taking
place in relation to the initial, bargaining-related spur for integration. If disintegration can
be provoked by a decrease in transnational exchanges and interdependence, as liberal
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism seem to imply, both accounts lack the tools
to identify these changes and turning these approaches around does not provide much
help.
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Whereas integration theories are successful in including complexity of
occurrences, approaches to withdrawals and secessions are not. Unquantifiable and
qualitative variables are crucial and appear in equilibria of withdrawal games. Non-policy
costs, discount for further cooperation, the value of an “outside option” and belief in
losses all seem to make disintegration murky and unapproachable. All these factors make
a game-theoretic framework in particular and rational-choice reasoning in general short
of predictive power to approach disintegration. Here, complexity leads to virtual paralysis
of conduct. The economistic approach to separatisms replicates and magnifies the
problems of this logic by acknowledging the plethora of additional dimensions which
have to be considered. Apart from facing serious empirical challenges, economistic
accounts on disintegration lead to theoretical controversies such as whether separation or
union always result in equilibria when complexity and more public goods are considered.
A universal disintegration theory should therefore put complexity in the heart of
its analysis while simultaneously building on what withdrawal and secession games have
to offer: parsimony and methodological neatness. The level of parsimony has to be
balanced with the depth of possible data-gathering and general knowledge about this
phenomenon.1 Disintegration cases across three levels of analysis are not the same and
subject to identical laws. By using a general theory of disintegration, researchers should
be able to put particular cases in a general background and pay attention to crucial
variables, thus avoiding risky or simplistic statements.
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Figure 2: Meeting Explanation and Theorizing Powers on Complexity / Non-Universality
Spectrum of Approaches to Disintegration

Figure 2 shows schematically the state of research on disintegration. Quadrant I
groups narrative, historical or sociological accounts, which have strong explanations to
particular events but lack universal applicability. Integration theories, or rather their
reversals, can largely explain what happened post factum but lack a theoretical basis to
tackle the disintegration phenomenon as a whole. Quantile II is an area to avoid because
complexity and universality hardly ever come in pair. Too much theory produces too
little explanation. Quadrant III groups game-theoretic accounts which are parsimonious
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and neat but their ability to explain particular cases is limited, sacrificed for replicability.
Rising complexity improves explanation power but reduces universal application. Finally
Quadrant IV is another area which should be avoided. It includes approaches which are
largely non-theoretical, simple and well-fit to explain particular cases. The intercept of
both slopes indicates the most promising goal to be pursued by disintegration researchers.
Even though theorizing power declines with growing non-universality, just enough
amounts of complexity and learning from game-theoretic replication power can drive
researchers towards improved explanation and “just enough” theory.
What approaches to integration, secessions and withdrawals have in common is
the general framework which considers actors and their respective decisions resulting
from perception of available benefits. Withdrawal and secession games picture unitary
players who may be constrained by the strategies of others, the amount of information
available, and beliefs and resource endowment, according to game-theoretic logic. The
payoffs structure may be inconclusive because of the inclusion of non-quantifiable
variables. Positive integration theories enrich this picture. Liberal intergovernmentalism
claims that actors are unitary but constrained by external and internal factors.
Neofunctionalism argues that states may lose control over the integration process and that
spillover mechanisms are in play.
Regardless of the fundamental differences between these approaches, they both
can supply disintegration theory with crucial insights. Dynamism of preference-formation
at the unit level should be given much attention. Also, spillover logic and semiautomatism of integration are serious hints that the initial integration process differs in
quality from potential disintegration. Initially, integrated issue areas become trespassed,
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extended and augmented, usually to the point where the unit does not know anymore
what it is giving up upon disintegration. If indeed the unit loses control over the
integration process, it is unable to scrutinize fully what additional links emerge behind
the scenes. Disintegration becomes not only asymmetric but also different in quality.
The positive theory of disintegration should build on integration theories as well
as on withdrawal and secession games starting from their common denominator: actors,
their decisions and payoffs-induced motivations.

Figure 3: Disintegration Theory Dealing More Efficiently With Time Progression and
Costs Murkiness
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Figure 3 shows that an ideally-designed theory of disintegration should borrow
from both theories of integration as well as theories of secession and withdrawal. The
former should inspire a similar slope of efficiency loss when costs become murkier.
Disintegration theory should also share the same starting point with the latter in a way
that qualitative change of costs is researched from time zero. As the payoff matrix
becomes blurred, the explanation power should not suffer as much as in game-theoretic
accounts.
The following part of this chapter will scrutinize the nature of actors, point out the
differences between integration and disintegration logic due to additional links and time
progression, and discuss the sphere of disintegration costs, which appears to be the most
essential. It will be demonstrated that the quality of disintegration costs is pivotal for
understanding why the decisions of actors cannot be subject to either integration theories
or game-theoretic accounts on withdrawals and secessions alone.

Actors and Their Decisions
One of the main contributions of integration theories is their accounting of actors’
freedom of choice. Neofunctionalism points out the lock-in mechanisms of transnational
exchange and trans-societal links that seriously undermine a member state’s autonomy.2
Liberal intergovernmentalism treats this phenomenon from a different angle, claiming
that various domestic and international pressures indeed limit states’ freedom of choice
but not autonomy, per se. In order to build on the contribution of withdrawal and
secession games, one should assume that players are unitary. Secession games show that
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a plethora of dimensions call for some form of political representation that would
aggregate a population’s preferences.3 Citizens’ ideal points become elevated to the level
of unitary subnational entity which then chooses the set of public goods it needs to
provide in the first place.4 Neofunctionalism’s challenge of states’ autonomy should not
prevent researchers from reaching what this theory has to offer: its emphasis on lock-in
and spillover after initial integration is launched suggests how powerful constraints on
actors’ freedom of choice can be.
Even if constrained, states should be viewed as the primary actors in the
disintegration game acting in their own national interest. 5 This assumption is crucial if
one wants to benefit from the contributions of withdrawal and secession games. As such,
states can and often do artificially change the cost-benefits balance of subnational
entities, international organizations or other states. As research to date shows, the
primacy of nation-states can also be assumed in the case of the European Union. Even
though supranational institutions possess some autonomy vis-à-vis member states, this
freedom of action is not sufficient to take the primacy away from state governments.6
The reason of this privileged position is quite simple. States enjoy exclusive
access to the power factor of sovereignty within international law augmented by
international recognition.7 They usually also possess greater access to other military,
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economic or societal power factors. Technically, states can simply disallow secession and
freely exit international agreements. Speaking in game-theoretic language, states should
be viewed as principal agents with agenda-setting abilities and first-mover advantage
where they decide, upon constructing the game, how much freedom of action would be
attributed to “semi-autonomous” actors: subnational entities and international
organizations.8 This characteristic is implied, though not explicitly, by withdrawal games.
The choice of the type of disintegration game coupled with the ability to move
first is a formal tool which could help to deal with the reality of states’ sovereignty. The
problem arises, however, when other peer states enter the framework. By definition, they
should be equally privileged and as such their strategies can lead to equilibria in which
the primary players don’t exercise their first-mover and agenda-setting abilities to the
fullest extent. For example, the disallowance for Kosovo’s secession didn’t end with a
stalemate mainly because states like France, Great Britain or Germany entered the
disintegration game set by Belgrade.9
Elevated preferences and actions of sovereign states shape the international
system’s level. This anarchic and “self-help” environment is considered the universal set
containing all elements of political world: foremost states, organizations and subnational
8
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entities. Anarchy advantages powerful actors. This systemic attribute corresponds to the
feature mentioned earlier: states are virtually unconstrained because of their possession of
nominal autonomy. However, this universal set governed by self-help includes important
subsets containing most elements of the world system. These subsets are international
regimes. Since regimes are the most inclusive when it comes to the number of elements,
all states, organizations and subnational entities dwell within them. They are “nested.”10
Whereas anarchy itself is constant, changes in the state of the world are encouraged by
changes in or of international regimes.
Regimes tame anarchy with “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area
of international relations.”11 In disintegration game regimes are exogenous to the point of
assuring their chance-mover advantage. They constitute “nature” by solidifying certain
paths of cooperation, establishing mutual expectations about behavior, reducing
transaction costs and providing information.12 Actors of disintegration game in general
and states in particular must constantly update their beliefs about the state of the world
since rules of regimes “are frequently changed, bent, or broken to meet the exigencies of
the moment.”13 This dynamic component has a profound impact on costs of withdrawal
or secession.
The Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe created a security regime set
on artificial maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. One of its main aspirations
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was to prevent revolutions from occurring.14 The established rule of intervention to
restore rightful rulers in revolution-torn countries was a great disincentive for prospective
secessionist movements. Independence turns in Latin America and Greece proved
successful only because they were supported by some of the great powers of the Concert.
Subsequent breaches in the regime revealed by the successful liberal movement in France
and the independence of Belgium sent signals to other European opposition forces that
liberal and nationalist sentiments can prevail, which led to the revolutionary upheavals of
1848.15
In the last decade of 20th century, the Washington Consensus outlined the path to
market-oriented reforms, putting emphasis on deregulation, privatization and economic
liberalization. The East Asian crisis of 1997 put basic assumptions of this regime in
question. One implication of this erosion was the implementation of more stateinterventionist policies by East Asian states. Another outcome was adoption of
Augmented Washington Consensus which modified its initial strictly neo-liberal
outlook.16 Changes on the systemic level were among the drivers which led Malaysia, Sri
Lanka and Thailand in 1999 to withdraw from the International Natural Rubber
Organization. Since these member states were not able to assure an increase in the basic
reference price of rubber in order to recover their economies from the 1998 crisis, they
decided to quit the organization.17 When the Washington Consensus eroded, states began
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to put more hope in their own developmental schemes without so much reliance on
market forces. Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand assumed that under these new
conditions the costs of disintegration from International Natural Rubber Organization
were smaller than potential benefits of controlling the rubber market their own way.
Changes on the systemic level are of crucial importance since whenever the
disintegration game assumes nature (or chance) to be the first mover, the subsequent
player demonstrates their understanding of how the system evolved over time. Obvious
priors in this logic can be constituted by moves of other players in other disintegration
games. States or subnational entities can thus conclude that their counterpart, which
already decided to disintegrate from a union, revealed to some extent the payoffs matrix
outlook for other players contemplating disintegration. One can mention here the collapse
of colonial regimes or disintegration of the League of Nations under the outburst of new,
militaristic environment. The number of secessions during decolonization took place both
within a wave and under international regime change. Similar situations occurred after
the bipolar world ceased to exist and a number of previously Soviet republics gained their
independence. Since their counterparts were placed in similar international and domestic
backgrounds and since first movers already succeeded with their actions, decisions to
disintegrate became less risky.
In sum, the research to date shows that actors of disintegration games potentially
face a number of constraints on their moves. Fully autonomous states and semiautonomous players have to confront strategies of others as well as uncertainty about the
state of the world. Facing other states in a game also brings uncertainty about these
player’s types, thus one cannot be sure what equilibria is considered. The mere
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conviction that an actor will do well after disintegrating from the union because it
possesses resources securing future well-being cannot be sufficient to make this move.
Catalonia, for example, is in a better economic position than the rest of Spain,
transferring eight percent of its GDP to the poorer regions. It is, however, politically
disadvantaged since the central government in Madrid doesn’t allow separation, in line
with the Spanish constitution. Catalonia is unsure whether after declaring independence it
would be admitted to the European Union and thus if it would secure its economic wellbeing. It also probably cannot hope for universal international recognition.18 In sum,
Catalonia has self-confidence because of economic power factors. It faces a “strong type”
of principal actor – Spain – which signaled its type vigorously by pointing out the
illegality of a potential independence referendum. It is disadvantaged by political power
factors and by the fact that Spain moves first (as a lawmaker and fully-autonomous
actor). Finally, the world in which Catalonia dwells would impose high costs of
separatism, including isolation from the economic benefits of European integration.
After exploring the nature of actors and highly complex sphere of players’
decisions, it is the time to discuss how this complexity makes disintegration qualitatively
different from integration.

Differences between Integration and Disintegration
Disintegration seems to require a separate, positive theory. Approaches to
European integration don’t provide enough tools to tackle disintegration and this
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phenomenon cannot be viewed as simple reversal of integration process. A candidate EU
member state is never in the same position as a country contemplating exit. Member
states are usually not able to track all the developments which occurred after they
accessed the EU. It is often impossible to foresee everything in the treaties or even to pay
attention to all societal and economic dynamics. On the other hand, the integration
process can be well explained with rational choice and economistic models. Upon
formation of the union, units bargain; that is, they give something up in order to receive
something they value more. A game-theoretic account of disintegration fails precisely
because the bargaining process becomes challenged: actors cannot tell what they are
giving up and what they would gain. This quality is represented by additional, nonquantifiable costs in withdrawal games. The tools of positive disintegration theory must
therefore deal with what happened along the duration of the union. Whereas approaches
to integration picture a situation at “time zero”, disintegration theory should always
consider “t” factor. Theoretically, the time lapse could not be significant or it could be
insufficient to qualitatively change disintegration in comparison to integration. However,
the answer to this question would never be revealed unless the time progression’s effect
is scrutinized. This is precisely the critical element which all existing accounts either
ignore or simplify.
Usually, an integration treaty is designed to deal with certain concrete policy
dimensions. These spheres are outlined by drafters of a treaty and therefore can become
subjects of bargaining upon integration. The economic area of cooperation is usually
essential because it is often the most salient for the units’ constituents, playing pivotal
role in preferences formation. It is also fairly easy to quantify, and thus potential benefits
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can become assessable. A game-theoretic framework can be successful in tackling the
integration dynamics because it is possible to assess topics in the bargaining process,
especially if they are economic in nature. It has to be remembered that European
integration started in a single market and related areas. These spheres also experience
supranational governance to its full extent. Over time, cooperation spilled over to other
spheres – societal, symbolic, and ideological to name the few – and contemplating
disintegration must take these variables into account.
A sociological approach to dwelling in international organizations has some
leverage in explaining why organizations often appear to be dysfunctional from an
economistic standpoint. Initially-formulated spheres of cooperation become impacted by
non-material and other additional factors, depriving rational choice theorizing from its
explanatory power. Certain type of spillover is surely present not only in the case of the
European Union but also in other organizations and states. There is no reason why this
mechanism would not be noticeable in these cases, too. Integration in an initially agreedupon policy sphere may provide incentives for its further extension both to secure gains
and magnify them. In a neofunctional vein, an initial integrational contract fosters
cooperation in very specific and agreed spheres but soon new obstacles for securing gains
are revealed and thus new regulations are enacted.19
There surely has to be a dose of consent for further extension of cooperation. It is
hard to imagine that a forcefully annexed subnational entity would allow additional links
to emerge rather than fight for its independence to be restored. But when a union is
approved both by government and society the road is paved for additional areas of
cooperation and links to emerge. One can mention here political decisions of ruling elites
19
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to integrate with some entity, followed by a referendum expressing the general will of
people.
Unitary actors surely want to remain in control of the integration process. Liberal
intergovernmentalism points out corrections to problematic issues with bargaining and
renegotiation schemes. It happens sometimes that states enter intergovernmental
organizations hastily and then use their power and cognitive abilities to improve Pareto
efficiency. Withdrawal clauses, anti-secession constitutional provisions or renegotiation
schemes help to maintain unions of units. A secured right to exit from intergovernmental
organization together with treaty amendments help to seek Pareto-optimality but the
decision to undertake these actions lies solely on the state government’s shoulders. Due
to cognitive and institutional limits, decision-makers may not always derive optimal
solutions: they thus often decide to hold on to current arrangements. Elites of subnational
entities, apart from costs induced by plethora of issue-linkages, have to also take into
account constraints imposed by a parent-state and think about future international
recognition.
There are therefore many additional factors which actors must consider upon their
decision to disintegrate. Andrew Moravcsik pointed out technocratic coordination,
planning, and credible commitments resulting from interdependence. Non-material ties
include also fixation of meanings, loyalty, patriotism and kinship, ordinary routine,
family ties resulting from migration, channels for communication, entrepreneurial
possibilities or developed risk aversion. The example of Montenegro shows how the
union with Serbia enjoyed general legitimacy, leading to the fixation of Serbian–
Montenegrin identity to the point where calls for independence couldn’t be based on
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nationality criteria. Instead, the willingness to fully democratize and join the prosperity
sphere created by the European Union proved to be the leading factors prompting
Montenegro’s independence.20 It has to be noticed that Slovenia’s accession to the EU in
2004 showed that the former Yugoslavian republic could have become successful in both
securing its independence and joining the European prosperity area. One can speak here
about change in the state of the world revealed by an action of comparable unit.
Integration in “time zero” relies on the bargaining power of negotiation partners,
their understanding of state of the world, gains, concessions and predicted long-term
developments. Various legal provisions aim to help to mitigate future uncertainties. Upon
disintegration, when “t” factor is in play, actors must take into account much more than
negotiation processes with union partners. Additional links that emerged over time are
challenging to include into a bargaining scheme because they are non-material, usually
unquantifiable and because political players are usually not in charge of them. To be sure,
a partner’s strategy to disallow disintegration can be a serious obstacle, but there are
other powerful factors in play, such as the state of the world resulting from international
regimes, resources endowment and domestic preferences.
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Figure 4: Differences between Integration and Disintegration over Time

Figure 4 illustrates how actors of an integration game quantify their benefits from
treaty implementation. Over time, some of negotiated issues become underdeveloped
while other expand or replicate to adjacent spheres. Construction of a payoffs matrix
upon disintegration often fails because comparing it to the one from the time of
integration makes little sense. Some replicated issues gain symbolic, informal and nonmaterial meanings. It is difficult to quantify and implement these provisions in treaties
and further adds uncertainty to disintegration understood as the annulment of a treaty.
Additional problems are posed by external, internal and strategic changes which can
embrace some policy issues while downgrading others.
The following section of this chapter shows that this precise problem with the
nature of exit costs paralyzes the backward induction process and leads to
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inconclusiveness of Bayesian logic. In other words, actors find it challenging to deduct
from what they have observed over time and the magnitude of costs they have to take into
account upon disintegration.

Costs
As it has been agreed by now, all players of disintegration games have to make up
their minds about what action to perform, taking into account benefits they desire and
constraints imposed on their ability to acquire these benefits.21 In game-theoretic terms,
what drives their moves is payoff structure.22 In other words, strategies of other players,
the state of the world, internal conditions or resources endowment all have a reflection in
payoffs linked to an actor’s action. If any ingredient of payoffs is difficult to assess, the
whole rational choice-theoretic conduct is challenged. The nature of costs considered in
disintegration games often proves that this is the case.
Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore correctly point out that international
organizations often exist as dysfunctional constructs which reproduce routinized
behavior, mirror contradictions and pursue non-materialistic goals.23 It might be the case
that even though the initial goals of an organization are no longer met, member states are
prevented from exiting by the costs which are asymmetric and qualitatively different
from benefits pursued upon treaty formation. The dissolution of an organization may
bring about indirect effects like the deterioration of communication channels, losses
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experienced by industries servicing this organization, abandonment of issue-specific
scientific progress or diminishment of cultural exchange. It is probably not so much an
organization serving its own dysfunctional goals in order to survive as it is member states
keeping organizations alive and inefficient, even though efficiency goals ceased to be
met. There is nothing irrational in this behavior.24 Players know what they want but the
complexity of occurrences they have to take into account can “paralyze” them, lead to
mistakes, risky behavior or non-Pareto-optimal outcomes.
Since disintegration costs are induced by the state of the world, strategies of other
players, and internal conditions, uncertainty about each of these components magnifies
confusion about the exact nature of costs. As it was mentioned earlier, systemic changes25
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have a profound impact on a unit’s perception of how they can benefit from
disintegration.
When other states enter a disintegration game, they can exert their influence in a
variety of forms applied to states, subnational entities and organizations. To name a few,
first, other states can design treaties in a way to make withdrawals easier or harder, threat
with sanctions, ostracism or isolation, declare war, form coalitions, advocate for changes
in international regimes or boycott one’s activity. Second, other states can recognize selfdeclared secessionist regions, act in defense of ethnic minorities, support subnational
entities politically, economically and militarily, name a secessionist movement a terrorist
organization, isolate it from international forum, support a state that is crushing proindependence rebellion or force peaceful settlement of status quo under multilateral
coalition. Third, states can decide to dissolve an international organization, amend
constituting treaties, increase or decrease the amount of autonomy available to the
organization’s bodies, use it instrumentally to force national interests or paralyze its
actions by exercising veto power. Russian engagement in Transnistria’s secessionist bid
is an explicit case of other states entering the disintegration game: here played between
Moldova and Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. The eastern part of Moldova differs in
language, history and ethnic composition from its parent-state. The bloody conflict after
Transnistria’s declaration of independence was ended with cease-fire in 1992, which has
since been protected by trilateral peacekeeping mission, a buffer zone and Russian
military presence. Transnistria has been de facto independent but officially belongs to
Moldova and is not recognized on the international stage. The resolution process has been
stagnate. Transnistria wished to form a confederacy of two equally independent states
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while Moldova offered Transnistria a special status within the Republic.26 One can
clearly see an equilibrium which emerged when one principal player (Russia) confronted
its strategy with the other advantaged player (Moldova). It is also interesting to notice
that the international climate for Transnistrian independence was favorable, taking into
account the proliferation of new nation states after the Soviet Union decomposed.
Finally, upon contemplating disintegration, a player has to check in a decisiontheoretic manner whether this move is beneficial, taking into account internal conditions.
This class of conditions is the most extensive because there are no simple rules to
generalize about it. Therefore, each case must be considered individually, taking into
account various political, economic, societal, security-related, ideological, historical and
other factors. For example, in democracies, the instruments of referendum and opinion
polls can be the indicators of citizens’ willingness to pursue disintegration. Experts’
opinions about economic viability of such a move, consultancy with business leaders,
trade unions’ representatives and corporations can serve similar purpose. Ruling elites
must assess the chance of bureaucratic and governance efficiency after disintegration
takes effect.
Game-theoretic conduct provides concrete tools to deal with uncertainty about the
costs induced by others and by the state of the world. The former is mitigated with a
signaling effect, the latter with Bayesian logic. Uncertainty about internal conditions is
different because it almost never exists without reference to these two. There is no level
of isolation sufficient to let a unit decide to disintegrate without paying attention to the
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state of the world and strategies of others. This factor makes internal costs different in
quality because units cannot track domestic developments without understanding what is
going on externally: and they rarely do. The calculus is thus murky and incomplete.
When it comes to signaling, subnational entities may not know whether their
parent-states decide to retaliate when they declare independence. States may not know
whether their withdrawal from intergovernmental or supranational organization will
provoke the ostracism of their fellow members. Finally, organizations themselves may
not know whether allowing for exit will lead to better performance or will deepen
dysfunction. Signaling effect helps to mitigate this uncertainty. The idea of
decolonization assured many former subjects of the British Empire that the current day
Great Britain will allow for independence and therefore its type is different from that
present during American Revolutionary War. The withdrawal of Mauritania from the
African and Malagasy Common Organization in 1965 was followed by wave of exits
including Zaire, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Madagascar and Chad in 1970s. Rather
than provoking improved performance of the organization or retaliation from fellow
member states, the withdrawals led to dissolution of the organization in the mid-1980s. A
majority of the European Union’s citizens would like for Great Britain to remain in the
EU, while Germany warned that London better exit if it plans to obstruct the Union’s
principle of free movement. The European Commission itself claims that Great Britain
would have no influence over international developments, including negotiations with
China or the US on equal footing, if it decided to leave.27
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Now, when it comes to the state of the world, participants of disintegration game
must also confront uncertainty about their own positions in the game. In this case, they
are not sure whether their action would lead to a terminal node with high costs or high
benefits. In other words, they don’t know if the world in which they dwell is the one that
will make them bear extensive costs of disintegration or not. If actors are not sure what
costs they will bear they can possess certain prior beliefs about high-costs or low-costs
outcomes and risk the move of disintegration, according to Bayesian logic. Players may
believe that they reached an information set because they had observed a move of
preceding player and thus they witnessed an event which indicated in which state of the
world they dwell. For example, Greenland’s self-government referendum from 2008 may
have given a hint to another Danish subject - the Faroe Islands - that the international
climate (both immediate and wider) is independence-friendly.
Even though game theory provides mechanisms to tackle uncertainty resulting
from others’ strategies and the state of the world, these tools often seem to be incomplete
because of the nature of costs. Even if one knows other player’s type and the state of the
world she is not able to demonstrate how the payoffs setup is structured, because nonmateriality costs are non-quantifiable and because many of them emerged behind the
scenes outside of cognitive tracking. One deals here with two types of uncertainty. The
first one points towards an epistemic type which is associated with the knowledge about
the state of the world. Due to actors’ uncertainty about some underlying fact of the
matter, it cannot be sure whether it dwells within low or high costs world. Priors supply
actor with knowledge about this fact and help assess the probability of either outcome.

powers-Westminster-apart-France.html; "Eu Exit Would Leave Britain with Zero Influence, Says Barroso,"
BBC News(19 October 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-29680059.
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This is, however, not the whole picture. The second type of uncertainty is associated with
vagueness: there is no fact of the matter about the state of the world, and the term “high
costs world” is ambiguous. The vagueness permits borderline cases like “quite costly
world.”28 The reason why actors cannot determine whether a high costs state of the world
is epistemic reality is because the extent and nature of costs make it impossible for it to
calculate them and to contrast them with benefits. In an actor’s mind, there is no numeric
value which can be multiplied by Bayesian probability.
The schematic representation of contemplation of costs followed by cognitive
mechanisms used to deal with uncertainty is showed in the Figure 5.

Figure 5: Perception, Cognition and Decision in Disintegration Game
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Significance of Time Progression and Emerging Links
The dataset of 342 intergovernmental organizations and membership-related
activity reveals some interesting characteristics.29 In total, there were 572 definite
withdrawals of member states from these 342 organizations since when the organization
was formed and up to year 2000.30 Within the average age of an organization equal to 32
years, there were 1.7 exits per organization. Organizations of general, wide scope (for
example the Arctic Council, the Arab League or the Non-Aligned Movement) faced 0.13
exits within the life-span of average 27 years. In contrast, organizations covering a
specific issue (the European Organization for Nuclear Research, the International
Conference for Promoting Technical Uniﬁcation or the North Pacific Fur Seal
Commission) faced as many as 3.05 exits within comparable life-span of average 22
years. Going more into detail, organizations covering security, social and environmental
issues faced smaller number of exits in comparison to organizations of legal, economic
and communication-related scopes.
As much as 31 percent of all withdrawals occurred within the first five years of
country’s joining an organization while the first ten years accounted for 49 percent of all
exits. The bivariate regression shows highly statistically significant negative relation
between years of membership within an organization and the number of exits.31 The
general distribution of withdrawals by the duration of membership is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Histogram of Exits from IGOs per Duration of Membership in Years

27 percent of all withdrawals occurred around 1965 - during the time of
decolonization. The second highest number of exits accounted for four percent of the
total – in 1945 and 1998 respectively. The first accounts for the shift from non-regime to
the Bretton Woods system32 while the latter points towards the collapse of Washington
Consensus. Figure 7 shows this relation.
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Figure 7: Histogram of Exits from IGOs per Year and Under International Regimes
Changes

Analysis of the dataset coupled with the fact that, thus far, there has never been a
case of withdrawal from the European Union, suggest that the longer states belong to
intergovernmental organizations the less likely they are to exit. Also, if an organization is
more “all-encompassing” in its scope, member states are less likely to withdraw. Finally
the changes on international regimes’ level are positively correlated with emerging waves
of withdrawals.
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The analysis of secessions doesn’t allow such a straightforward statistical
assessment. In many cases, it is difficult to decide on clear-cut dates of independence
because of intermediate phases of transition, brief moments of sovereignty and the
resulting difficulties with finding a point of reference from which union with a parentstate should be assumed. Cases of secession should be given particular caution and
researched individually.
Very schematic analysis of world system’s data33 shows that out of 169 cases of
newly independent countries throughout the last two centuries, only 25 percent can be a
subject of simplified descriptive statistics. 60 percent include states created in the wave of
decolonization process (Senegal, Angola or Barbados), during the Latin American wave
of independence (Brazil, Venezuela or Peru), and through the decomposition of the
Soviet Union (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or Belarus). The remaining 15 percent is
constituted by states which acquired their independence through a transition process: for
example, the United Nations’ trusteeship (Togo, Burundi or Palau). Even though these
are still the valid cases it can be concluded that the lack of history of independence in
majority of these examples allows attributing secession mainly to changes on
international regimes’ level. Transition periods seem to be an important tool to gradually
“test and mitigate” potential costs.
States with a history of independence prior to the formation of union with a
parent-state constitute the remaining 25 percent of cases in the dataset. Very simplified
categorization shows that the formation of a union occurred either voluntarily or nonvoluntarily (thorough conquest, occupation or annexation). In the former category the
33
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median age of union upon its dissolution equaled 75 years, while non-voluntary unions
lasted 45 years on average. Cases included in the voluntary unions category included
cases like Singapore, Montenegro or Panama, while the non-voluntary category included
examples like the Dominican Republic, Uruguay or Latvia. While the small-N problem
and difficulties with categorization preclude detailed statistical analysis to be conducted,
there is certain reason to believe that the voluntary unions last longer as it converges with
assumptions of the theoretical solution proposed here. Unless under critical changes in
international circumstances, the extent of penetration coupled with the longevity of union
make secessions risky due to blurred costs of exit.

How to Study Disintegration
Every case of disintegration has its own story and researchers should be sensitized
to particular variables rather than seek simplistic framework applicable to states, IGOs,
subnational entities and the European Union. As has been shown, the game-theoretic
framework in particular and Rational Choice Theory in general become inefficient at a
certain stage of organizational dissolution. The criticism of these accounts should be used
to highlight the power of disintegration costs, which often escapes cognitive calculation.
It should not lead to complete abandonment of either approach because they together
offer methodological neatness and logical conduct of research.
Purely game-theoretic framework should be avoided because, as it was
demonstrated, researching disintegration often assumes complexity and unquantifiability
of some sort. Even though assessing integration with utility maximization theory is
possible in many cases, disintegration phenomenon is different in nature. To be sure,
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game theory should enrich the conduct by its pressure put on decisions under constraints
and towards utility maximization. Building on this fundamental frame detailed research
on motives, conditions, actions and constraints should fill in any gaps in descriptive
manner. Indeed, a descriptive model is highly desirable here due to the nature of costs
which escapes numeric assessment.
The best way of understanding the situation of the unit upon disintegration is by
comparing it with the moment of the unit’s accession to the union. Two different analyses
should be introduced - at t0 and at t1 - and within three areas: showing strategies of other
actors, the international environment and internal conditions. First, honoring the
assumption of unitarism, one should aggregate preferences to subnational level, states,
IGOs and the European Union, portraying them as players in a disintegration game.
According to the principal-agent theory, states should be viewed as advantaged and thus
exerting the biggest influence over the outcomes. Research on actors’ motives may
include a signaling mechanism, if necessary. Second, in the international area, regimes
should be considered as first movers or nature condition-setters. Changes in international
regimes should be revealed by prior occurrences, Bayesian logic (where possible) and by
disintegration moves of other players, thus indicating possible waves of disintegration.
Third, internal conditions of units can be approached with analysis of opinion polls,
expertise or voting behavior.
All three points of conduct should be executed for t0 and t1. This process should
reveal how conditions changed over time, what links became extended and why.
Technically, few issue linkages should reproduce less additional links while more time
lapsed should encourage more of them to emerge: conditional on changes in internalities,
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strategies and externalities. The mixture of all three points should proceed in a descriptive
manner to justify actor’s action or inaction due to its understanding of costs in
disintegration game.
Following the logic of Analytic Narratives, much attention should be paid to
stories, accounts and context. This way of conduct helps to maintain formal rigor while
facilitating proper explanation. It helps be remain focused on problems rather than theory
and maintains actor-centric approach and sequentially-occurring moves while keeping in
mind importance of history, uncertainty and capacity to strategize.34
In sum, actors of a disintegration game are assumed to pursue greater utility but
usually they are cognitively not able to come up with a payoffs matrix. The artificial
environment imposed by Bayesian mechanism raises concerns about whether real-world
actors indeed proceed in this ideal manner.35 The variables of crucial importance for the
conduct include time progression, initial links, consent and conditions for the emergence
of additional links, other players’ strategies and changes on regimes level. It is desirable
to find a tipping point where mysterious costs become mitigated to the extent allowing
the unit to disintegrate.
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Figure 8: Conceptual Sketch of Conduct in Disintegration Case Studies

The framework sketched in Figure 8 points out crucial variables present in
disintegration games. It should serve as guidance for the conduct of research on particular
case studies, applicable to states, intergovernmental organizations and supranational
organizations. What occurs after integration is introduced should be viewed as
empowering the costs section. All three areas – internal, strategic and international –
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should be researched separately but conclusions about the costs should be drawn from the
mixture of all three spheres.
Detailed research on situations in t0 and t1 should reveal potential change in
quality between a clear bargain upon integration and the murky contemplation upon
disintegration. Looking at internal conditions should proceed in a decision-theoretic
manner and assess how resources, preferences and governance dynamics changed over
time and what the implications are for the viability of potential disintegration.
Researching strategies of other actors should start from the clear identification of players,
with states given more bargaining power than subnational entities and intergovernmental
organizations, and with one particular state being chosen as the principal agent with
agenda-setting capabilities, first-mover advantage and particular type. Confrontation of
strategies, especially those of sovereign states, imposes certain equilibrium to represent
the current status quo of the disintegration process. Finally, research on the international
sphere should assess what and how changes on the regimes level occurred, what path of
cooperation was solidified, what expectations were established and what information was
provided. Bayesian logic should be proposed to understand these changes by unit of
interest with priors and potential waves of disintegration playing a critical role.
Blending outcomes of research in all three areas should be used to explain units’
action or inaction disintegration-wise. The emergence of additional links connecting
units, especially if union was voluntary, should explain why an initially agreed
integration scheme was trespassed and why the sphere of costs gained significance.
Contemplation of non-material elements of identity, meanings fixation, and legitimacy
should be given primary attention. The ultimate question should be whether the payoff
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structure can be constructed and understood by the disintegrating unit, taking into
account the complexity of occurrences along the way.
The following chapters apply this conceptual framework of conduct to particular
case studies within three structures of analysis in order to understand disintegration cases
better.
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CHAPTER IV
DISINTEGRATION FROM STATES
This chapter provides analysis of two disintegration case studies which took place
on the “state” level. Montenegro chose independence in a May 2006 referendum, after
almost 90 years of union with Belgrade. The common state functioned first as a joint
monarchy of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and then as
communist Yugoslavian federal republic. After the bloody collapse of the federation,
Montenegro continued its union with Belgrade, but the ties were gradually softened until
full disintegration followed.
Quebec was ceded by France to Great Britain in the 1763 Treaty of Paris, thus
ending the Seven Years War. The following period saw the local population’s aims to
protect their Francophone identity. After this general background of mutual relations was
established, the proper integration moment took place in 1867 when Ontario and Quebec
formed the Canadian Confederation. The consolidation and expression of nationalism,
especially politicized by Parti Québécois, led to two sovereignty-related referenda: in
1980 and 1995. The disintegration did not follow and the period of these 15 years is
researched here as a proper moment of interest.
Two case studies were chosen precisely because one of them led to independence
and the other did not. What is more, both of them occurred on different continents, which
gives a broader geographical perspective. The selection of case studies shows different
paces of changes on strategic, external and internal levels, as well as the diverging nature
of additional links’ emergence. Most importantly, Montenegro was unified with Belgrade
and subject first to centralization and then to federalization, while Quebec did not allow

91

many issues to interconnect and was solidified by opting for confederal solution. Both
cases picture quite clearly how political elites managed to understand and react to
existing costs of disintegration.

Montenegro, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and State Union
Actors: Changes on Strategic Level
In November 1918 the Kingdom of Montenegro merged with the Kingdom of
Serbia and in December of the same year became the unit of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes: the predecessor of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The most important
actors of Montenegro’s integration game included Serbia, the Ottoman Empire, AustriaHungary, and of course Montenegro itself. The influence of France, Italy, Great Britain,
Russia and the United States was also prominent and can be distinguished from an overall
systemic ramification.
Two power vacuums of those times – after the Ottoman Empire’s and AustriaHungary’s demises – had profound effects on Montenegro’s independence-related
strategies and subsequent outcomes.

While the former led to the recognition of

Montenegrin independence at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the latter empowered
Serbia and pro-Serbian Montenegrin forces in pursuing the union with Belgrade. Even
though both Serbia and Montenegro forged strong ties with Russia, it was the former
which ultimately emerged as a stronger regional actor. Both states tried to pursue a vision
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of South Slavic leadership and bastion of Serbdom but the rivalry was in the end won by
Belgrade.1
Montenegro entered the First World War as an ally of Serbia under unified
command structure. The visible privileged position of Belgrade was reinforced by
Serbian claims of primacy in any new Yugoslavian state.2 The planned unification of
Southern Slavs was therefore to be played according to Belgrade’s rules. Subsequent
events led first to Austria-Hungary’s occupation and dissolution of the Montenegrin
army. In October 1918, allied military troops from Great Britain, the United States,
France, Italy and Serbia arrived, filling the power vacuum left by Austria-Hungary. The
events were especially fortunate for Belgrade, which was able to pursue its own version
of Yugoslavian project.
Previously created with Serbia’s involvement, Montenegrin Committee for
Unification started preparing an assembly which would implement a union on Belgrade’s
terms. With the Serbian army stationed in Montenegro, and in fact just outside of the
building where the Assembly of Podgorica took place, unconditional unification with
Serbia was declared. The outcome came as a violation of Montenegrin constitution of
1905 as well as the People’s Assembly of Montenegro’s subsequent intention. It also has
to be noted that members of Podgorica’s Assembly were selected from among the
supporters of unification.3 Whether the integration process was in fact a forceful
annexation4 will to be discussed more in the section on internal conditions; nevertheless,
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it can be concluded that Serbia was the more powerful actor in this integration game,
probably even the one possessing a game-setter’s capabilities.
Other actors in the integration game were largely supporting Belgrade’s actions.
The decisions of Podgorica’s Assembly to dethrone King Nicholas I and to merge
Montenegro unconditionally with Serbia were met with silent approval from the major
great powers of that time which did not officially recognize them but subsequently also
neglected to react. Later, the unification was supported by the United States, France and
Great Britain and opposed by Italy, which was trying to pursue its own geostrategic
interests.5
Surely the silent backing of great powers was important for Serbia which
additionally emerged victorious from the First World War. Belgrade possessed also a
relatively strong army and was already in control of Montenegro when the decision about
unification was to be made. King Nicholas was not able to pursue his own vision of
South Slavic unification and it can therefore be concluded that the integration game was
set primarily by Serbia.
The process of Montenegro’s disintegration started around 1997, just after almost
80 years of dwelling within the common state. The gradualness of the process which took
almost 10 years to finalize was, to a large extent, enforced by important actors of the
disintegration game. It can be said that de facto independence was exercised in 1999
when Montenegro sided with NATO over the Kosovo question.6 The primary, fully
autonomous players included the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which, during this
period of time, became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and the United States
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of America. The subnational unit was, of course, Montenegro while the supranational,
not-fully-autonomous entity was the European Union. An important observation is that
FRY and the State Union were in fact Serbia-dominated while the European Union
played a critical role despite its legally disadvantaged status.
Even still before Tito’s demise in Belgrade, the gradual loosening of centralized
ties within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took place. After the Second
World War, Montenegro was granted the status of republic, in 1974 each federal unit was
given a significant amount of autonomy, and in 1979 Montenegro reopened its foreign
ministry – after 54 years.7
The major turn in federal internal policy took place after Milošević’s rise to
power, when Belgrade-orchestrated anti-bureaucratic revolutions aimed to overthrow
local leaders in Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina to introduce a more centralized
Serbian control.8 Pro-Serbian sentiments reemerged and Montenegro was perceived as a
variable in this equation. The Carrington Plan aimed to propose a loose association of
Yugoslavian states but under Serbian pressure the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
enacted and supported by 95.7 percent of participating referendum voters. Milošević’s
plan to maintain more centralized Serbian control was taking shape.9
The crucial year of 1997 marked a split in ruling SDP party in Montenegro into
pro- and anti-Milošević factions. The latter turned later into pro-independence party. The
Prime Minister, Milo Đukanović, during his 1996 speech in Montenegrin Assembly,
7
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indicated his country’s intention to move closer to the European Union and the United
States with or without FRY.10 After becoming President in 1998, Đukanović indicated
that pressures from Serbia and the subsequent war in Kosovo posed a serious security
threat to Montenegro and reaffirmed his commitment to seek closer ties with the West in
general and the United States in particular. The pressure from Belgrade led to another
centralization turn. Milošević rejected Montenegrin pro-Đukanović deputies to the
federal parliament, in 1998 budgetary transfers were halted, and Montenegro established
alternative diplomatic relations with many states, took over customs, and introduced the
Deutsche Mark as a parallel currency.11 Subsequent demonstrations in Serbia followed by
Milošević's concessions sent a signal to ruling Montenegrin elite that Belgrade’s regime
was unstable.12
In the beginning, Đukanović was cautious in expressing a pro-independence
stance since it would be “gambit with unknown consequences.”13 Even though in 2000
Milošević assured that Montenegro was free to choose, the Yugoslavian army deployed
its troops in strategic positions to intimidate Montenegrin authorities.14 The last
Yugoslavian president Vojislav Koštunica expressed his concerns that the new borders
might cause problems and that he might pursue independence of Serbian region in case
Montenegro decided to secede.15 Nevertheless, after Milošević Montenegro seemed not
to pay much attention to Koštunica and the risk of FRY army’s intervention was
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perceived rather minimal.16 The Koštunica-Đukanović dynamics reinforced the need for a
referendum to reframe Serbian-Montenegrin coexistence.17 As FRY was perceived as
non-functional because both Serbia and Montenegro already maintained independent
state functions – international, domestic, political and economic – the Javier Solanasupervised Belgrade Agreement allowed units of State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
to pursue independence after 3 years period.18
After the fall of Milošević, the political arena in Montenegro split once again.
Đukanović’s DPS supported independence while Bulatović’s SNP favored a union with
Serbia.19 The newly enacted State Union was not embraced either by Montenegro or
Serbia. The former pursued independence while the latter wanted a more centralized
Belgrade control. International actors were yet once again sending mixed signals but not
as ambiguously as at the time of Podgorica Assembly. They were largely afraid that too
hasty independence would cause the radicalization of Serbia and threaten regional
stability. Both the European Union and the United States were issuing financial support
to Montenegro and, since 1998, the U.S. advocated exempting Montenegro from
sanctions against FRY. In addition, the Washington supported Đukanović pursued a split
in ruling elites in 1997.20 However, the American ambassador to Serbia and Montenegro
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assured that Washington would not intervene in the question on Montenegrin
independence, which was perceived as an internal matter of the State Union.21
The European Union was heavily involved in designing the Montenegrin
independence referendum. Its critical role oscillated around mediation, forging mutually
acceptable criteria and enacting the required threshold of 55 percent, counting on a
preservation of the union.22 The EU feared increased regional instability, a lack of
economic self-sustainability, problems with organized crime and an ultimate lack of
ability to integrate with the EU’s bodies.23 In May 2006, with the turnout of 86.5 percent
and support for secession reaching 55.5 percent, Montenegro became a fully independent
country.

Externalities: Changes on Regimes Level
After Russia had lost its war with Japan, the question of Balkan nationalisms
reemerged on the international agenda. Previously, the Balkan region was discussed upon
the Congress of Berlin when Montenegro’s independence was recognized. Between 1878
and 1907, the foreign policy actions of European powers were concentrated mainly on
colonial rivalry.24
Towards the end of the First World War, the international system was
experiencing important changes on both empirical and theoretical levels. The outbreak of
the war was caused by tensions between existing alliances, territorial disputes between
21
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particular states and contiguous rivalries which increased dramatically after 1907. The
spread of the war was thus a political process facilitated by a physical proximity which in
turn augmented irredentist claims.25 Ideologically, the cult of offensive security doctrines
was adopted across Europe and the simultaneous invention of new military technologies
like machine gun or barbed wire made the war particularly deadly.26
In order to understand the devastating outcome of the conflict and to avoid similar
tragedy in the future, the idealistic thought favored collective security as an alternative to
balance of power which had been in effect since 1815.27 From a geopolitical standpoint,
the direct result of the war – the complete demise of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman
Empire – had a profound effect on the European power calculus and compelled the
international level to respond to emerging nationalisms.28
The Balkan region played a pivotal role in all these dynamics. In 1918, President
Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points recognized autonomous developments for
the people of Austria-Hungary (point X) and assured international guarantees for
independence and integrity of the Balkan states (point XI).29 The principle of selfdetermination was an important novelty introduced on regimes level, as was in tune with
the outburst of nationalisms not only in the Balkans but elsewhere in Europe. After the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars, an important change of
discourse was already unfolding. The Balkan region on the eve of the First World War
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was full of revolutionary movements, symbolic appeals and romantic liberation
discourses.30 After the war, the main objective of victorious powers was to channel
nationalisms, divide the Balkans and create a strong Serbia and Greece in order to forge a
buffer zone between Soviet Russia and Western Europe.31 The geopolitics and principle
of national liberation came hand in hand.
Since the end of the nineteenth century, many European states were facing
tensions between democracy-leaning university students and authoritarian rulers. This
was also the case with Montenegrin graduates returning from Belgrade where they
experienced Serbian nationalism and more openness than under the rule of King
Nicholas. What is more, many local Montenegrin leaders found the king’s
authoritarianism harmful for economic and political progress amidst increasing Western
investments.32
Internationally-recognized discourse of nationalism and national liberation and
particular attention paid to the Balkans made it possible for Montenegro to solidify its
statehood. However, Serbia enjoyed the favor of major powers and, coupled with its more
appealing version of Serbdom, made a Belgrade-promoted vision of Yugoslavia desired
by many people in Montenegro.
Montenegro’s systemic surrounding underwent many changes during 70 years of
its dwelling within the joint state: from the first, a failed attempt to replace the Congress
of a Vienna-originated balance of power with the regime of collective security under the
League of Nations, through the Second World War, through the creation of United
Nations, through the division into capitalist and communist regimes, to the break-up of
30
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Yugoslavia and expansion of democracy and free market in the Balkan region. At the
time of Montenegro’s disintegration, the following changes on the international level
were the most critical: the regime of democracy and human rights gained prominence
and, in fact, a legitimacy-granting power; the European Union’s sphere of freedom and
prosperity was continuously expanding in Eastern and Central Europe; Yugoslavia
collapsed leading to atrocious crimes which attracted attention and reaction of
international community; and finally, the globalization process and well-established
collective security seriously changed the way of thinking about “state” as a concept.33
The expansion of a human rights regime after the Second World War led to the
situation where, around the year 2000, approximately three-fourths of world states
acceded to International Human Rights Covenants.34 Wider human rights protection is
assured only when international actions can influence domestic decision-making
calculations based on what they do through sanctioning, shaming and cooptation.35
Yugoslavia of the Milošević era was sanctioned and shamed. Early on, Montenegro
decided to pursue a democracy path and play by the rules set by the European Union. The
willingness to exist within the world of democracy, economic prosperity, and integration
led Montenegro’s elites to choose pro-Western course. Podgorica wanted to distance
itself from wrongdoings of Milošević’s era. Whereas upon integration Serbia was
perceived as guarantor of greater openness and democracy, at the time of disintegration,
Montenegro felt that Belgrade was dragging Cetinje down in its democratization
33
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progress. Đukanović was particularly aware that greater economic and social prosperity
would emerge in Montenegro only through democratization and normalization of
relations with the West.36 The subsequently developed and consolidated European
Union’s sanctions regime coupled with the Union’s eastward enlargement sent a signal
that no country in the region was able to fully benefit from the sphere of prosperity
without democratizing, consolidating the rule of law, and developing respect for human
rights.37
The dramatic outcomes of Yugoslavia’s break-up in the early 1990s had a
profound effect on the international community. The euphoria after the Cold War turned
into shock, fear of regional conflagration, and a potential threat to European identity.38
The conversation became about a new security regime where concrete measures ought to
be taken to prevent regional turmoil.
The effects of this new thinking were visible in cautious attitudes towards
Montenegro’s path to independence. It can be concluded that particular international
actors, including for example the United States and the European Union, acted according
to this new security regime set on the prevention of regional conflicts and especially
directed towards the former Yugoslavia. The gradualism of Montenegro’s disintegration
process, advocated by the European Union, was followed by conditionality where future
European integration was at stake. These are examples of how delicately the international
community tried to deal with the region.
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Internalities: Changes on Domestic Level
Preferences of Montenegrins at the time of integration oscillated mainly around
the dimension of national identity. In the 18th and 19th centuries, joint identification of
one as Serb and Montenegrin was common especially because of shared Orthodox faith
and opposition to Ottoman rule.39 Even though ethnic origin of Montenegrins is not clear,
the locals were widely perceived native Serbs living in the Montenegro region and
speaking essentially the same language.40 The vision of nationhood embraced by ruling
Petrović-Njegoš dynasty assumed mutual Serb-Montenegrin identification and Orthodox
faith.41
The distinct feature of Montenegrin nationalism was the promotion of wider
Serbdom and Slavic identity rather than local particularism. Prince-Bishop Petar II used
the first, newly introduced printing press to distribute works which praised Slavic and
Montenegrin romantic heroism.42 Pan-Slavism and a strong sentiment of larger Serbian
identity was ever present and the main feature of King Nicholas’ rule was to channel this
perception towards Montenegro as a center.
Subsequent Balkan Wars and the First World War led to the empowerment of
Belgrade at the expense of Montenegro. King Nicholas’ strategy to embrace Serbdom
around Cetinje’s pivot ultimately led to the degradation of Montenegrin statehood and his
39
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own position as a monarch. The strong sentiment of pan-Serb unification got out of hand
and it was becoming obvious that Belgrade, not Cetinje, was to play the central role in
consolidating Yugoslavism.43
In 1917 and 1918, the preferences for union took the form of either joint
statehood on equal terms or unconditional unification with Serbia. Proponents of the
latter solution saw Montenegrin military power eroding after the Balkan Wars, feared
Austria-Hungary domination before Montenegro was liberated from Vienna’s occupation
and perceived Serbia to be more open and progressive than Cetinje under Nicholas’ rigid
rule.44
The preferences for unification and joint statehood were spilt roughly half-half
and the outcomes of the Podgorica Assembly were controversial to some. A belief in
common nationhood was present, but the subsequent consolidation of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes proved that Belgrade overtook the dictate of the vision of
Yugoslavism. The enacted Vidovdan Constitution introduced a unitarist form of a joint
state with the king virtually not answerable to anyone.45 Article 4 from the Chapter II of
the Constitution stated that there was only one nationality throughout the kingdom. It can
be concluded that at least for the slight majority of Montenegrins, the unification with
Serbia occurred with consent and the preferences for joint statehood were satisfied. Since
the newly created joint state was unitary and very centralized, there was a potential for
additional political, economic and social links to emerge. Subsequent events led to the
43
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decentralization of Yugoslavia and, as it will be demonstrated, the gradual political,
social and economic separation diminished the costs of potential Montenegrin
independence.
The areas discussed the most upon Montenegro’s disintegration were institutional
performance and economic viability. Security concerns were also raised, but they were
not as salient as couple of years before. Just like during the time of integration, identity
and calls for democracy constituted the main levels of expressed preferences.
The formation of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 was largely an elitedriven process, obscure to citizens. As it turned out, the new state happened to be
institutionally dysfunctional with units’ disproportionate sizes, populations and diverging
economic interests.46 In the 2000s, the Montenegrin elite began arguing that Podgorica
lost its market, fleet, revenues from tourism and was contributing too much to the federal
institutions.47 The difference was that in 1992 Montenegrins didn’t believe in their
institutional capabilities while by the 2000s they gained much self-confidence.48 By the
end of Milošević’s era, Montenegro was already functioning as a quasi-independent state
with its own foreign, monetary policy, customs, legal system, system of property
relations, system of values and culture.49
Economically, Montenegro suffered a lot during the last years of SFRY and
throughout the duration of FRY. The effects of the oil crisis in 1979 were felt especially
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by poorer Yugoslavian republics50 while lifting sanctions after the Dayton Agreement did
not lead to improvement of the economic situation nor integration with international
institutions.51 When Montenegro was gaining more freedom of action, the economic
conditions visibly improved. In 2000, the first positive GDP growth in 10 years was
noted and pro-independence elites started pointing out lower inflation, higher
employment and good conditions for investments. It was believed that Montenegro
possessed resources, human capital and the government organizations necessary to
independently finance itself, without Belgrade’s supervision.52
Milošević’s anti-bureaucratic revolution turned Yugoslavia from a closed
communist state into a closed nationalist one.53 Montenegrins gradually grew dissatisfied
with Serbia’s actions, but didn’t want to be a target of international sanctions and wished
to integrate with the West. Political identity transferred to national identification: in
Socialist Yugoslavia, the majority of population regarded itself as Montenegrin whereas
around the time of independence referendum the society was divided into Serbs and
Montenegrins.54 The new democratic and human rights frame made pro-disintegration
elites highlight civic nature of Montenegrin statehood, targeting ethnic minorities with
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independence campaign.55 Pro-union campaigners continued to portray Montenegro as a
crib of Serbdom.
In the end, the statehood and nationhood of Montenegro was constructed by
ruling elites as civic, inclusive, democratic community with its own language, historic
legacy and national symbols recalling in romantic fashion pre-1918 era.56 In May 2006, a
referendum 55.5 percent of voters chose to create independent Montenegro.

Understanding the Payoffs
When Đukanović “rebelled” against Milošević in 1997, the question of
independence was really not yet on the agenda. Even if Montenegro’s ruling elite sensed
that secession might be worth considering, the costs sphere was too extensive to even
raise this idea.
Upon integration, the payoffs structure of Montenegro could largely be reduced to
benefits from pursuing the vision of Serbdom. Because Belgrade was a principal actor
and because the international community favored strong Serbia, Montenegro didn’t quite
reach its desired payoffs. Nevertheless, the project of Yugoslavia was conceived.
Upon disintegration, Serbia (or FRY and its legal follower) was still a principal
actor. The potential secession of Montenegro would compel Podgorica to seek
international recognition while Belgrade would keep State Union’s and Yugoslavian
legacy. Centralized statehood introduced in 1918 was never fully accepted by
Montenegrins who benefited much more under aa decentralized Socialist Yugoslavia. It
55
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can be thus concluded that legitimacy and identification with Serbdom was replaced by
Yugoslavism but the concept gradually died in the early 1990s. What is more,
Milošević’s recentralization augmented dissatisfaction. The problem was that Serbia had
penetrated Montenegro over all these years. It was not only about Serbdom and identity
anymore; in fact, there were military relations, welfare area, economic ties and social
policy. In the beginning, Belgrade kept sending signals of being a strong type of player,
but this reality gradually changed, especially after Milošević’s demise. Montenegro could
thus assess its options after security concerns were largely removed from the costs
sphere.
Even though international regimes have changed much since 1918, the major
actors seemed to be quite ambivalent when it came to Montenegrin independence.
However, in contrast with integration era, Serbia was not that “respected” anymore
because of Yugoslavia’s bloody collapse. Collective security was well established and the
strong signal sent by intervention in Kosovo in 1999 made both Belgrade and Podgorica
update their beliefs about the systemic conditions. It truly was about democracy and
human rights and Montenegro understood that joining the pro-democratic club would
decrease the costs of disintegration. Not knowing that, Podgorica could understandably
have feared a Bosnia-like bloodshed. What is more, the European Union’s conditionality
regime made it very clear that if Montenegro wanted to secede it had to do it gradually
and through dialogue with Serbia.
What emerged internally during almost 90 years of joint statehood exceeded the
initial framework implemented by Podgorica Assembly and solidified by Vidovdan
Constitution. In Yugoslavia, Montenegro enjoyed subsidies, representation, excellent
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employment opportunities,57 pensions, education and health care. Montenegrin
companies relied on raw materials from Serbia. What is more, a separate army and
diplomacy would induce substantial costs.58 Immediately after Milošević’s fall, the costs
of independence were said to disturb the “normality” of life, replacing it with “danger
and unrest”, inducing Serbia’s “hard barriers” and the international community’s
ambivalence.59
It is difficult to compare “normality” with “danger” and “barriers”. It can be
concluded that the payoffs structure at that time was really unknown to Montenegrin
decision-makers. Even the signals sent by Vojislav Koštunica and the international
community in Kosovo were not enough for Montenegro to simply say: “we dwell in lowcost world”. Only gradualism and careful detachment from Belgrade made Podgorica
self-confident economically, politically and socially. To be sure, the decision to
disintegrate was still a gamble with an unknown fate of such issues as Montenegrin
students in Serbia, property ownership or pensions.60 Whereas political and economic
dependence was largely dismantled, which helped to clear the costs sphere a bit, social
connections resulting from migration and intermarrying were still salient.
In the end, Montenegro made a decision in a game-theoretic fashion to introduce
the independence referendum and proceed with disintegration. The gradual process of
reaching this point let Podgorica finally contrast costs with benefits to the best of its
knowledge. Figure 9 shows the disintegration of Montenegro as an extensive form game.
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Figure 9: Disintegration of Montenegro: Extensive Form Game

In this game of complete and perfect information consisting of 9 subgames B
denotes Belgrade, W – the Western world, and M stands for Montenegro. It is crucial to
notice that generally both Montenegro and the West would prefer to see Belgrade
backing down on its opposition to Montenegro’s independence. Moderate engagement is
the best solution for the West since it would not alienate the remaining players too much.
Under existing international regimes’ conditions, Belgrade is also better off not staying
firm.
The game has one subgame perfect equilibrium (Back down for Belgrade;
Moderate response from the West; Independence choice of Montenegro). Independence
proves also to be Nash equilibrium in all Montenegro’s subgames; however, only on this
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one occasion does it fulfill the condition of subgame perfection, thus being the ultimate
outcome of the game.

Quebec and Canada
Actors: Changes on Strategic Level
Quebec’s integration game that resulted in the creation of Canada was set mainly
by the imperial power of that time: the United Kingdom. British colonies in North
America, at least initially, played largely according to the rules imposed by London,
which is not to say that they didn’t have any influence over the outcome of integration.
Nevertheless, taking into account the superior position of Westminster, it is fair to
consider colonies as non-privileged actors. The United States influenced these outcomes
as well, but Washington’s role was rather indirect.
Before the formal subordination of Canada to Great Britain was abolished in
1931, Quebec as the province of Lower Canada was the colonial subject of London,
forming in 1841, together with Upper Canada, the United Canadas61. Since the British
conquest of Quebec in the Seven Years War, the province was an object of a heavy
assimilationist policy. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 issued Anglo-conformity under
which British institutions, language and culture were favored, Catholics marginalized,
and the Protestant church served to promote the British way of life.62 The main function
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of colonial Quebec was to supply London with raw materials, furs, wheat and timber,
serving simultaneously as a market for manufactured goods.63
As assimilationist policy failed to achieve its goal and French-Canadian identity
survived, one can speak about subnational actorness of Quebec. This fact, together with
the outbreak of American Revolution and indirect influence exerted by the newly formed
United States, made the United Kingdom change its strategy towards its North American
colonies. In fear of Quebec joining American states in the south, London enacted in 1774
Quebec Act, confirming French civil law and initiating inclusion of Catholics. The
respect for different civic cultures and religions was followed by the creation of dual
legislature.64 This development can be viewed as a beginning of an integration game in
which not only Great Britain but also colonial actors were choosing their strategies.
The Act of Union of 1841 was one outcome of pressures from Quebec and
Ontario, which erected a legislative union of both units. The United Province of Canada
proved to be largely stalemated and the revisions of the status continued. This integration
game gained its real momentum when the American Civil War and the prospect of the
Union’s victory raised serious fears of United States’ expansion to the north. While the
English traditionally placed more emphasis on the federal model and the French believed
in greater autonomy with simultaneous benefits coming from being part of stronger
political unit, the American Civil War largely removed British reluctance towards
confederal construct and facilitated consensus among the colonies.65
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The Confederation project could be seen as an outcome of bargaining between the
principal actor – the United Kingdom - and two units of United Canadas: Ontario and
Quebec. The latter wanted to assure the protection of French-Canadian identity and other
actors complied with this request by allowing confederal units to choose their own
private laws. Abandoning the idea of independence (which would probably have brought
about economic and military weakness) Quebec agreed to the formation of a
Confederation which gave it joint defense with other units, market, and political strength,
as well as British protection in the case of war.66
The time when prospect disintegration of Quebec was the most probable was
marked by two sovereignty-related referendums in 1980 and 1995. The setting of the
game differs from the one present when integration occurred, especially actor-wise. Here,
Quebec is considered a subnational entity which possessed significant autonomy but still
was legally and economically secondary in comparison to a new actor on the scene:
sovereign and privileged Canada. Other units of the Confederation are considered
secondary actors as well. The United Kingdom entered the game at some point but its
influence was much smaller than at the time of integration. Technically speaking, London
was more privileged than Quebec but its choice of strategies did not interfere much with
the ones chosen by Quebec.
The problems with the Confederation oscillated around the poor fit between
geographic, social and economic realities of its units and thus many national unity
problems became augmented. Canada’s political system was designed to empower its
constituting parts but the downside was a deepening of center-periphery problems and
66
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Anglo-Francophone disagreements.67 During the 1980 referendum, campaign advocates
of the union believed that the change of federalist procedures within the constitutional
framework was a remedy for Quebec’s grievances. Indeed, the “no” vote in the
referendum was attributed to trust in political community and prospect improvements.
However, the second referendum was introduced because the support for independence
rose between 1980 and 1995.68
After the aggregation of Quebeckers’ preferences, pro-independence strategies
were executed by Parti Québécois. Formed in 1968 with the goal to conduct step-by-step
ballot box revolution, the party won elections in 1976, repeating its success in 1994.69
Upon both the 1980 and 1995 referendums, Parti Québécois suggested replacing federal
bonds with a bilateral economic association, aiming to alleviate concerns about the
economic viability of independence.70
In 1995, independence supporters assured Quebeckers that Confederationprovided economic and social benefits would be maintained but this argument was
quickly refuted by Ottawa. The federal government made it clear that Canada would not
enter into an economic partnership with Quebec and that its citizens would be considered
foreigners. Proponents of the federation claimed that an independent Quebec would have
to pay its share of Canadian debt, simultaneously losing access to social programs and
defense assurances.71 Ottawa didn’t try to challenge the legality of the referendum itself,
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hoping for a victory similar to the one in 1980. However, since the results nearly led to
break-up of Canada, the 1998 Supreme Court’s ruling confirmed that unilateral secession
would be illegal without prior changes of the constitution.72
Amendments to the Canadian constitution were indeed proposed in 1982, 1987
and 1992. The first one, passed by Canadian and British73 governments, was rejected by
Quebec. The second one, the Meech Lake agreement, was proposed by Quebec but not
ratified by Newfoundland and Manitoba. The Charlottetown Accord from 1992, which
would have given Quebec a guaranteed 25% in the House of Commons, was rejected in
referendums in several provinces and by the majority of Canadian population.74
By 1998, Quebec was quite free to choose its strategy of pursuing independence
because it aimed to achieve sovereignty through bypassing the constitution, which faced
a rather mild response from Ottawa. The situation changed when the federal government
decided to confirm its legal superiority over the provinces, requiring the constitution to be
changed prior to prospect independence. As empirical data shows, the constitutional
amendments witnessed conflicting strategies of the provinces, leading to the equilibrium
of stalemate.

Externalities: Changes on Regimes Level
The international system of the late 1800s was characterized by the emergence of
a few imperial power centers which dominated the global economy, having all parts of
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the world linked to them. The most important of them was the United Kingdom 75 which
largely stabilized international trade regime through the exercise of Pax Britannica.76 At
the time when the Canadian Confederation was formed, critical changes in this
international economic and security regime were taking place.
The period between 1849 and 1880 saw the heights of British domination of the
world economy.77 After defeating Napoleon in 1815, the United Kingdom solidified its
naval superiority and assured global free trade regime in order to exert greater influence
over international affairs.
This turn towards freer trade meant a new reality for the British colonies. The
concept of staples assumed their export of narrow range of goods, primarily food and raw
materials, to the colonial center. The United Kingdom particularly needed both upon
becoming the first industrialized country in the world, and its financial and industrial
center.78 However, the demise of fur trade in 19th century left Canada with no effective
staples.79 What is more, the move from prohibitionism to freer trade made London repeal
Navigation Acts which used to give Canada a preferential role in supplying Great Britain
with timber, enjoyed since 1803. The colony of the West Indies shared the same fate as a
sugar exporter. Since 1849, Navigation Acts that prohibited foreign ships from trading in
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British colonies were repealed and replaced by unilateral British free trade act. 80 The
Anglo-French treaty on commerce from 1860 set a fundamental framework for the
subsequent development of a low-tariff regime that was maintained until the late 1870s.81
The birth of Canadian Confederation in 1867 took place precisely during this
time. It also occurred when the British Empire enjoyed the heights of its hegemonic
dominance. The Pax Britannica reflected balance of power between five major players in
Europe and established British supremacy overseas because of its acquisition of strategic
bases.82
In its essence, Canadian unification was not nationalistic but rather provincialist,
which was understandable taking into account the ethnic diversity of the Confederation.
This fact contrasted with similar developments, for example, with the Australian case
which saw territorial and ethnic motivations of its independence.83 However, as an
outcome of bargaining, the Confederation project included the element of Britishness
embraced by Ontario. Here, patriotism and imperialism were deemed synonymous and
British-Canadians expressed their pride of belonging to the great brotherhood of
nations.84 Newly independent Canada found itself placed in the free trade regime and the
Pax Britannica security and economic regime, which had a profound impact on the
integration process.
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The British superiority lasted until unified Germany, France and the United States
industrialized, and the naval dominance was not assumed anymore. Colonization
reemerged and the open trade regime saw many defections. The international macroconditions continued to change under 1880-1914 large-scale immigration and rapid
economic development of colonies, which started to influence developments on micro
levels.85
There were two profound developments on the international regimes level
surrounding Quebec’s pursuit of disintegration. First, the oil crisis in early 1970s shook
the world economy and led to the general replacement of a Keynesian approach with a
neoliberal model. Second, the decolonization process was ongoing worldwide,
augmenting the voice of ethnic minorities and also these inhabiting Canada.
Between 1973 and 1975, Quebec found itself in the midst of stagnation which led
to economic recession, both developments provoked by the oil crisis. As an oil exporting
country, Canada doubled its oil prices and Quebec tried to stimulate the economy by
heavy investments in public sector.86 Ottawa’s raise of interest rates to battle inflation in
1979 led to another recession, followed by the next, deep one, in 1981-82. Like in the
early 1970s, Quebec conducted massive investments in higher education programs,
academic research, public road construction and housing.87
Strong attachment to the world economy via Canada coupled with the global shift
towards neoliberalism made Quebec vulnerable to economic difficulties. Independent
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Quebec of that time would have serious problems with servicing its external debt while
its industry would have to adapt quickly to face international competition.88 What is
more, in contrast to the English part of Canada, Quebeckers were used to social
democratic form of governance: “communitarian liberalism” with humanized capitalist
incentives.89
Quebec traditionally had expressed anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist traditions
even long before the international regime of decolonization became reality. When it
happened, local nationalism was magnified by these sentiments. The realities occurring in
the Third World were internalized by Quebec and adapted to its own situation of ongoing
socio-economic

transformation.90

However,

“although

the

references

to

the

decolonization phenomenon continued to be heard in the course of the Parti Québécois’s
rise to power and the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association, there was a growing
sense of disappointment as it became apparent that the ‘national’ component had come to
occupy center stage in the drive for Quebec’s national liberation, and that the dreams of
fundamental socio-economic change that decolonization had helped inspire were not
being fulfilled. Such disillusionment has been only exacerbated by the acceleration of
liberal capitalist globalization and, in the case of Quebec, the results of the 1980 and
1995 referenda and accompanying disarray of the sovereignist camp”.91
A serious change in the federal government’s attitude towards the question of
ethnic minorities inspired by the decolonization process was also reflected in policy
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evolution vis-à-vis Canadian aboriginal population. After the liberal government had
introduced the assimilationist White Paper on Indian Policy in 1969, the 1970s brought
the serious assertion of aboriginal rights marking the new phase of negotiated
settlements.92

Internalities: Changes on Domestic Level
Since the conquest of Quebec, the main desire of French-Canadians was to
preserve their national identity against British domination. Nationalism evolved into
different forms over time, but it is fair to conclude that the survival of the sense of
community was an overarching driver influencing the preferences of Quebecers. They
sought protection against formal Anglicization, which was fairly quickly achieved. Then
the goal of fair institutional representation, economic viability and social protection was
being pursued.
At first, the situation of Quebec was the one of a conquered entity, cut from
contacts with brotherly France, and politically and economically dominated. Its focus was
thus defensive, closed and a bit messianic while British-Canadian nationalism revealed
imperial, open tendencies.93 The English dominated urban life while the French
continued to strengthen their rural, communal ties, pursuing the ethos of protective
Québécois life.94 The Constitution Act of 1791 solidified division between Upper and
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Lower Canada, recognizing the latter as distinct and culturally different entity,
reinforcing Quebecers’ attachment to their territory. 95
The formation of the United Canadas came to meet the French-Canadian desire of
equal political representation. Even though the outcome was the institutional stalemate,
the newly-created parliament was characterized by dualism and not by English
domination. Both provinces had to look for ways of effective political conduct and the
Confederation proved to be a desired solution: joint coordination on the federal level
while simultaneously assuring non-subordination of one provincial government to
another.96 It is, however, important to highlight that by 1860s Quebecers equaled French
Canada with Lower Canada, revealing a small awareness of the existence of French
Canadians outside of Quebec. Thus the Confederal project aimed primarily to separate
provinces as much as possible in order to preserve local autonomy while simultaneously
benefiting from a joint political unit.97
The reasons were appealing. In 1864, French-speakers did not constitute a
majority in Canada and they would potentially lose seats in joint legislature while
keeping their representation in Quebec.98 Another emerging phenomenon was the
continuing influx of the non-French population to the Lower Canada, triggered by
industrial revolution and agricultural changes. In 1861, about 22 percent of Quebec was
not French Canadian.99 Even though the Lower Canada was a pioneer in railways
construction, the build-up of railways by 1867 affected Ontario much more than Quebec.
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The former was much better supplied with iron and coal, and it revealed closer ties with
the United States.100 Quebec realized that it had to cooperate with the Upper Canada to
create opportunities and constrain mass emigration to New England in pursuit of
manufacturing jobs. “The British North American provinces had been endowed with
resources enough. If they worked together to develop them, they could enjoy abundance,
material progress, and even economic power.”101
In 1867, Quebec became the part of a new economic entity with much wider
domestic market and industrial and agricultural sectors dominating its economy. Even
though the union was probably necessary modernization-wise and market-wise,
unemployment rates increased and income rates lowered.102
The primary motive for joining the Canadian Confederation was rationalitydriven and assumed a political alliance in exchange for multiple powers and privileges
for culturally, language-wise and religion-wise different Quebec. The desire to build a
Canadian nation was never strong and continuously precluded by the nature of political
institutions.103
Until the 1850s, Québécois nationalism was defined by the Catholic faith while a
century later a newly emerged political class challenged this establishment and the sense
of identity started to be connected with language rather than religion. 104 The old sense of
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nationalism was inward-looking and defense-oriented, with agricultural society largely
excluded from the mainstream of urban life.
The victory of the Liberal Party in 1960 marked the beginning of an end of this
socioeconomic, political and ideological settlement. The launch of the Quiet Revolution
aimed to modernize, remodel and effectively empower Quebec politically. 105 The reforms
introduced changes in areas of social welfare, education, healthcare and energy. The
period of 1960-1980 saw a greater involvement of the public sector in economic activity,
and massive investment in infrastructure, social services and housing.106
A very strong statist approach appealed to the Québécois desire for greater control
over their affairs and became an important label of the new form of nationalism. Quebec
should be able to promote French-Canadian interests though an empowered state,
democracy and modernity. These practices led to an increased awareness of the state as a
public goods provider for Quebeckers, controlling both the economy and social wellbeing. Indeed, the state interventionism boosted the growth of industrial, financial and
service sectors and led to the emergence of dedicated Francophone middle class.107
The 1980s brought failed an independence referendum, economic problems and
important changes on regimes level. Serious voices were raised, calling for privatization
and a decrease of state interventionism. This, of course, hit the core of Québécois
nationalism, leading to a political vacuum stretching over this decade. Sovereignty was
rejected, and so were the plans to remodel Canadian constitution, and the state’s ability to
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provide for Quebeckers was under attack. Nationalism experienced relegation from statesponsored and organized to more personal-initiative-driven. The disappointment came
also from the federal level and from the actions of other provinces when both Meech
Lake and the Charlottetown proposals did not come into being. The call for independence
was deemed the only solution to this stalemate, which almost became reality when
sovereignty was rejected by only a small margin of the population.108 The grievance
towards federal practices was reflected in a 1995 opinion poll, where “yes” referendum
voters were more negative towards Canada than their counterparts in 1980.
All in all, the support for independence has been virtually limited to the
Francophone population and the question of properly chosen expression of national
identity has prevailed as the main driver of disintegration.109

Understanding the Payoffs
While the British / American dynamics played a profound role in Quebec’s
integration process, the disintegration bid was characterized mainly by mechanisms of
bypassing the legal powers of privileged actor: Canada. Quebec was quite skillful in
mitigating potential costs imposed by principals of both games. The integration saw the
United Kingdom’s willingness to compromise over the scope of autonomy given to its
colonies due to the American Revolution and American Civil War. Upon disintegration,
the murkiness of the Canadian constitution almost let Quebec declare independence
without serious legal costs imposed by Ottawa.
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Economic costs were not mitigated. Any evaluation of prospective sovereignty
choice by Quebeckers proved to be made, apart from language situation, mainly on
economic basis.110 While the Québécois economy grew strongly between 1987 and 1988,
it slowed down the year after and turned down in 1990. Quebec was definitely worse off
than the rest of Canada and it would be very difficult for it to secure prosperity as an
independent state.111
Ottawa didn’t make it easy for Quebec to mitigate economic costs, stating that the
economic union would not be pursued. If Quebec decided to negotiate separate free trade
agreements after declaring independence, the outcomes could be not as beneficial as the
ones then in force. Canada and the United States might, for example, demand from
Quebec less interventionist policies with regards to domestic industries.112 And the whole
idea of a viable, strong and proud Quebec rested on a statist approach.
The spur for disintegration upon the 1995 referendum, provoked by a stalemate of
inter-provinces bargaining, was almost sufficient for Quebec to declare independence,
proving that the pursuit of identity protection, if aggregated efficiently by nationalist
forces, could suffice to make Quebec a sovereign country. The legal uncertainty added by
Canada’s 1998 ruling about illegality of secession makes similar outcomes unlikely in the
future.
There were surely very few additional links that emerged on social and
ideological platforms after Quebec joined Ontario and later Canadian Confederation. The
Francophone society was largely impregnable and there was no way for the sense of a
Canadian nation to overtake Québécois identity. Institutional constraints played an
110
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important role in this matter. Quebec was very unsure about its economic prospects as an
independent state and this situation continued to prevail since the time of integration.
Great Britain’s dominance over international regimes faded, and Keynesian economics
gave way to neoliberalism. What is more, Ottawa consolidated its formal power to make
Quebec’s independence illegal. Even though Quebec might have entered the union with
Ontario and later the Canadian Confederation on more or less equal basis, now it’s
legally disadvantaged and must face different economic quality than it the midst of Pax
Britannica.
Quebec’s disintegration is different in quality than its integration. The latter was a
clear bargain which appeased French-Canadian fears of subordination. The former was
torpedoed by other provinces and later by the federal government. Here, the
constitutional uncertainty ended up being clarified for Quebec’s disadvantage. The union
formed with Ontario was surely different than the one to be dissolved in 1980 and 1995.
Also, Québécois society was different then. Upon integration, it was closed, local and
self-protective, while upon disintegration it demanded modernity, social welfare and
democracy. These goals couldn’t be achieved without full participation in the world
economy, which changed profoundly between these two points in time. Prospects of
Canada and the United States isolating independent Quebec added much uncertainty
about economic viability of sovereignty. Figure 10 shows Quebec’s disintegration as an
extensive form game.
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Figure 10: Disintegration of Quebec: Extensive Form Game

Quebec’s game of disintegration consists of 7 subgames and assumes complete
and perfect information. Because two sovereignty-related referenda revealed a quite even
split between independence and union supporters, player Q (Quebec) values both
outcomes equally, although more under Ottawa’s (O) ambivalent attitude towards this
issue. Player P (Canadian provinces) prefers the current status quo, although this outcome
does not depend on its actions. The subgames starting from player 2’s nodes assume
either embracement or opposition to constitutional changes demanded by Quebec. There
is no subgame perfection in this game. Ottawa is always prone to choose ambivalent
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action. Quebec always opts for changes and is equally likely to choose independence and
the status quo, while Canadian provinces will play Embrace and Oppose with the same
probability.

Summary: Time, Costs and Uncertainty
For both Quebec and Montenegro, time progression contributed to qualitative
changes between integration and disintegration. The former experienced bargain and use
of leverage during its unification with Ontario. The latter surrendered, though largely
willfully, to a more powerful Serbia. Upon disintegration, bargaining was not so much an
issue for Quebec. It was more about understanding the payoffs structure and ultimate
failure to convince the population that its construct was favorable. Montenegro had a
similar problem, however, the costs sphere was largely revealed thanks to the gradual
process of gaining self-confidence.
Both entities experienced changes on strategic, external and internal levels.
Belgrade signaled to be a weak type of actor, in contrast to its strength upon integration.
International regimes did not favor Serbia anymore and thus Belgrade lost its prestige and
legitimacy behind centralist policies. Montenegro complied with the new regime of
democracy and human rights. Internally, the preference for Serbdom was quickly
replaced by Yugoslavism, which in turn died together with Josip Broz Tito. Quebec
didn’t have to bargain with the United Kingdom anymore and Canada proved to be an
actor with less conflicting strategies. International regimes began to favor neoliberalism
more, which contrasted with Quebeckers’ demand for interventionist state. Finally,
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internally, the population constituted a closed and self-protective society no more.
Instead, it demanded participation, modernization and democracy.
Additional links emerged in both cases, although in different ways. Montenegro’s
integration scheme opened doors for full unification and linkages in all possible issues
could be noticed. Upon disintegration, it had to face potential problems resulting from
breakage of military, economic ties, representation, health care or employment relations.
The symbolism of joint identity still had some influence. Even though political, economic
and military issues were resolved and costs largely cleared in these areas, the fate of
social relations constituted a clear risk which Montenegro decided to take. It can be
concluded that the payoffs were cleared to the extent of encouraging political elites to
introduce the referendum and for Montenegrins to opt for it.
Quebec was different. Very few linkages emerged on social, symbolic or even
political levels. The crucial element proved to be economy: the uncertainty fueled by
changes on international regimes level and Ottawa’s reactions. It is critical to remember
that Quebec almost chose independence. It can be even tempting to risk the statement that
disintegration costs were cleared to the point that pure luck decided that the union would
be continued.
Table 2 provides a summary of all crucial disintegration variables in comparison
between Montenegro and Quebec.
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Actors
change

Externalities change

Internalities change

Additional
links

Montenegro

Moderate

Profound

Profound

Many

Relative
clearance
of costs
High

Quebec

Profound

Moderate

Profound

Few

Moderate

Table 2: Variables in Disintegration Game: Changes for Montenegro and Quebec

The outcomes of both disintegration games can be largely explained with the
extensive form games presented earlier in this chapter. This explanation is a post factum
attempt and the real payoffs matrix contemplated by Montenegro and Quebec upon
decision to disintegrate must have, by assumption, assumed a certain degree of
uncertainty.
Figure 11 shows in simplified strategic form disintegration games of both units.
The upper row represents actual strategic interactions while the row below shows
hypothetical distribution of payoffs under increased uncertainty over the exact nature of
costs.
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Figure 11: Disintegration of Montenegro and Quebec: Strategic Form Games with Actual
and Hypothetical Payoffs Structure

The game in the upper left corner has one Nash equilibrium which assumes
Belgrade allowing independence and Montenegro choosing it. The game in upper right
corner has three Nash equilibria: Canada allowing independence and Quebec choosing
either to secede or to remain part of the union, and Canada disallowing with Quebec
opting for status quo.
Both games in the lower row show how uncertainty about a payoffs structure
might have impacted the actual decision. It might have been the case that independence
was not as beneficial for Montenegro even though it was still considered more favorable
than status quo (game in lower left corner). Belgrade, on the other hand, might have
favored upholding its opposition toward sovereignty to highlight its strong position but

131

Montenegrin independence would have proved ultimately to be beneficial for Serbia.
Quebec might have favored sovereignty slightly more than status quo (lower right corner)
while Ottawa might have suffered slightly less from standing firm, even though Quebec
would have disintegrated. Both games show plausible distribution of payoffs and it is fair
to assume that players could have seen their payoffs this way. Mixed strategy Nash
equilibria in these cases show this confusion: (2/3Allow, 1/3Disallow; ½Independence,
½Status quo), and (5/6Allow, 1/6Disallow; Status quo), (Disallow; Status quo).

Figure 12: Probability of Choosing Independence: QRE Corresponding to Introduced
Strategic Games
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Finally, Figure 12 shows the probability of disintegration for Montenegro and
Quebec under Quantal Response Equilibria and in correspondence with strategic form
games introduced earlier. Here, better strategies are played more often but certain
deviations from Nash equilibria are possible. In short, higher lambda coefficient suggests
greater rationality of player.113 Both games in the upper row reveal a disintegration option
reaching immediately probability of 1 and 0.5 for Montenegro and Quebec respectively.
In the modified Montenegro game, after initial shock probability of secession converges
slowly to 0.5. QRE for modified Quebec, the game shows indifference only under very
small lambda values, thus under higher “irrationality”, while status quo option is quickly
reached as the only plausible result.
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CHAPTER V
DISINTEGRATION FROM INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Two case studies presented in this chapter were chosen to depict the logic of
disintegration on international organizations structure level. The Andean Pact formed in
1969 by five Latin American states saw Chile’s withdrawal just seven years later. The
Pact created by the Cartagena Agreement aimed to bring together regional developmental
efforts and to constitute a safe haven amidst economic liberalism embodied by Bretton
Woods and GATT. The organization failed to extend its initial integration goals or even
to fulfill the goals included in the treaty. This failure prevented additional issue linkages
from emerging and pursuing state interventionism in a developmental effort was rejected
by Augusto Pinochet’s neoliberalism-oriented dictatorship.
Fiji’s contemplated withdrawal from the Pacific Islands Forum stretched between
2012 and 2015. In 2009, the island state was suspended in its membership by other
member states and it tried to organize an alternative regional organization, repeatedly
indicating its intention to leave the Forum after almost forty years of membership. The
organization itself evolved to include many areas vital for South Pacific island states’
development, significantly exceeding functions performed upon integration.
The choice of Chile and Fiji as case studies helps to research disintegration in
different parts of the world. Both states differ also with regard to their relative strength,
international position and strategic setting. In both cases, external developments impacted
heavily domestic choices. While Chile experienced a highly revealed payoffs structure
due to the lack of strategic constraints and scarcely replicated integration links, Fiji
disintegration’s costs proved to be murky due to reversal of these reasons.
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Chile and the Andean Pact
Actors: Changes on Strategic Level
The Andean Pact was formed in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru after signing Cartagena Agreement. By that time, the founders realized that the
framework of the existing Latin American Free Trade Association was unbeneficial for
them as countries at intermediate stages of development. In particular, states like Brazil,
Mexico and Argentina were receiving disproportionate benefits from the LAFTA scheme
while other members were lagging behind.1 Even though participants of other Latin
American integration projects influenced indirectly the creation of Andean Pact, 2 their
impact should be considered an element of a greater, regional picture, possibly the one
belonging to the regimes level. From a game-theoretic standpoint, there were thus five
equal actors in this integration game: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and most
importantly, Chile. Venezuela can also be counted as a player because of its participation
in negotiations, even though it didn’t join the Andean Pact until 1973.
Actors widely shared fundamental ideas of how the organization should look.
Nevertheless, the outcome of bargaining upon the Cartagena Agreement was achieved as
equilibrium with certain compromises. For example, during negotiations, Chile and
Colombia represented hard position on tariffs abolishment while Peru and Venezuela
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were more concerned with assuring measures for industrialization. Bolivia and Ecuador
tried to secure preferential treatment accounting for their relative underdevelopment.3
In the end, the founders sought to maintain equality between them by properly
channeling market forces. The least developed member states – Ecuador and Bolivia –
were to be treated preferentially.4 The clear goal of the five founding countries was thus
to pursue economic well-being which was to be “balanced and harmonious”, fairly
redistributive, aimed to reduce development differences among member states and based
on solidarity.5
The founding governments concluded that their interests would be best served and
regional development best secured if certain “distinctive features” were introduced.
These features included automatic elimination of intraregional trade barriers, introduction
of common external tariff, special treatment of foreign investment, and implementation
of programs for industrial development.6 Elimination of tariffs and further establishment
of Common External Tariff was seen as a necessary step towards desired goal: the
creation of customs union. The sectorial industrial development programs aimed to
enhance production of components of manufactured goods not produced before within
the region, and then to trade the goods among partner states.7 The sectors of industrial
planning included metalworking, petrochemicals, glass, pulp and paper, dye-stuffs,
pesticides and fertilizers, automobiles, steel, pharmaceuticals and electronic projects. 8
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The consensus reached by founders of the Andean Pact reflected a mixed
economy model with greater role of the state. In Chile, this scheme was implemented by
the government of Eduardo Frei. The project lasted for couple of years but eventually
member states’ governments began to change their policies. Chile transformed under
Augusto Pinochet and other founders were hit by externalities including the oil crisis.9
On 30 October 1976, Pinochet’s aggressive-free-market-pursuing Chile withdrew
from the protectionist Andean Pact. The actors of disintegration game included five states
from the integration period plus Venezuela which acquired member status in 1973. The
question of actorness or semi-actorness of Andean Pact as an intergovernmental
organization has to be asked, as required by the framework of the disintegration game
explained in Chapter III.
The most important bodies created by the Cartagena Agreement included the
Commission and the “Junta”10 which didn’t possess supranational power. At the time of
Chile’s withdrawal, the Andean Pact’s institutions suffered from permanent crisis
resulting from the politicization of the integration process. Member states started to pay
more attention to their own economic interests than that of region as a whole. In fact,
around 1975, it was virtually impossible to appoint members of the Commission and the
member states either did not comply with organization’s provisions or neglected to
implement them uniformly.11 For example, the Andean Pact’s decision 49 was accepted
unanimously by member states in 1971 but wasn’t implemented by any of them until
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1976.12 It can be concluded that the Andean Pact as a whole did not possess sufficient
autonomy to be considered an actor in the disintegration game.
The six member states diverged greatly in their enthusiasm towards the Andean
Pact. In fact, every one of them valued different area of cooperation and these attitudes
derived largely from selfish considerations. In 1975, Chilean self-perceived activity and
optimism in the integration scheme was among the lowest, together with Bolivia. In
contrast, Peru and Venezuela perceived themselves as the most active. Together with
Colombia, Chile valued trade liberalization the most while Venezuela and Peru were
more concentrated on industrial planning. Regardless of perceptions, the actual goals met
by the Andean Pact were scarce. Negotiations on industrial planning were filled with
controversy as no member state was willing to give up its industrial course. Until 1979,
the planning was agreed upon only in metalworking, automobiles and petrochemicals 13.
Neither legal treaty provisions nor individual member states’ actions posed
serious constraints on Chile’s withdrawal. There was some conflict over Chilean Decree
600 aiming to mitigate effects of Andean Pact’s Decision 24: the “common regime of
treatment of foreign capitals and on trademarks, patents, licenses and royalties”.14 Fellow
member states strongly opposed the Decree and the Commission declared it incompatible
with Decision 24.15 In 1974, Chile was ultimately charged by fellow member states for
non-compliance with the Decision and agreed to change the Decree but the conflict over
foreign investment became a direct spur for Chilean withdrawal.
12
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In sum, the Andean Pact at the time of Chile’s exit was a largely dysfunctional
intergovernmental organization, lacking coordination, criteria for implementation of
decisions, and uniformity in member states’ preferences. It wasn’t in power to pose
serious withdrawal costs to Chile and fellow members neglected to do so as well.

Externalities: Changes on Regimes Level
The end of 1960s was the time of fully-functioning Bretton Woods system under
which major European currencies became convertible, as was the dollar in relation to
gold, and parities were fixed but adjustable.16 What Latin American states in question did
by creating the Andean Pact was in fact a turn-away from this international regime,
believing that it was harmful for regional development.17 It is fair to say that the five
founding states responded negatively to the global trade and financial regime, acting
within a Latin American sub-regime characterized by state-interventionist culture,
industrialization and ideas of dependency theory.18 The impact of Bretton Woods’
international trade and financial regime was thus profound as by the scheme of regional
integration the Andean Pact’s member states tried to protect them from the perceived
unfair distribution of development which this regime reproduced.
Since the voting power in International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
reflected share ownership, the Latin American influence was weaker in comparison to
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European states.19 This and other discrepancies fueled the dissatisfaction of
disadvantaged member states. The IMF tried to convince its protectionist members to
implement more free market practices, but upon formation of the Andean Pact, the five
founding countries had already lost faith in the system. In general, they were more
concerned with trade issues, trying to win favorable concessions for developing
countries. Trade area was in turn of secondary importance for the Bretton Woods
proponents. After the Havana Charter’s decision to create the International Trade
Organization had failed to be implemented, many Latin American states further
expressed their doubts in Bretton Woods’ solutions.20
Failed codification of international trade resulted in what Andean Pact members
perceived to be an irrelevant and unbeneficial solution: the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. Many Latin American states didn’t see how GATT could help their growth
and development. As a result, many countries from the region refused to join the
Agreement up until 1980s. Exports fell continuously while the need for imports
magnified arising balance-of-payments problems.21
The participants of Latin American integration schemes assumed that the
abolition of internal tariffs coupled with intraregional imports and exports would help to
fix the balance-of-payments problems. They also hoped that insulation from world trade
through regional integration mechanisms would secure the region against external
shocks.22 It is true that intraregional trade increased in absolute and even relative terms
19
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until the late 1970s, but Andean Pact member states struggled with various economic
problems, foremost inflation, consequently denying the IMF’s calls for exports
expansion. As critics of inward-looking policies argued, the conditions created by the
Bretton Woods regime could help to extract major advantages only if a state agreed to
participate in expansion of world trade under GATT and trade liberalization in general.23
The 1973 oil crisis and OPEC’s actions leading to oil price increase by 400% had
a profound impact on oil-importing countries, including Chile. After the crisis, borrowing
became cheap, which left the Latin American states heavily indebted.24 This was yet
another reminder how balance-of-payments could impact the economic development of
inward-looking countries. In these economies, foreign borrowing became “gap-filling”
with respect to balance-of-payments deficit.25 It is striking that the region remained
vulnerable to external shocks despite the Andean Pact’s goal to prevent harmful impacts
of the global economy.26
By the time of Chile’s withdrawal from the Andean Pact, the Bretton Woods
system virtually collapsed. 1976 was a border year of transition from non-regime
conditions in monetary policy issue area to a new international regime based on flexible
exchange rates and Special Drawing Rights. 27 In trade issue areas, the global regime of
GATT was still in place until Uruguay Round Agreements established the World Trade
Organization almost twenty years later.
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Trade deficit, calls for dollar devaluation, the inability of the United States to
keep convertibility to gold and the subsequent adoption of floating currency by majority
of developed countries brought an end to the fixed exchange rates system.28 The collapse
of a functioning monetary discipline coupled with a price boom posed particular
challenges to countries that based their policies on curtailed exports. The Latin American
states, shifting from traditional import-substituting industrialization, responded in three
main ways to these developments. They either adopted export promotion, export
substitution or primary-export development. After Pinochet’s coup, Chile followed the
export substitution and neoliberal path.29 It is important to mention that none of these
attitudes proved to be particularly successful for the Latin American region’s economic
growth, which now became increasingly dependent on foreign borrowing.30
The 1970s saw increase of real wages in developed states which started to
delegate labor-intensive tasks to developing countries, which in turn raised the trade of
manufactured goods. Export pessimism of Andean Pact ideology was challenged yet once
again with Southeast Asian countries presenting an alternative model of state
interventionism and subsequent export-led economic growth.31 The hint that a strong,
authoritarian state might be better suited to effectively manage export-oriented economies
was a potential signal sent to upcoming far-right reformers in the Andean region.32
While Chile’s withdrawal from the Andean Pact was spurred directly by the
conflict with the Commission and other member states over foreign investments,
28
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subsequent global developments showed yet another justification for pursuing freemarket schemes and an export-oriented economy. While in the early 1970s the Andean
Pact’s member states were ruled largely by progressive reformists, by the mid-70s farright dictators came to power.33 The developments on international level must have led to
the reform of the Andean regional integration project, but by 1976 Chile grew impatient
with protectionist policies. While domestic conditions were decisive for Chile’s move,
the international setting certainly made it easier for Pinochet’s administration to avoid
additional economic costs.

Internalities: Changes on Domestic Level
At the time of integration with the Andean Pact, Chile was governed by Christian
Democrat Eduardo Frei, who in 1970 was succeeded by socialist Salvador Allende. Both
presidents promised revolutionary changes with regard to development and social justice,
to be achieved within democratic framework. Frei largely managed to secure both justice
and democracy, but this came at the expense of rising inflation and economic backlash.
The same problems coupled with increasing class polarization continued under Allende,
despite his being able to achieve an immediate increase in the living standards and
political participation of low-income social groups. In contrast, under Augusto Pinochet,
the military government decided to depart from a democratic framework and focus on
fostering economic well-being coupled with wiping out Marxist influence.34
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In order to understand internal conditions and the distribution of Chilean
preferences in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is necessary to mention two facts. First,
the economic problems and respective responses from the Chilean governments reached
back at least to the beginning of the century. Second, Chile was democratic at that time
and therefore decision-makers had to take into account the preferences of the larger
population.35 These conditions changed drastically under Augusto Pinochet’s
dictatorship.
Wage readjustments designed to compensate for chronic inflation were used in
Chile at least since the 1930s. Between 1958 and 1964, President Jorge Alessandri was
trying to fix the inflation problem by introducing a policy of austerity and restricting
wage increases, but the situation worsened again when the government ended up with no
money to enact necessary reforms. In 1966, President Frei’s government managed to
reduce inflation, increase production and redistribute income, but by the time of
Allende’s coming to power, Chile was caught in an economic recession and financial
crisis. The Socialist President tried yet again, manipulating real wages and boosting
consumer demand, accepting inflation as a lesser evil than impeding redistribution of
benefits to the poor.36 The Chilean people at the time of integration within the Andean
Pact were thus in a constant state of wage and redistribution experiments with visible
governmental leanings towards protectionism and social justice. The Andean Pact came
in handy because the goal of regional integration was to boost development while
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respecting local economic culture, industrialization needs, workers’ protection and selfsufficiency. The satisfaction of popular demand had been a top priority for at least three
decades before Allende, coming in excess of economic capacity.37
Democratic Chile was in a state of constant “electoral fever” with presidential,
congressional and municipal voting constituting a vital part of Chilean identity.38 By
1970, an expansion of the electorate occurred rapidly, and so did the increase of voter
turnout.39 Deeply rooted pro-social-justice preferences were reflected by the
congressional representation of Marxist parties which, from 1932 until 1973, were
entering electoral alliances and governmental coalitions and finally took over the
executive in 1970.40 Allende wanted to keep the democratic framework in his socialist
endeavor,

reshaping

institutions

and

seeking

alliance

with

working

class

representatives.41 In the end, however, the opposition managed to convince the middle
class that it didn’t have to share the burden of national development as envisioned by the
socialist President.42
When Augusto Pinochet took over power, Chile had been suffering from the
worst economic crisis in its history. During its participation in the Andean regional
integration scheme, the country was able to boost its interregional trade almost twice,
taking four years to increase the exchange more than other Andean Pact member states
did in seven years. Integration partners also managed to draft industrial development
projects in three sectors. In the beginning, Salvador Allende believed that Chile didn’t
37
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need foreign investments for its growth. Even despite his later shift on this issue, the
investments progress was hampered by a high level of nationalization.43
Pinochet’s remedy for the balance-of-payments situation and for general
economic deterioration assumed aggressive free-market actions and compliance with the
rules set by international monetary and trade regimes. The so-called Change Team in
Chile, comprised of economists trained in the United States in 1960s and early 1970s,
assumed high positions in Pinochet’s government. They believed that Chile’s chronic
poor economic performance resulted from state interventionism, high inflation and
protectionism. The picture upon Allende’s downfall was telling its story: import tariffs
averaged 105%, there were many additional quantitative trade restrictions, the state
controlled about 600 companies, and the inflation rate hit the highest score in the world:
600%.44 After Pinochet’s radical changes, the number of state-controlled companies
decreased to 50 in 1976, a dramatic reduction and simplification of trade barriers was
implemented, an extreme devaluation scheme and active exchange rate policy were
initiated and by, 1981, the inflation rate equaled 9.5%.45
Pinochet’s far-right brutal dictatorship was set on cleansing the remains of
Marxism in Chile, which also assumed repression of left-wing labor union leaders. Since
membership in labor unions diminished dramatically since 1973, the government found
43
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itself among different interest groups and therefore different formulated preferences to
respond to. Because the political system of Chile was authoritarian at that time, internal
pressure resulting from formulated preferences did not come from the wider electorate.
Free from electoral constraints, Pinochet’s government had to be responsive to
preferences of various interest groups. These consisted mainly of import-competing
agricultural producers, export-oriented mining producers, representatives of non-tradable
industries, financial conglomerates and the remaining unionized workers. Importcompeting sectors primarily lost on tariffs reduction but benefited from currency
devaluation,

while

export-oriented

producers

benefited

from

general

trade

liberalization.46
It is safe to say that the Chilean decision to disintegrate was elite-driven,
encouraged by developments on an international regimes level. The nature of Chile’s
political system made the government responsive mainly to interest groups but not to the
population as a whole, which additionally influenced the perceived costs sphere. It is
interesting to note that in the 1990s, after Pinochet’s dictatorship, popular support for
regional economic integration in Chile equaled 60%. The nature of the political system
surely tells much about preferences aggregation conducted by unitary players of the
disintegration game.47
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Understanding the Payoffs
As with any case of disintegration subject to the theory proposed in Chapter III,
Chile’s withdrawal from the Andean Pact should be reviewed by using the main
indicators: time progression, initial links, consent and conditions for emergence of
additional links, internalities, other players’ strategies and changes on regimes level.
Comparing the situation at the time of disintegration with the one at the moment of
integration should help to understand how occurrences within three levels of analysis
(internal, external, strategic) became internalized by Chile’s ruling elite, what
understanding of a potential payoff matrix emerged, and how it influenced the decision to
withdraw.
Chile withdrew after merely seven years of membership in the Andean Pact. This
case is representative of an average tendency retrieved from the dataset presented in
Chapter III.48 The median for 613 exits from intergovernmental organizations is 11 years,
with IGOs of an economic scope facing 2.61 withdrawals: almost the highest number
among other organizations. The general theoretical statements are that states are more
prone to exit after few years of their membership, that one issue-coverage makes the
costs sphere more approachable, and that the economic area of cooperation is the easiest
to break, probably because of the fairly easy quantification of costs and benefits. This
picture is not complete without delving more deeply into case studies.
Relatively few years of dwelling within the Andean Pact coupled with only
several issues subject to cooperation pointed out in the Cartagena Agreement49 hampered
the emergence of additional links. It is important to note that trade and investment
48
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openness were perceived to be beneficial due to international conditions. Chile was trying
to regulate foreign investment outside of the Andean Pact, even during its membership in
the organization. Many other goals set by the Pact were not met before Chile’s
withdrawal anyway. What Chile really lost upon its exit was an important market for
metalworking: the issue in which cooperation goal was achieved. Nevertheless, relatively
few agreed upon issues within industrial planning and the lack of enthusiasm Chile was
showing to this issue reveal rather minimal costs to be paid upon disintegration.
Much more important were political costs. The Cartagena Agreement created a
handful of bodies for the coordination of the integration project. Additional links that
emerged over the few years of Chile’s membership included a forum for consultation
with its neighbors. Venezuela was the only Latin American country capable of carrying
on investments and, together with Colombia, it was the only democracy in the region.
Also important were the ties with Ecuador and Venezuela on the basis of their oilexporting significance. Shared borders with Bolivia and Peru made them potential
geopolitical rivals, so contacts with these states were of vital importance.50
The discrepancy between integration assumptions is strikingly outlined in the
Cartagena Agreement and within actual developments around 1976. This case shows how
qualitatively different these two moments were. Economic goals agreed in 1969 were not
fully met due to the lack of political will of member states. Each state valued different
issues more and integration often became paralyzed. Also, institutions created by the
Cartagena Agreement proved to be dysfunctional, and there was no real room for them to
replicate and transform, possibly into supranational bodies. The politicization of the
Andean integration process meant a prioritization of particular interests over the common
50
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vision. Upon disintegration, Chile was not giving up benefits it agreed upon in the 1969
treaty. It was resigning much less and the various political ties were not the direct subject
of integration agreement.
In the end, players of Chile’s disintegration game proved to be weak in type,
preoccupied with their own problems and answering to international regimes’ demand for
export-oriented economies. Pinochet’s dictatorship had to respond to interest groups vital
for capitalist systems.
Chile’s withdrawal from the Andean Pact is an interesting case, showing different
qualities of disintegration, but the case where strong international signals coupled with
internal demand, the choice to disintegrate was facilitated. In the actor’s mind, the
benefits on the horizon outweighed mostly political costs.
Figure 13 aims to code strategies of Chile withdrawal game’s players together
with respective payoffs into an extensive form game tree.
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Figure 13: Disintegration of Chile: Extensive Form Game

Under this suggested distribution of payoffs, player M (Andean Pact member
states) can decide to choose either a strong or weak position. The former means that there
is a willingness to improve the Pact’s conduct and a belief in its regained efficiency. In
this case, player Ch (Chile) is indifferent between staying and withdrawing because
technically it could bargain with other member states to reshape the Pact’s form to its
favor. Member states would rather see Chilean continued membership in order to prevent
the organization from potential collapse. If player M chooses to play weak, it indicates
that the Pact really serves each member’s particularistic interests and it’s even better for
Chile to exit because the future bargaining over these interests would be much easier
without confronting Chilean strong position. Also, player Ch prefers to withdraw in this
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case, opting for its own way of development without being exposed to stalemated
negotiations with fewer pro-market partners.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game assumes player M choosing
weak and player C playing exit. The withdrawal move of Chile is also weakly dominant
under uncertainty of member states’ future intentions to modify the Pact’s nature. In other
words, the internal preferences of Chile ruled by Pinochet’s dictatorship were so liberalmarket-oriented that disintegration from the Pact was seen favorable, even if its member
states decided to shift towards this direction in the future.

Fiji and the Pacific Islands Forum
Actors: Changes on Strategic Level
Fiji and its island neighbors in the South Pacific region did not play any
prominent international role during the colonial era. Many of them were not pushing for
autonomy, not to mention sovereignty and freedom of action in foreign policy sphere.
The situation began to change with the global decolonization process, which appealed
both to colonial powers and to their subjects themselves.
The period directly after the Second World War saw a continuity of established
colonial order. The major players in the region – the United States, the Great Britain,
France, Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia - were dedicated to maintaining their
influence, developing South Pacific Commission to jointly pursue this goal. This decisive
body had the Conference at its disposal – the gathering of South Pacific island states
performing an advisory function on economic and social issues. Execution and even
discussion of political matters were restricted to colonial powers, a fact which was
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becoming a source of dissatisfaction magnified by decolonization process. Western
Samoa achieved independence in 1962 as the first colony in the region and, around that
date, subnational actors began to call for more powers to the Conference. In 1965, a Fijiinitiated “rebellion” resulted in the creation of the Pacific Islands Producers Association
operating outside the South Pacific Commission’s framework. Two years later, meetings
of the Conference and the Commission were held together and by 1974 the former
became the governing body of the latter. Since the South Pacific Commission’s scope
proved to be too limited to grasp the entirety of regional challenges, the South Pacific
Forum was formed.51
Fiji played a pivotal role in these developments, not only by integrating with the
newly created international organization, but also by initiating and founding it. The
movement outside of the framework set by colonial powers started with the creation of
PIPA and was indeed orchestrated by Suva. Fiji took the next step together with Cook
Islands and Samoa, and soon was joined by other regional actors. Fiji’s role was
prominent and it is fair to say that Suva took leadership in the integration game setting, at
least vis-à-vis other South Pacific islands states.52 Of course, little could have been done
without the consent of privileged colonial powers, but the regime of decolonization
placed them in a state of the world in which the benefits of letting former colonies decide
for themselves outweighed the benefits of maintaining the status quo. Nevertheless, good
relations with these actors were critical for South Pacific islands states which relied on
their aid, countries that often specialized in just one-product exports and were short of
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trading partners. For example, the invitation of Australia and New Zealand to the South
Pacific Forum aimed directly to secure funding as well as a greater international
presence. The scheme of regional integration was set to achieve the highest possible level
of economic development while taking into account limiting factors.53
The early focus of the Forum was set indeed on developmental topics including
trade, telecommunications, shipping, civil aviation, and education, but the participant
units also tried to take control over political matters sensitive to the region, especially
nuclear testing and decolonization. The most important feature was pursuing these goals
for the first time independently from the colonial powers or rather with “controlled
dependence” where ties with the US, the UK, France, New Zealand, Australia, European
Communities and Japan were channeled to achieve better economic performance within
the framework of joint regional cooperation.54
Members of the Pacific Islands Forum are small yet proud of their
independence.55 In the period of Fijian prospect disintegration stretching from 2009 to
2015, these states performed the functions of actors in the game. Actorness of the Forum
as a whole is highly questionable since it has never evolved from international
organization to a regional community.56 Its scope is crucial and represents South Pacific
island states’ interests but it is risky to claim that it has shaped these interests in a
significant manner. Other actors present in the disintegration game included China,
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Japan, Russia and the United States but their influence had an impact on the Forum
member states’ preferences rather than colliding with their strategies.
Indeed, the Forum as a whole suffered at times from individual members’
propensity to take advantage of others. Fiji, as the most powerful of the island states, was
itself accused of such practices especially with regard to University of South Pacific and
Air Pacific from which it was said to benefit the most and disproportionally. It is
important to mention that each of the Forum’s members had the right to exercise a veto
and thus institutional deadlock was inherent. What is more, the Forum has been
traditionally reluctant to intervene in the domestic matters of its members, for example,
during the Fijian coup in 1987 and secessionism in Papua New Guinea.57
There were, of course, many successful attempts and the members of the Forum
extended their cooperation in several areas: telecommunications, fisheries, aviation, or
environment. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty from 1985 aimed to counter French
actions in the field. In 1992, the Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation
brought together the efforts to fight transnational crime.58 Since the early 2000s, virtually
all states in the region adopted neoliberal economic policies.59 The Forum influenced the
creation of semi-independent organizations covering specific issue areas: the Pacific
Forum Line, Telecommunications Training Center or Forum Fisheries Agency.60
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In April 2009, Fiji was suspended from the Forum after failing to keep up the
promise to return to democratic governance by March the same year.61 Since the changes
were still not implemented three years later, the members of the Forum collectively
reinstated their decision in September 2012.62 Fiji’s position was firm and there is a
reason to believe that Suva had confidence in its exceptional role in the South Pacific
region.
In August 2013, Suva organized the meeting attended by Papua New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Nauru and East Timor to demonstrate its ability to lead
regional cooperation.63 Suva tried to organize the Pacific Islands Development Forum to
counter the Pacific Islands Forum which it believed had become dominated by Australia
and New Zealand. It failed, however, to secure sufficient support from its neighbors.
Fiji’s initiative was considered pointless, and in the view of Samoa's Prime Minister
Tuilaepa Sailele, it aimed to duplicate activities already covered by the Forum.64
Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama tried also to force Australia and New
Zealand out from the Forum, accusing them of dominance over its activities. The truth
was likely that Suva faced serious criticism for the 2006 coup and tried vigorously to
reconsolidate its position in the region but all attempts had failed. Even the threat to leave
the organization unless Australia and New Zealand continued to be members did not
achieve its goal. The Fiji’s suspension was lifted in October 2014 and ultimately, in May
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2015, Bainimarama backed down on Fiji’s refusal to participate in the Forum’s
activities.65

Externalities: Changes on Regimes Level
The creation of the South Pacific Forum was accompanied by three main
developments on the international regimes level. Nuclear proliferation sought by the
United States, France and Great Britain made them look for conveniently empty spaces
suitable for weapons’ testing. The problem of choosing the South Pacific region to
perform this function was “causal racism” towards its inhabitants, which assumed that the
local population’s voice could be ignored.66 Decolonization was a critical phenomenon
which motivated South Pacific island states to seek independence and simultaneously to
engage in regional cooperation to manage the burdens of sovereignty. The growing
demand for healthy economic performance was dictated by the growing globalization of
the world economy and newly independent island states found their way to respond to
this challenge through the formation of the South Pacific Forum.
The question of nuclear proliferation was especially problematic for the region.
Indeed, “no aspect of French activity in the South Pacific since the 1960s has been as
controversial as France's testing of nuclear devices in Polynesia.”67 Whereas the United
States and the Great Britain abandoned testing in the 1960s, France continued its
activities, causing serious environmental concern in the region. Before the 1985 South
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Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty, France was subject to numerous protests including
diplomatic frictions with Chile and Peru, as well as cases in the International Court of
Justice filed by Australia and New Zealand.68 The international nuclear proliferation
regime was an important spur for South Pacific islands states to join their voices in
defense of their environmental security.
The wave of decolonization reached the South Pacific region with delay and after
it pushed many nations in Africa and Asia towards independence. Since the policies of
colonial powers in the region were not perceived to be exceptionally oppressive and the
Pacific islands were aware of their economic vulnerabilities, many units opted for
continuing ties with their respective centers: both economic and security-related.69
Nevertheless,, the global regime of decolonization initiated by the United Nations put a
significant amount of pressure on colonial powers. New Zealand decided early to
reformulate relations with its dependencies, while Australia was pressed to quickly grant
independence to Papua New Guinea.70 It soon became evident that the gathering colonial
powers – the Commission formed in 1947 - became anachronistic by the mid-1960s.71
Those island units which decided to pursue independence found themselves in a
world demanding nation state framework subject to increasingly salient globalization
forces. The 1960s saw the beginning of global exponential growth, interrupted by several
crises, but experiencing the total ratio of foreign trade to gross domestic product climbing
to 52 percent by 1999. Trade agreements proliferated heavily in the 1970s. The pace of
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regional cooperation in the South Pacific assumed a response to the growing demand of
economic globalization and the South Pacific Regional Trade and Cooperation
Agreement quickly followed.72
The externalities of the time of Fijian potential disintegration were determined by
the international regime of economic neoliberalism and globalization. Security concerns
didn’t play much of a role for South Pacific island states, partially due to the post-Cold
War peace dividend and the move towards the abolition of nuclear weapons, and partially
because of location and size-determined minor peril of military intervention.73 Few
regional players possess military forces and threats to security have been perceived rather
through the prism of international crime and environmental deterioration.
The actions of the Forum initiated upon the new millennium aimed to enhance
trade liberalization and compliance with WTO principles.

Economic globalization

exerted its influence on the South Pacific island states and encouraged many of them to
adopt neoliberal economic policies.74 Compliance with the rules of the international
economic regime led to changes not only in terms of internal policies but also in foreign
behavior. China’s trade expansion lead the South Pacific island states to benefit from
cheap goods to the point where, in 2013, Beijing’s exports constituted 11 percent of the
total Papua New Guinea’s imports.75 Many regional economic arrangements aimed to
bring together Pacific states with Australia and New Zealand (Pacific Agreement on
72
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Closer Economic Relations), or with the European Union (Economic Partnership
Agreements).76
This compliance may have resulted from a lack of choice since the South Pacific
island states have undiversified production, while their economies rely heavily on imports
and exports. It also makes them vulnerable to global fluctuations which constitute the
major part of world economic developments. During the 2008-2009 crisis, the fall of
global demand harmed regional tourism, manufacturing and agriculture.77
The struggles against neoliberal policies come predominantly from Pacific island
states’ workers and indigenous populations which traditionally enjoyed safety nets
subject to erosion caused by globalization. The percentage of people living below the
poverty line ranges from 12 percent in Cook Islands to 50 percent in Kiribati. Inequality,
social exclusion and poverty continue to grow.78 In 2001 in Papua New Guinea at least
three students were killed protesting the IMF and World Bank. For many of these people,
resistance embodies traditional opposition to imperialism and neo-colonialism.79
The rise of inequality combined with environmental damage augmented by the
regime of neoliberal economy constitutes an important challenge for the South Pacific
island states despite providing benefits of trade and growth.80
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Internalities: Changes on Domestic Level
Fiji became an independent state in 1970. There were two profound factors which
constituted the source of the island population’s preferences. First, the British colonial
rule in Fiji was far from oppressive. In fact it became a sort of experiment under which
Fijian culture and political customs were given exceptional protection. Second, the ethnic
composition of the population was subject of critical changes due to investment in the
local sugar industry. The effects were to become perennial and critical.
In the 1870s Fiji’s first British governor Sir Arthur Gordon decided to protect the
island’s identity from potential demands issued by white settlers. Fijian customs, heritage
and trade were deemed inalienable and paramount. The island was divided into districts
and provinces under the authority of local chiefs who were themselves represented in
general Council. The constitution of independent Fiji from 1970 solidified this
establishment, giving the Council of Chiefs authority over land and customary laws.81
London’s policy to “import” Indian sugar plantation workers during the colonial
era led to a situation in which by the end of the Second World War the descendants of
these laborers constituted majority of the island’s population. Political parties which
emerged during Fiji’s movement towards independence reflected racial polarization
developed during that time. Federation Party originated from laborers’ unions which
criticized Fijian chiefdom establishment. In turn, Alliance Party became a voice of this
establishment. The emergence of Fiji Labor Party in 1985 provoked by stagnant
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employment and wages freeze could have started an era of ideologically rather than
racially divided party system but the latter still continued to prevail.82
Looking on Federation Party’s and Alliance Party’s programs from 1968’s byelections reveals no major political differences. The former advocated for minimum basic
living wage, more equitable terms of trade with such countries as New Zealand and
Australia, maintenance of Fijian land ownership, and free education and health. The latter
focused on movement towards internal self-government, tourism and sugar industries,
social justice, education, roads, and communication. The only real difference besides
racially-defined electoral support was the view on independence. Alliance Party opposed
Federation Party’s calls for immediate sovereignty.83
This fact reflected the fear of ethnic Fijians to become dominated by IndianFijians after independence is declared. Around that time British last governor Sir Robert
Foster expressed his conviction that the island possessed many critical features such as
healthy economy, high literacy, efficient civil service and satisfactory standards of
medical care. Indeed, newly independent Fiji was surely the strongest of South Pacific
islands states, it had advantage of central location in the region and enjoyed international
transport arrangements.84
Yet this potential was eclipsed by continued ethnic division. In the 1960s
independence was viewed by much portion of the population with anxiety about IndianFijian aspirations. The chiefdom establishment proved to become a tool against these
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ambitions which largely precluded ethnic Fijians from responding to the modern world’s
opportunities and challenges. At the same time Indian community was making rapid
advances in education, commerce and public sector.85
The post-colonial history of Fiji is the one of coups, frequent constitution changes
and endless tension between the native population and Indian-Fijian community. The
legacy of the first governor Sir Arthur Gordon has been deeply rooted in the island’s
identity and indigenous Fijians feel entitled to the country’s resources, whereas the Indian
descendants feel continuously excluded.86 Electoral victories of Indian-Fijian-backed
political parties led to one constitutional crisis and two coups. The latter – in 1987 and
2000 – aimed to restore native Fijian dominance. The formation of Fiji Labor Party did
not bring expected long-term shift from ethnicity-based to ideology-based competition
and the elections of 2006 brought yet once again very ethnically-polarized results.87
The 2006 coup of Frank Bainimarama aimed to end this perennial division and
restore democracy after this task was completed. Even though neither of three coups was
particularly damaging to Fijian institutions and the democratic functioning was restored,
the country has been facing continuous exodus of Indian-Fijian population. The situation
has remained unchanged after 2006.88 According to the opinion poll from September
2011 Bainimarama enjoyed 66 percent support and 67 percent of respondents believed
the government was doing good job in ending racial division. Overwhelming 98 percent
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believed in right to vote and expression, thus revealing strong democratic sentiment.
Finally, 79 percent disagreed with suspension of Fiji in Pacific Islands Forum and 77
percent were confident in their country’s leading role in the region.89 Despite these
beliefs, two years later Indian-Fijians continued to flee the country: to Australia, New
Zealand, the United States and Canada. Those who remain constitute the poorest portion
of the population, consisting mainly of unskilled workers.90
Since Fiji has failed to confirm its regional position by threatening to disintegrate,
nor it was able to form an alternative regional organization, it is probably its fate to dwell
within the Forum. Going alone economically is unthinkable even though the island
possesses high level of urbanization, literacy and quite diversified exports.91 Escaping
democratic framework did not work internally – since 1987 coup the economic growth
slowed down and Indian-Fijians continue to emigrate.92 The Forum’s members also stood
firm not letting Fiji back until democracy was restored. China didn’t have similar
objections and in January 2011 the Reserve Bank of Fiji revealed that both China and
India were the main contributors to the country’s direct investment. 93 But for now all
these developments have resulted in Fijian comeback and “playing by the rules.”
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Understanding the Payoffs
“Bainimarama’s crusade to marginalize the Forum would have been unthinkable
in the era dominated by the two great leaders of independence in the Pacific: Fiji's
Kamisese Mara, (…) and PNG’s grand chief, Michael Somare (…). For both leaders, the
Forum, still based in Suva, was an international body which they viewed as their own
creation. Its traditions and its island style validated their approach to leadership.”94
Indeed, in this vein Fiji’s contemplation of disintegration should mainly be perceived as
the search for validation of Bainimarama’s choices. He believed that his methods to
restore order in Fiji were justified even if they took a nondemocratic form. Ambitions to
form an alternative to the Forum, threats of disintegration and attempts to exclude
Australia and New Zealand were a natural extension of domestic politics and expressed
the search for legitimacy to the regime.
It was, however, impossible for Suva to mitigate the costs of exiting the Forum
mainly because of other actors’ strategies. They stood firm against Fiji’s attempts, thus
giving the hint that South Pacific regional cooperation is not only Fiji’s creation anymore.
At the time of integration, the opposition to colonial powers and putting the fate of the
region into island states’ hands proved to be critical motivations for cooperation. Upon
debated disintegration, Suva tried to play a similar card, but its neighbors had much more
say.
The Forum has always tried to play according to rules set by international regimes
and Fiji’s actions would have threatened this course. The doubtful fate of alternative
regional organizations would have put benefitting from the neoliberal economics in
question. Support for Fiji’s undemocratic actions would have undermined the Forum’s
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international reputation. It seems that upon integration, the island states had much more
freedom of choice when it came to domestic regimes, but nowadays, an authoritarian
form of rule is largely unacceptable, especially for small and uninfluential countries.
Fiji has had major problems with internal stability issues, and cooperation with
nondemocratic states like China cannot compensate for good relations with immediate
neighbors, including Australia and New Zealand. Suva was unable to prove its dominant
regional role to the island’s population even though the majority of citizens believed in it.
What is more, almost 100 percent of Fijians desire democracy and the rule of law.
Since no viable alternatives appear on the horizon, disintegrating from the Forum
would bring major costs. It is impossible for Fiji to contemplate its situation from the
early 1970s and conclude that it has enough power to shape the region. The Forum has no
charter, which means every member possess veto power. Many additional links emerged
during the Forum’s lifespan and included areas vital for isolated island states:
telecommunications, shipping, aviation, fisheries and climate change.95 The unsure future
of replacing these institutions or negotiating separate agreements for each issue is a very
powerful incentive against disintegration.
Finally, regionalism is critical for the South Pacific island states, even more than
for other regions. Opting out from these benefits would lead to the breakup of critical
avenues: something that a small, isolated and economically vulnerable island state cannot
gamble with.96
Figure 14 shows strategies of Fiji (player F) and of the Forum’s member states
(player M) with respective payoffs coded into an extensive form game tree.
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Figure 14: Disintegration of Fiji: Extensive Form Game

The best possible outcome for Fiji as presented in this game is to withdraw from
the Forum after other member states have accepted Suva’s strong position: that is, they
joined Fiji’s efforts to form an alternative regional scheme. Alternatively, Fiji prefers to
continue its membership if other member states refused to join these efforts. In turn,
player M wishes to see Suva backing down from the very beginning, complying with
pressures to restore democracy and returning to normal functioning within the
organization. Alternatively, Fiji’s withdrawal consequences are a great unknown and
member states cannot be really sure whether joining Suva’s efforts to form an alternative
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regional organization would bring higher benefits. At this stage, it is much safer for them
to expect Fiji’s continued membership and return to democracy.
The game has one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which Fiji’s attempts to
shake the cooperation come to be opposed by other member states and Suva ultimately
chooses to retain its membership. The Nash equilibrium of Fijian withdrawal doesn’t
enter subgame perfection: the continued membership is the only possible option.

Summary: Time, Costs and Uncertainty
Since their creation, the Pacific Islands Forum and the Andean Pact evolved along
different paths. The former has been largely general in scope and initially agreed upon
cooperation on economic issues quickly expanded into other areas. The latter failed to
evolve towards greater integration despite ambitious goals set in the Cartagena
Agreement.
The creation of the Forum coincided with South Pacific island units increasingly
reaching their independence, which added real symbolic meaning to the organization.
The whole rationale for sovereign existence and prosperity relied on the regional
cooperation that flourished on the basis of decolonization and augmented self-confidence
in political matters. This symbolic tie has been very difficult to break. The Forum’s
framework expanded to include additional issues: telecommunications, fisheries, the
environment, civil aviation, education and political coordination. This spectrum of
decisiveness is something virtually unachievable for a small island state going it alone.
Fiji understood this and tried to form alternative regional solutions which unfortunately
failed to attract its neighbors.
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The withdrawal from the Andean Pact didn’t really induce serious costs for Chile.
Except for losing the market for metalworking and some political breakage, the Chilean
government concluded that internalities, externalities and strategies of other member
states did not collide with disintegration. Contemplation of political costs confirms their
non-quantifiable character but the failure of the Pact to form efficient institutions was a
serious hint that political coordination could be well managed outside of the Pact’s
framework.
The moment of integration reflected Andean Pact member states’ distribution of
bargaining positions. The developmental scheme was directed towards the poorest
members, while upon disintegration, the particularistic interests coupled with the
developmental model’s failure to mitigate the impact of the oil shock assured Chile that
the costs of disintegration would not be profound.
In turn, the Pacific Islands Forum’s need for political resilience from the time of
integration evaporated together with colonial powers’ “causal racism” and great power
politics in the region. Fiji’s rhetoric of opposition towards Australia’s and New Zealand’s
dominance was poorly grounded and the Forum’s biggest concern at the time of Suva’s
contemplated disintegration was development. Due to the lack of alternatives and also
due to the symbolism of South Pacific cooperation, the withdrawal of Fiji would have
brought costs beyond perception.
Table 3 summarizes variables which played a role in the disintegration of Chile
and Fiji in comparison with the moment of integration.
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Actors
change

Externalities change

Internalities change

Additional
links

Chile

Poor

Moderate

Profound

Few

Relative
clearance
of costs
High

Fiji

Profound

Profound

Moderate

Many

Low

Table 3: Variables in Disintegration Game: Changes for Chile and Fiji
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CHAPTER VI
DISINTEGRATION FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
Disintegration in the third structure of analysis – supranational institutions – is
presented here in the cases of Greenland and Greece. Due to the one-N problem, the
European Union is the only example of a supranational institution currently available.
Greenland was admitted to the European Communities in 1973 together with Denmark
and as its integral part. After twelve years of membership, in 1985, it decided to leave.
Greece joined the EC in 1981 during the second enlargement, after the
government of Colonels was replaced by a democratic regime. The entrenchment in
Western institutions and global economy was accompanied by a growing demand for and
provision of a welfare state, financed by extensive borrowing and debt-running. Over
time, Greek anti-Americanism and distrust towards the Western camp, which had been
sparked by humiliation over the Cyprus dispute, was coupled with the EU’s strong
position over economic adjustments when the crisis hit Europe in 2008. Debates over
exiting the EMU and potential disintegration from the EU as a whole have lasted for the
past seven years.
Two cases are contrasted. Greenland disintegrated while Greece is still an EU
member. The former reveals a very controlled environment in which the payoffs matrix
was largely revealed because additional links had not emerged and withdrawal
negotiations were virtually only over one salient issue: fishing rights. Athens in turn was
unable to understand the real magnitude of exit costs, and neither did the EU member
states and its institutions. Greece integrated with the Union fully and over a long period
of time. The most powerful of additional links, the European Monetary Union, proved to
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be the biggest concern. Changing strategies and international conditions made these
developments possible and deeply entrenched.

Greenland
Actors: Changes on Strategic Level
The case of Greenland is peculiar in the context of the proposed theoretical
framework because Greenland itself cannot be perceived an actor of neither integration
nor disintegration games. It could be if its disintegration from Denmark was
contemplated, but as the theory suggests, only states can be considered actors when
disintegration from supranational institutions is debated. The lack of actorness is a
serious obstacle and the theoretical account cannot be exercised to the fullest extent.
However, this case of withdrawal from the European Communities is worth researching
since it was accompanied by several important mechanisms.
Until 1953, Greenland had the status of a Danish colony and, in 1979, the Home
Rule Act empowered it with autonomy over internal matters. Upon integration with
European Communities in 1973, Greenland was an integral part of Denmark. This fact
made the previously expressed opposition of 70.3 percent of Greenlanders towards the
membership irrelevant and Denmark joined the EC with an overall 2:1 support in the
referendum.1 In more technical words, Greenland fell into the category of Territory of the
Community. The only special treatment it received was expressed in Protocol 4 of the
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Accession Treaty, which charged EC institutions with finding solutions to specific,
fisheries-related problems of the island.2
The integration game of Greenland was thus played by Denmark on its behalf.
Other actors active at that time included six founding members of the EC, the United
States and, to some extent, the European Communities themselves. Danish accession was
not controversial and no hard bargaining was taking place, at least in comparison to the
United Kingdom’s application. It is true, however, that Denmark was from the beginning
very selective, expressing its preference for intergovernmental structures and not so much
for supranational bodies. It primarily wanted access to markets, especially agriculture.3
France, led by Charles de Gaulle, proved to be a strong type of player which
consistently vetoed Great Britain’s membership applications on the basis of balance of
payments problems, suspected lack of ability to make necessary adjustments, and
possible Atlantization of the Communities. De Gaulle accused the United Kingdom of
focusing only on trade and market access without commitment to other areas. The other
five members largely supported the British case.4 The Danish application was not vividly
contested and de Gaulle supported Copenhagen’s access amidst vetoing British bids.5
The United States under Nixon’s administration shifted its attention to China and
the Soviet Union but did not downplay expansion and integration of the EC. What is
more, enlargement was perceived as important step towards European self-reliance. It
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was understandable that Washington especially desired British accession in order to
maintain its influence in Europe amidst the French strategy to eclipse it.6
Finally, the European Communities themselves possessed a dose of actorness.
This feature was limited by sovereignty-related power resources, but it was possible to
notice a distinct agenda pursued by the EC. Between 1969 and 1983, the Communities
were preoccupied mainly with the question of monetary integration which became an
arena for bargaining between strong-currency and weak-currency states. Enlargement
itself was neither foreordained by founding members nor prevented by them. As a result,
after de Gaulle left the office, the EC expanded for the first time in its history to admit
three new member states, including Denmark and, by necessity, Greenland.7
The most significant development during the time of Greenland’s membership in
the EC was the implementation of the Home Rule Act, which gave Nuuk authority over
some internal matters. If the analysis was about Greenland’s disintegration from
Denmark, the island could be considered an actor with Copenhagen performing a
privileged role. The question of actorness in disintegration from the Communities is more
problematic because the EC of that time should be viewed as an intergovernmental
organization with supranational elements. Greenland was considered part of Denmark in
the integration treaty and thus any disintegration-related actions must have been
processed via Copenhagen. Taking into account the complexity of this situation coupled
with the lack of precedent, it can be concluded that a disintegrating Greenland had the
traditional ability to aggregate and represent its preferences, and to exert pressure and
6
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bargain over its future status. However, it couldn’t be perceived as an actor per se, as
pointed out in the integration treaty. The change in Greenland’s status should be thus
viewed as a significant update in its power resources even though the actor-related
activities were still executed by Copenhagen.
Apart from Denmark or Denmark-Greenland joint representation, other actors of
the disintegration game were comprised of the EC member states. The Communities as
supranational actor exercised very limited influence although reference to the treaties and
the theme oscillating around supranationally-regulated fisheries gave the EC some actorlike features.
After the Home Rule was implemented, Copenhagen remained in charge of
Greenland’s foreign affairs but simultaneously indicated that it would not stay if Nuuk
decided to leave the EC. This situation resembled the case of the Faroe Islands which had
Home Rule powers at the time of Danish accession and decided not to join the
Communities. Legislative and executive privileges given to Greenland were in fact much
greater than many self-governing territories possessed, plus Copenhagen gave Nuuk its
full support during potentially difficult withdrawal negotiations.8
After the referendum on Greenland’s exit took place in 1982, Denmark submitted
a proposal on adjustment of the Treaties to the Council. The idea was to grant Nuuk the
Overseas Countries and Territories status suited for former colonies and would assume
removal of duties and other quantitative restrictions. As a supranational actor, the EC
expressed its favorable opinion via the Commission and the negotiations were to take
place among member states; even though there was no precedent in this case, the
8
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common understanding was that all member states would have to agree to the proposal.
Some actors proved stronger in negotiations than others, but member states generally
claimed that the EC made huge investments in Greenland,9 that common fisheries policy
would become threatened, and that withdrawal would constitute a dangerous precedent
for other autonomous regions. Germany in particular demanded satisfactory solutions
since it fished extensively in Greenlandic waters.10
Ultimately, on the 1st of January, 1985, Greenland withdrew from the
Communities, after being granted the OCT status and agreeing to assure the EC’s access
to its waters in exchange for fishery products’ flow to the common market and for
financial transfers.11 Bargaining between the Communities’ member states proved pivotal
in handling the exit.

Externalities: Changes on Regimes Level
Upon Danish and Greenlandic accession to the European Communities in 1973,
the international system was dominated by two major developments. First, it was a
turbulent time of the Bretton Woods system’s collapse. Trade issues were regulated by
the GATT regime. Second, in the security sphere, the world saw another phase of the
Cold War – détente pursued by President Nixon’s administration.
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After the dollar’s convertibility to gold was abandoned, the period of 1971-1975
saw a lack of regulations in the monetary regime area.12 The subsequent rise of capital
mobility undermined domestic macroeconomic autonomy and encouraged regional
arrangements to stabilize exchange rates.13 Indeed, Bretton Woods’ pegged exchange
rates proved to be ill-equipped to manage increasing capital mobility, thus forcing the
rigidity of monetary systems just at the time of demand for adjustments. The EC member
states and candidates largely kept exchange rates within narrow bands, which caused
serious problems and doubts in the dollar’s stability, illustrated by several crises in the
United Kingdom, strikes and capital flight in France, and rumors about possible German
Mark’s revaluation.14
In 1971, the United States abandoned convertibility to gold amidst rapid German
inflation and intense speculations against the dollar. Many countries let their currencies
float and the EC was prompted to seek an autonomous exchange-rate mechanism. The
“snake agreement,” in compliance with the Smithsonian Agreement’s fluctuation margin,
was short-lived and, after the oil crisis in 1973, participating countries ultimately let their
currencies float against dollar. The Werner Report set a step-by-step plan for an
Economic and Monetary Union, which needed a whole new design since the 1958 Treaty
of Rome did not devote much attention to monetary planning.15
The emergence of the European Communities occurred within the context of the
GATT trade regime and in compliance with it. The Communities made extensive
12

Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 64.
Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, 239.
14
Barry Eichengreen and Peter B. Kenen, "Managing the World Economy under the Bretton Woods
System: An Overview," in Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years after the Bretton Woods, ed. Peter B.
Kenen(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 27-30.
15
Richard Myrus, "From Bretton Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the Exchange-Rate
Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund and the European Community," Fordham Law Review
62, no. 7 (1994): 2102-10.
13

177

arrangements to assure compatibility with GATT requirements and Washington, from its
side, initiated the Kennedy Round of negotiations to mitigate the potential for trade
diversion. There wasn’t much to be worried about as the EC’s external tariff was not
higher than previous national tariffs of member states.16
President Nixon’s-initiated détente started in 1969 and assumed maintenance of
the status quo between Washington and Moscow as well as the increase of links between
Eastern and Western Europe.17 Immediately before 1973 enlargement, the European
Communities feared an eroding US nuclear deterrence credibility and a decreased
NATO-flexible response, coupled with the prospect American troops’ withdrawal, the
rise of the Warsaw Pact’s conventional power and a decline in European defense budget
spending. Thus in the early 1970s there was an increasing understanding that Europe
should pay more attention to security cooperation to the point where, on the eve of
enlargement, European Political Cooperation became a feasible tool for diplomatic
concentration.18
Between 1973 and 1985, the international system experienced major
developments on the regimes level. The Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations aimed to
deal with the “unfinished business” of the Kennedy Round in the international trade
area.19 International security regimes continued to assume détente, which led to the
Helsinki Agreement, until President Reagan started seeking more confrontational
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relations with the Soviet Union and the security regime again became more reliant on a
bipolar balance.
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the European Communities were
virtually unable to introduce coordinated monetary policy. The situation changed in 1977
when the Council approved the Franco-German proposal for the European Monetary
System. While inflation and unemployment were plaguing Europe during the large part
of 1970s, the 1980s saw much growth and stability enjoyed by the EC member states.20
Until 1985, the Communities experienced one more enlargement to include Greece and
opened negotiations with newly democratized Spain and Portugal. Expansion seemed to
be a desired mechanism and a different quality emerged in comparison with the situation
before the first enlargement in 1973.
The Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, which took place between 1973 and
1979, aimed to further reduce tariffs, non-tariff barriers and export restrictions. It adopted
a series of tariff cuts and five codes to liberalize non-tariff barriers. Even though the
negotiation positions of the United States, the Communities, Japan and the least
developed countries might have reflected their particularistic interests, the EC aimed to
shape and participate in the global trade regime to the fullest extent, keeping the US
simultaneously satisfied with these developments.21 In 1979, the Council endorsed the
results of GATT negotiations and the EC signed the Tokyo Round of agreements.22
The final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in
Helsinki in 1975, became a milestone in West-East relations and a manifestation of the
20
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“content and substance” of détente. For the West, human rights entered the agenda on
equal footing with security, political and economic issues. For the East, the Act codified
existing borders in Europe. Despite these different understandings, the change on the
international regimes level was implicit and human rights never again really disappeared
from the security agenda.23
Carter’s version of containment and a human rights regime was replaced in 1981
by President Reagan’s doctrine of rollback, a plan that assumed heightened tensions with
the Soviet Union, the pursuit of an ideological offensive, the biggest American military
build-up since the Korean War and proclaimed a crusade for freedom and democracy.
The EC found itself in difficult position, experiencing problems with diplomatic
coordination on hard security matters. For example, while the US imposed sanctions on
both the Soviet Union and Poland in response to the implementation of martial law in
1981, the EC introduced only limited restrictions on the USSR. In general, it was NATO
and not the EC that played the security-coordination role in Europe at that time. Despite
the fears of the pursuing an ideological offensive and rollback, NATO was not damaged
and continued to coordinate the hard security matters of the European states.24

23

Harold Molineu, "Negotiating Human Rights: The Helsinki Agreement," World Affairs 141, no. 1
(1978): 24-26.
24
Michael Smith, "The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Post-Modern Policy
Framework?," Journal of European Public Policy 10, no. 4 (2003): 560; Robert L. Ivie, "Speaking
"Common Sense" About the Soviet Threat: Reagan's Rhetorical Stance," Western Journal of Speech
Communication 48, no. 1 (1984): 41; Barry R. Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense Policy and the
Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment," International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 3; Andrew
E. Busch, "Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire," Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3
(1997): 453; 61; Federiga Bindi, "European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview," in The Foreign
Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World, ed. Federiga Bindi(Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution, 2010), 22.

180

Internalities: Changes on Domestic Level
Prior to Home Rule, Greenland lacked power over its domestic affairs. The local
councils performed only consultative functions and the island itself was believed to
require protection rather than an equal voice. This protection was particularly important
for Denmark which wanted to secure access to tradable goods provided by traditional
hunters.25
One of the clearest manifestations of Danish control over Greenland was the
consent given to the United States to establish meteorological and military bases during
the Second World War, concluding the treaty on Greenland’s defense in 1951 and a
further permit to evict Thule tribe in order to extend the American base26. On the one
hand, this growing interest in Greenland resulted in the break of its isolation,27 but it was
only after forced accession to the EC when the Greenlandic desire for self-governance
accelerated.
The international regime of decolonization compelled former colonial powers to
readjust relations with their subjects. The Danish move to incorporate Greenland into the
kingdom rather than to grant it independence relieved Copenhagen from submitting
reports to decolonization bodies of the United Nations. The fact that the UN recognized
the Danish decision prevented Greenland from demanding independence on the basis of
colonial status.28
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The period of Greenlandic territorial unity with Denmark was filled with
controversies as, on the one hand, the island was deprived from its power resources
through centralization and, on the other, this deprivation augmented a growing desire for
self-governance. Nationalism and self-consciousness became answers to the policy of
Danization, which assumed assimilation and birthplace criteria but neglected the status of
Greenlandic language. Even though formal equality was established, Greenlanders felt
disadvantaged and subject to ethnic hierarchy. Societal changes, migration and
urbanization led to further alienation of the locals.29
When Copenhagen applied for the EC membership in 1961 there was a general
consent in continental Denmark about the economic benefits of this move. The agreement
reached by social democrats and non-socialist parties paved the way for accession,
despite opposition gaining its momentum during the final phase of negotiations.
Ultimately, the referendum revealed 63 percent support for Danish membership in the
Communities.30
Concerned about the fate of fisheries, 70.3 percent of Greenlanders voted against
the accession but, as a part of the Danish kingdom, the island had no choice but to enter
the EC. It is interesting to note that in 1962 both Greenlandic delegates to Danish
parliament opposed the island’s membership, yet the provincial council gave favorable
opinion about it, provided that fisheries received special treatment. In 1971 and 1972, the
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council saw an influx of new, young members and the path towards Home Rule and
withdrawal from the EC was launched.31
Despite economic and fisheries-related issues being dominant for preferencesformation upon Greenland’s withdrawal from the Communities, Greenlanders weren’t
satisfied with their membership also on a non-material basis. They felt that decisions on
their behalf were made even further from Copenhagen – in Brussels - and that they had to
deal with two foreign bureaucracies instead of one. Greenlanders also felt that their
identity didn’t fit the rest of Europe.32
The island’s economy was heavily dependent on fishing and the manufacturing of
fish products. Even though the membership in the Communities was economically
attractive because of access to the market, funding, and infrastructure, Greenlanders felt
“robbed” of their national treasure when other EC members received fishing quotas
around the island. It is understandable that the people of Greenland preferred staying
outside the Common Fisheries Policy. Under OCT status, they were able to use some aid
and loans, access the common market and give away some quotas that were more in line
with their own terms.33
During the membership period, Nuuk received some social expenses
reimbursement from Brussels, loans from European Investment Bank and attracted some
investments, but grants from the Communities constituted only about eight percent of
what Greenland was getting from Denmark. Roughly the same economic benefits were
31
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secured by selling fishing licenses to the EC after 1985, which became a source of stable
income for years to come.34 Nuuk didn’t really need membership in the Communities
since its link with Copenhagen allowed living standard to rise and the balance of trade
deficit to be run.35
The Home Rule Act of 1979 gave Greenland the power resources needed to
aggregate preferences, form a political agenda and put more meaningful pressure on
Denmark. When the center-left Simut party won Greenlandic elections in 1979, EC
membership was immediately put at the top of the political agenda, leading all parties to
agree about the need for referendum. The campaign was harsh and filled with anger and
examples of fishing abuses within the 200-mile Greenlandic economic zone. Simut,
together with other parties, trade unions and fishermen organizations, wanted to transfer
fisheries from supranational to local level.36
The introduction of Home Rule was a manifestation of new tendencies expressed
by young Greenlanders. On the one hand, they were tired of the perpetual presence of
Danes in the island’s administration. On the other hand, they wanted to respond to the EC
membership by taking into account their own preferences. The referendum of 1972
revealed a “smashing victory” of this new generation and the vision of “more
Greenlandic Greenland”. The 73 percent support for Home Rule in 1979 coupled with
consecutive successful withdrawals from the EC proved how these “unblocked”
preferences channeled power resources to reach for perceived greater benefits.37
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Understanding the Payoffs
The case of Greenland’s withdrawal is fascinating in terms of variables,
conditions and the precedent it constituted. What it shows is a strict set of terms under
which the exit occurred: Greenland was represented by Copenhagen, its interests were
still being advocated by Denmark and, apart from fisheries, there was virtually no other
major issue to discuss. Because of this very concrete and narrow framework, Nuuk’s exit
didn’t spur changes in Treaties when it comes to a member state’s withdrawal.
Amendments were introduced later by the Lisbon Treaty.38
The case constitutes a sort of laboratory experiment with many variables
controlled for. Because Greenland was extensively connected to Denmark, even in spite
of the Home Rule, some of the vital costs of withdrawal have been mitigated. The
question of fisheries has been one rather symmetrical issue which Nuuk resolved in a
purely Rational-Choice-Theoretic manner. Greenland was given just enough power to
control fisheries while other issues have been secured by Denmark and OCT status that
granted economic stability, security channeled through NATO, citizenship, and an
international presence.
One can notice how important the strategies of other players proved to be. The
decision to disintegrate required fundamentally different mechanisms than the ones used
upon integration. Since the Treaties did not assume withdrawal, the EC’s role was less
significant than that of member states. French opposition to British accession was
controversial, in contrast to German demands put on exiting Greenland. In other words,
enlargement and integration seemed to be natural, especially after 1973, while
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disintegration was perceived to be an anomaly. One can claim that the strategies of other
member states upon integration were mitigated to some extent by a supranational push,
while disintegration proved to be qualitatively different, with the Commission playing
only a consultative role.
Even if the withdrawal was codified by the Treaties, which happened exactly with
the ratified Lisbon Treaty, disintegration would still be qualitatively different. Already
mentioned were the bitterness of negotiations, a different political climate, a far lesser
need to satisfy the EU by an exiting state than by an acceding one, and no clear goal of
withdrawal. Whereas the integration process puts concrete demands on a candidate, the
Commission’s marginal role make potential disintegration an unknown territory.39
Greenland’s case was particular and most of these variables were controlled for so that
Nuuk could focus virtually only on fisheries.
The international system between 1973 and 1985 experienced a turbulence of
monetary and security regime, as well as increasing codification on the trade regime
level. In response to the Bretton Woods collapse, the EC started pushing for monetary
planning while GATT negotiations moved forward, receiving full compliance from the
Communities’ side. The security regime changed from détente, through human rights
advocacy, and through Reagan’s rollback. What can be said is that Greenland - thanks to
OCT status, NATO membership and a link with Copenhagen - followed these
developments without bearing the additional costs of withdrawal.
The forced accession to the Communities boosted Greenland’s demand for greater
autonomy and the Home Rule Act supplied Nuuk with significant power resources.
Through this channel, the island gained control over its economic resources: most
39
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importantly, fishing. Emergence and solidification of nationalism and identity heavily
influenced the preferences of Greenlanders and now these preferences could be
aggregated and operationalized by Home Rule authorities. The clear choice was made:
Nuuk continued to receive the same benefits without participating in the common
fisheries policy. This was just a one-issue question and virtually no additional links
emerged during Greenland’s 13-year membership in the EC. Society felt isolated and
unwilling to integrate, which was clearly stated in referendum, while economic benefits
were easily eclipsed by Danish transfers.
The tree in Figure 15 shows Greenland’s withdrawal as a game in extensive form.
Player D stands for Denmark, player M for the EC member states, and player G stands for
Greenland.

187

Figure 15: Disintegration of Greenland: Extensive Form Game

In this setting Greenland is always much better off withdrawing from the
Communities. In order for its information set to be reached, however, the EC member
states have to agree that exit is possible and Denmark has to endorse pro-autonomy
tendencies in Greenland. If Copenhagen had curtailed these developments in the very
beginning, we probably would not have seen further subgames of this setting. The
outcome would have been largely neutral for Denmark and the EC member states while
Nuuk would have suffered the costs of constrained self-expression. Since Copenhagen
decided to enact Home Rule in Greenland and since pro-disintegration sentiments
followed, the member states had to decide whether to allow Nuuk to move towards
withdrawal. Since the outcome of bargaining on conditions of disintegration brought
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benefits to the Communities, allow was a reasonable move. If Nuuk’s exit had been
constrained by either other members or by the referendum’s outcome, Denmark would
have suffered some costs: Greenland had already been given some autonomy and
Copenhagen would have faced the politicized anti-EC grievances of its unit. The
subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is thus (Endorse for Denmark; Allow for the
EC member states; Exit for Greenland).

Greece
Actors: Changes on Strategic Level
Greece’s application for membership in the European Communities was dealt
with by member states that already had experience with enlargement. In 1973, the
organization admitted Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. It is fair to assume that
upon Greek accession in 1981, the supranational component of the Communities was
quite developed; however, the member states still possessed relatively more control over
the process. During the first enlargement, Brussels accepted new members on a pretty
much ad hoc basis with limited accession conditions and monitoring. The second
enlargement saw conditionality based on Paris and Rome Treaties; nevertheless, the more
elaborate use of conditionality mechanism appeared later, with the growth of negotiationissues’ complexity.40
In sum, the nine member states were highly privileged since they possessed veto
power over Greece’s application. The European Commission played an important role by
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providing scrutiny over the case. Legally, Greece didn’t have much leverage, but the
international regime of democratization coupled with the positive experience of admitting
a less developed country - Ireland in 1973 - seriously influenced the choice of the
member states.
Greece was also favored because, at the time of accession, it had been
participating in the association scheme with the Communities for almost 20 years. The
Athens Agreement was exceptional because, unlike similar frameworks, it suggested
future full membership. It introduced a customs union and promises of free movement of
labor and harmonization with the Common Agricultural Policy, thus seriously
minimizing the costs of future integration.41 The fast pace of accession was interrupted by
a military coup in 1967 but after a return to democracy in 1974, previous agreements with
the Communities were restored. The new Greek constitution introduced in 1975 was
designed to facilitate the accession, making sure that it was legal to confer powers of
domestic bodies to international ones.42
The member states and Brussels were still impressed with the successful
integration of Ireland which, at the time of accession, was economically underprivileged.
It was believed that fast and functional admission, even without strict conditionality,
could be the solution to long-term problems. Since Greece had just recovered from a nondemocratic phase, the speedy accession was seen as a way to consolidate democracy. 43
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The timing of Greece’s application proved to be crucial. It was very hard for other
member states and the Commission to reject the request of a democratic neophyte located
in the middle of Europe. There was a profound feeling that the Communities should serve
as a democracy exporter and stabilizer. This pressure coming from the international
regimes level made Greece enter the EC pretty much “by default” and resulted in
Greece’s accession being surrounded by an atmosphere of democratization rather than
discussion on technical issues.44 On the surface, the nine member states were expressing
positive attitudes, and so was the Commission. The latter was highlighting deepened
relations that emerged during the association agreement. In private, all of these actors
were less enthusiastic. France and Italy were concerned with competition from Greek
cheaper agriculture. There was also fear of being dragged into Greece-Turkey disputes.45
Even though the Commission suggested a seven-year transition period to ease
problematic issues, Greece found this proposal humiliating. It was able to convince other
member states to accept its accession precisely because other actors’ strategies were
confronted with developments on an international level.46 In the end, “Greece achieved
even more favorable conditions than candidate countries in the first round.”47
When it comes to disintegration, actors of the game include not only other EU
member states but also the Union’s institutions – especially the Commission and
European Central Bank – as well as the International Monetary Fund. Strategies of nonEU states, most importantly Russia and the United States, also influence the choices of
other players. The members, Greece included, are fully privileged due to their possession
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of nominal sovereignty. What is more, a withdrawal from the European Monetary Union
alone is not codified in the Lisbon Treaty and therefore negotiations with other member
states are critical.
Since exiting from EMU without subsequent withdrawal from the EU is legally
impossible, leaving the Eurozone remains a highly controversial case. There is virtually
no possibility of unilateral and simultaneously legal withdrawal. 48 The monetary union
was conceived as an irreversible construct, assuming the permanent delegation of
monetary sovereignty to the EU bodies. A unilateral exit would not only bring costs
resulting from treaty-breaching but also would endanger the financial stability of other
states using the Euro as their currency.49
This fact shaped member states’ strategies vis-à-vis Greece’s potential withdrawal
in particular but also towards a remedy for the situation in general. Economically strong
countries, especially Germany, didn’t wish the future of the Euro to be shaken by
instabilities elsewhere. Strong states are reluctant to subsidize poorer members, while
monetary tools intended to boost local economies are unavailable. On the one hand, a
return to national currency and defaulting may bring uncontrollable contagion effects. On
the other, austerity measures and bailouts are also costly.50
The Troika – the Commission, ECB and IMF – decided in 2010 to prevent Greece
from default by granting the first loan package. The second loan in 2012 intended to
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repay Greek sovereign debt held by private sector investors. The Troika made these
payments conditional upon Economic Adjustment Programs focused on entrenching
neoliberal practices. Unfortunately, despite a substantial decrease in public deficit, the
Greek recession led to a radical increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Athens continued to
introduce austerity measures, structural reforms and privatization schemes. Major cuts in
wages, pensions, public expenditures and investments led to the victory of left-wing
Syriza and the question of a potential withdrawal from EMU was revived.51
The new strategy of Greece, deriving from aggregated preferences of its
population and politicized by elected Syriza, assumed anti-austerity actions that
confronted the political preferences of other EMU and EU member states. It is critical to
highlight that increasing support for the political left does not necessarily correspond to
true willingness to exit the Eurozone.52 Syriza played the card of a strong state mainly in
order to gain favorable concessions from other players but the real withdrawal should be
viewed as the last resort. This position was clearly formulated in February 2015 by
Greece’s finance minister Yanis Varoufakis: “Exit from the euro does not even enter into
our plans, quite simply because the euro is fragile. It is like a house of cards. If you pull
away the Greek card, they all come down.”53 Knowing the fear of other EMU member
states about possible contagion effects, Syriza continued to call for anti-austerity
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measures. Upon victorious elections, the party called for higher pensions and a doubled
minimum wage and increase in public sector employment.54
While the Troika continued to issue “take-it-or-leave-it” conditions, Syriza
responded with its own sets of proposals assuming more or less concessions.55 While
Syriza’s leader Alexis Tsipras announced the campaign of “blackmail and terror” was
over, German finance minister Wolfgang Schauble reiterated that “fresh elections won’t
change Greece’s debt.”56 German parliamentary leader Christian Democrat Michael
Fuchs, claimed that “Greece is no longer ‘systemically relevant’ for the euro”, while
Syriza was convinced that the EU would back down on its demands.57 Meanwhile,
Washington urged negotiating partners to meet halfway, while Russia and Athens signed
a memorandum to introduce new routes for natural gas supplies.58 While the equilibrium
resulting from all these strategies must by definition assume some concessions from all
players, the back-down of a strong player might be seen as part of the equilibrium.
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Externalities: Changes on Regimes Level
Upon Greek accession to the Communities, Europe was facing economic
hardships caused by two oil crises. The security considerations were dominated by the
Cold War rivalry and the desire to spread democracy, especially among the immediate
neighbors.
OPEC’s embargo and the resulting oil crisis induced a deep economic downturn
across Europe and, after years of prosperity, the European economy faced recession
followed by high unemployment and an international monetary crisis. The European
Communities’ member states implemented policies to curb rising inflation but the dreams
of a monetary union had to be abandoned at that time.59 It should be noticed that this loss
of supranational push might have undermined confidence of the Communities, which, at
that time, turned out to work in favor of the Greek application. What is more, Athens was
facing serious crisis-induced problems and, to some extent, Brussels saw itself as a
rescuer, just like in the case of Ireland.
The economic problems on the regimes level were internalized by Greece in a
very specific manner. Since these problems started to appear around 1974, just after the
Greek return to democracy, it was the colonialist regime that was blamed for them.
Similarly, the second oil shock in 1979 caused real economic collapse which was once
again blamed on right-wing governments by succeeding socialists. Preoccupied with
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domestic developments, Greece lacked any discussion on the real causes of the troubles
and the debate was limited to internal matters.60
The problems were still profound. Governments after the dictatorship faced an
increasing demand for a welfare state and income redistribution. Industry was heavily
dependent on imported fuel. Imports suffered because of high oil costs while exports
faced restrictive policies of European partners aiming to reduce inflation.61
The Cold War context of Greece’s accession mattered significantly since it was
deemed important to assure the expansion and consolidation of the Western, democratic
camp.62 The regional actors were concerned about a Greek withdrawal from NATO’s
military command structure and the issue was pivotal.
From NATO’s creation, Greece was eager to join the organization to consolidate
its Western course and solve territorial issues. However, the dispute with Turkey over
Cyprus proved to be humiliating case, with Greece losing both the United Nations’ and
NATO’s support for its claims. The emerging anti-Americanism put Athens in a difficult
position in the midst of the Cold War. Since Greece was considered increasingly
important strategically, especially amidst an escalation of superpower antagonisms in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East, the Western camp tried to refurbish mutual relations,
even if it assumed working with Greek dictatorial regime of that time. The Organization
couldn’t, however, intervene in what was clearly an internal dispute between two
members since it was designed to face external threats. 63 Despite the continuous lack of
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support from NATO members and despite the socialist PASOK party’s demand to cut the
ties with the Communities and NATO, the revival of Cold War tensions in 1980s proved
to be sufficient to keep Greece in both.64
Greece’s game of withdrawal has been deeply rooted in occurrences of Eurozone
crisis, which in turn has been a ramification of 2008 global financial crisis. The ties
necessary to produce this contagion developed on international regimes level and
included globalization of the world economy, neoliberal ideology and financialization.65
Neoliberalism became deeply entrenched as a global ideology after the end of the
Cold War rivalry and was followed by a unipolar moment. The Greece case may
constitute an example of how neoliberal policies impact internationally uncompetitive
and consumerist economies. The spirit of the Washington Consensus promoting fiscal
consolidation, liquidity guarantees, reduced labor costs and reduced consumption was
embodied in the Troika-forged Economic Adjustment Programs. An overall austerity to
promote exports and revive the Greek economy through neoliberal practices met high
taxation and actions to entrench the welfare state. Not only did social cohesion, standards
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of living and morale suffer, but also the Greek economy didn’t show signs of healing.66
The paradox here is that neoliberal practices narrow the powers of states vis-à-vis
corporate actors, while the effective regulation’s need to maintain this system follows.
The case of the EMU is a manifestation of this rule.67
Financialization is another global phenomenon which, over the past 30 years, has
been witnessed by mature economies. Its essence lies in more corporations’ and
households’ reliance on financial markets. The former engage less with banks, the latter
becomes engaged with assets and liabilities. Banks become transformed, seeking profits
through fees, commissions and trading. The current phase of financialization is extremely
complex, inter-penetrative and asymmetrical, and connects almost every corner of the
world.68
American financial institutions and international banks between 2001 and 2007
created a vast bubble which led to crisis and recession. The former engaged in
speculative mortgage lending while the latter traded resultant derivative securities. The
institutional weakness of the Eurozone magnified these developments, with dominant
Germany’s growth being achieved through consumption financed by expanding
household debt. Without a fiscal union serving the EMU, Germany turned out to be the
biggest beneficiary, expanding at the expense of peripheral states, including Greece.
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Imbalances of competitiveness and productivity made the Eurozone prone to global
economic crises.69
While Germany prevented the burst of household debt by recycling its surplus to
peripheral countries, the long-term government bond yields for the most of Eurozone area
widened significantly, with the spread experienced by Greece being especially
dramatic.70

Internalities: Changes on Domestic Level
The two decades preceding Greek accession to the Communities brought much
turbulence in domestic affairs. On the one hand, Greece tried to consolidate its
refurbished democracy and confirm its membership in the Western institutions. On the
other, it was dealing with the shadows of 7-year-long dictatorship, worsening economic
conditions, and rising Euroscepticism and anti-Americanism.
The parliamentary opposition emerged after the long hegemony of right-wing
parties in the period following the Second World War. Political instability resulting from
this parliamentary competition raised fears of potential left dominance, while the parties
from this political spectrum were seen as a proxy for Communists. To prevent this
development from happening, Greek armed forces seized power just before scheduled
elections, in April 1967. The terror introduced included imprisonment, torture, exile and
executions, as well as a suspension of democratic mechanisms of assembly, freedom of
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speech and political protesting. Even if tolerated by anti-communist upper and middle
classes, the regime of Colonels was not supported by any political party and its appeal to
the wider population was limited. The students’ uprising in 1973 coupled with the
regime’s humiliation over Cyprus in dispute with Turkey led ultimately to its collapse.71
After the regime change, the center-right New Democracy won national elections,
focusing on preparations for the EC membership as a way to consolidate democracy.
However, Greek society revealed much Euroscepticism and anti-Americanism, mainly
because of Western reactions to dispute over Cyprus. Greeks still remembered and were
attracted to socio-economic development experienced by the Communities in the 1960s
but the old grievances over Orthodox – Catholic distinctions and a history of intervention
into Greek domestic affairs right after gaining independence were deeply entrenched and
then became magnified by the Cypriot developments. Also, despite conservative New
Democracy winning 1974 elections, Greek society was characterized by left-wing and
anti-Western leanings. These feelings were soon politicized and the socialist PASOK
party was gaining much support. The two parties dominated the Greek political system
since the late 1970s.72
Worsening economic conditions and the right-wing rule that was blamed led to
the victory of PASOK in 1981. As it happened, just 10 months after accession to the
Communities, 60 percent of Greeks supported Eurosceptical parties. PASOK opposed
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accession and even an association agreement, advocating for the national road to
socialism and a “special agreement” with the Communities, referring to the Norwegian
example. Taking over an economy that had collapsed after the 1979 oil shock, with a
current-account deficit doubling between 1978 and 1979 and where oil import price was
equivalent to 85 percent of all export earnings, PASOK did not fulfill its promises of
reformulating relations with the Communities.73
The Greek economy is open but small and unable to impact international
economic relations. Membership in the European Union gave Athens an opportunity to
competitively sell its products in the European market. This advantage diminished after
the euro was adopted, but even then Greece recognized the leverage of possessing veto
power in EMU, something that was definitely attractive for a small national economy.74
Upon entering the Eurozone, Greece enjoyed a period of sustained growth starting
in 1994. On average, its economy was expanding 4 percent until 2008: the fastest pace in
the Euro area after Ireland.75 After the crisis erupted, the European Union and EMU
played a different role. For Greece, they became linked with fiscal adjustments and the
loss of sovereignty. The price of staying within the Union was perceived to assume the
punishment and suffering of disadvantaged parts of the population, particularly
pensioners and the unemployed.76
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The Greek economic system has been characterized by turbulences and
inefficiency on the one side, and high demand for a welfare state on the other. While after
1974 excessive borrowings were used to legitimize revived democracy, the expansion of
the welfare state followed in the 1980s. Extensive social insurance services were
established and targeted underprivileged groups of the society. Continued borrowing to
fund employment in public service and the welfare state’s offerings without significant
increase of taxes led to an extension of public debt. A policy of running high debts has
always been the case for Greece, ever since the regime of the Colonels. Whereas the debt
has always exceeded annual income, in 2008 it reached “unmanageable proportions.”77
The Greek welfare state model was surely responsible for the extent of the crisis.
In short, social expenditures were allowed to “spiral out of control.”78 Even if the Greek
socio-economic model was largely brought to an end by the crisis, the economic
problems were not fixed. Greece has been struggling not only with public debt but also
with balance of payments deficit and lack of competitiveness in productive sectors. The
post-dictatorship regime was itself characterized by patronage, clientelism and tax
evasion. Culturally, the education system produced innovative generations which
unfortunately lack proper monetary motivation to achieve commercial success. Between
2007 and 2011, Greeks constituted one of the most Eurosceptical segments of European
population. Unsuccessfully implemented austerity measures under the banner of
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neoliberalism don’t help in regaining confidence in Brussels, nor encourage more
structural redefinition of the welfare state model.79

Understanding the Payoffs
Games of Greek integration and disintegration occurred within quite different
settings, but the way of thinking and strategy-formulation remained virtually the same.
This case can be largely explained with the proposed theory of disintegration. It can be
claimed that cognitive limits of rational actors compel it to choose from a narrowed set of
actions, especially when no alternatives have been revealed by previous examples. When
confronted with some form of novelty concerning the state of the world or strategies of
others, players are not really able to match their choices with payoff matrices.
In contrast to the Greek integration game, the contemplated withdrawal saw much
greater powers of the supranational component of the European Union. The role of the
Commission has been substantial, even taking lead over the solution-seeking process.
Nevertheless, the EU member states played and continue to play a decisive role. Then it
was about the small, legal base of the Treaties, and now it is about the Lisbon Treaty not
codifying withdrawal from European Monetary Union. It does, however, legalize exit
from the Union as a whole, so many raised voices about exiting the EMU bringing about
this effect are justified.
The Monetary Union itself has been a powerful example of additional links which
emerged after having not been agreed upon in an integration treaty. The ability to
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surgically sever this particular link without breaking other ties emerged over time is a
rational way to deal with the uncertainty of disintegration costs. Greece is aware of many
other extra issues interconnected over three decades of its membership and thus the exit
from the EU is perceived as almost suicidal. What is more, the EMU itself replicated
numerous opinions on the effect of EMU-exit, opinions that ranged from overwhelmingly
beneficial to totally costly and contingent.
Then member states’ strategies were influenced a by non-quantifiable, symbolic
urge to spread democracy and stability in the region. Now the taboo of the EU’s collapse
also serves a similar role. The “manifest destiny” of the integration has been functioning
for over 50 years and, by default, it is unimaginable to reverse it. 80 What is more, upon
integration, the case of Ireland lightened some shadows; that is, the uncertainty caused by
admitting an underdeveloped country was cleared in favor of the benefits rather than the
costs. At that time, the goal of serving as a development and democracy hub was
reinforced. Now, however, there is no such revealing case. No one has ever exited the EU
and nothing can be said about the immediate and long-term consequences.
Internally, such an exit may lead to dangerous polarization in Greece, the
disappearance of the middle class and the possible emergence of a dictatorship.
Externally, it may lead to contagion effects. Looking at the radical differences in opinions
on that matter, ranging for advocacy to leave the EMU to acceptance of the Union’s
conditionality, no one really knows what would happen. Globalization and
interconnectedness further complicate these calculations. If member states decide that
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exiting the EMU without withdrawal from the EU as a whole is not possible, Greece can
never be sure that it will be admitted again, even when its government changes.81
This uncertainty has been exploited by both sides to win leverage. Upon
integration, Greece sensed and used the “manifest destiny” aura to win favorable
conditions of accession. Now, Athens once again uses the fear of contagion and “house of
cards” theory. To be sure, Greece’s rivals in this game see this strategy and counter it
with assurances that the Eurozone will be just fine even if Greece leaves. This specific
game of chicken must end in some equilibrium, but without knowing the full matrix of
payoffs, it would likely be a non-Pareto-optimal one.
The one visible feature is that withdrawal from the EU is played as a threat, the
last resort of which no one really wants because the costs are unimaginable.
Figure 16 shows the hypothetical distribution of payoffs in an extensive form
game of Greek disintegration. The probability p reflects the chance that the world
imposes high costs on potential withdrawal. The product of 1-p gives the probability of
its reversed quality. M denotes the European Union’s member states, EC stands for
European Commission, representing semi-autonomy of supranational structure, while G
denotes Greece.

81

Petrakis, "Greece and the Eurozone: Staying or Leaving?," 25-26; Fouskas and Dimoulas, Greece,
Financialization and the Eu: The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction, 190.

205

Figure 16: Disintegration of Greece: Extensive Form Game

None of the players of this game really know what is going to happen after
Greece disintegrates from the EU. This fact is reflected by information sets connected
with dotted lines. The only observables are the moves of each player. In general, Greece
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prefers to withdraw only in a low costs world (p → 0) and when both member states and
the European Commission are headstrong, or when either of these players is playing a
weak strategy. The former case solidifies the Greek decision to seek benefits outside of
the EU’s framework while the latter undermines the belief in the Union’s coherence.
When both players are weak, Greece is willing to continue its membership and win
favorable conditions. In a high costs world (p → 1) exit never occurs in equilibrium and
the highest benefits are secured for Athens when both member states and the Commission
play weak, thus leaving sufficient room for negotiations. Alternatively, Greece prefers
member states rather than the EC to be weak because states have more sovereignty and
nominal autonomy.
The Commission desires to keep Greece in the Union under both states of the
world, especially when the supranational component is stronger than the sovereignty
exercised by member states. However, in a low costs setting, it would prefer to see
Athens leave rather than show a weak position. Symmetrical quality is true for member
states.
When p approaches 0.5, making a low and high costs world equally probable, a
Greek exit becomes feasible with 50 percent chance of occurring when member states
play strong and the Commission plays weak. Withdrawal enters subgame perfection
when both players choose a strong strategy. In other words, if Athens was sure that there
is a “coin-toss” probability of not bearing the high costs of disintegration and if it faced
headstrong negotiations partners, it would decide to disintegrate.
The more probable scenario is the one in which p is much higher. If we assume a
95 percent chance of a high cost world, the subgame perfection is met when Greece
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always decides to stay, with both member states and the Commission playing strong
strategies.
Two Quantal Response Equilibria for Greek disintegration are shown in Figure
17.

Figure 17: Quantal Response Equilibria: Greek Disintegration in High and Low Costs
World

Under the condition of increasing rationality – here represented by lambda – all
exit strategies converge to Nash equilibria resulting from the extensive form game tree.
Four lines on each chart represent four types of withdrawal strategies dictated by
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information sets. In the left figure, disintegration becomes totally unfeasible after initial
indifference and after rationality growth. In a low costs world, withdrawal enters
equilibrium in (Strong; Strong) information set. If the EC chooses to be weak, the
probability of an exit maintains a constant value of 0.5. Under two information sets
reached – (Weak; Strong) and (Weak; Weak) – disintegration probability approaches 1.

Summary: Time, Costs and Uncertainty
The accession of Greenland and Greece to the European Communities occurred
under different conditions than the ones present upon the moment of disintegration. The
EC had changed slightly when Nuuk withdrew and then changed drastically when the
Athens game was played. The supranational component evolved in both cases, but it was
Greek disintegration where it played a really active role. Withdrawal was codified in the
Lisbon Treaty and this fact additionally reinforced the political uncertainty of only-EMU
exit. The EC and its member states changed their strategies from rather passive and
unconditional to active and demanding. In both cases, the international system
experienced much evolution occurring amidst turbulence. In the 1970s, the EC took a
leading role in reshaping the regimes level after Bretton Woods’ collapse. In first two
decades of the 2000s, the EU was deeply engaged in the financialization of the world’s
economy, with the European Monetary Union constituting a critical element of these
developments. Internally, Greenland experienced profound changes in its self-expression
sphere, reformulating subsequently its preferences from passive and subordinate to active
and aggregated. The island’s inhabitants felt harmed by the Common Fisheries Policy
and they were finally able to take a political stand on the issue, with disintegration from
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the EC following as a result. Greece has been traditionally tied to its welfare state
objectives, which came especially salient after a return to democracy. Membership in the
EU gave Athens the possibility to borrow and spend, inflating disproportionally the
bubble of capabilities and demand.
Thanks to a highly controlled environment, Greenland was able to mitigate the
costs of disintegration by clearing-out the uncertainty. The island had secured an
economic future thanks to remaining in a union with Copenhagen and thanks to their
negotiated OCT status. These negotiations were critical because the treaties didn’t codify
the EC withdrawal at that time. Internal awakening helped Greenland to realize that not
many additional links had emerged during its membership. Especially those non-material
– social, symbolic and identity-related – had not really evolved. Nuuk was able to remove
the undesired CFP without losing the associated benefits resulting from the membership
in the EC.
Contrarily, Greece has been unable to exit the EMU with making sure that other
costs would not follow. Athens integrated fully and over a long period of time, so that
even the mitigation of economic costs would not clear out uncertainty to the point of a
plain-payoffs-matrix decision. Thus, costs range virtually from political turmoil and
return to dictatorship, through total economic collapse, to ideological crisis.
Table 4 summarizes variables which played the role in disintegration of
Greenland and Greece in comparison with the moment of integration.
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Actors
change

Externalities change

Internalities change

Additional
links

Greenland

Moderate

Profound

Profound

Few

Relative
clearance
of costs
High

Greece

Profound

Profound

Moderate

Many

Low

Table 4: Variables in Disintegration Game: Changes for Greenland and Greece

The game-theoretic account of Greenland’s disintegration is quite successful in
grasping the underlying forces, thanks to debated issues being narrowed down to virtually
one disputed area and thanks to a limited number of qualitatively different variables
included in equilibria. The case of Greece is totally different. The proposed extensive
form game tree suggests a fixed payoffs under uncertainty about the state of the world.
The decision to withdraw should become feasible in a Nash equilibrium when the
probability of a low costs world is high enough. However, since the time factor and
replicated linkages influence the payoffs matrix itself, it is doubtful that players in their
cognitive processes would be able to make these variables assume constant values.
Learning from certain priors about the value of p doesn’t make much sense since there is
no real payoff to multiply it by.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND GUIDELINES
Discussion initiated across the chapters of this dissertation aimed to focus the
reader’s attention on one of the least understood issues in international studies. It has
been suggested that this confusion about how to assess disintegration in world politics
has its roots in either the misuse of European integration theories to explain something
they are not fit to explain, or in treating disintegration simplistically with game-theoretic
approaches to withdrawals and secessions. The proposed remedy assumed the
construction of a whole new theoretical account which would build on a Rational-ChoiceTheoretic definition of actors, on their choices and utility-maximization, with
simultaneous attention paid to complexities and cognitive limitations. Introduced case
studies suggested that the proposed framework has the potential to be successful in
understanding disintegration in world politics.

Different Approach
The main difference introduced by the proposed framework is that it treats
disintegration exclusively, as a separate phenomenon. Since much confusion was recently
revealed by political analyses surrounding the prospective Greek exit from the European
Union, outcomes of the Scottish independence referendum, or separatist demands
forwarded by the people of Catalonia, researchers of international studies should be able
to use a concrete tool to understand these phenomena.
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These points of view need revision. We are quite successful in using RationalChoice-Theoretic approaches to integrational and bargaining events, and yet this account
largely fails to capture disintegration dynamics. Withdrawals and secessions need to be
viewed positively rather than negatively. That is, they are not byproducts of the lack of
some quality in integration process but are decisions like any other, subject to the
variables which influence them. Even if some integration theories imply that, over time,
disintegration becomes more difficult and less straightforward than initial bargaining
(unless, for example, some external shock is in play) they still seem to contribute to the
same fallacy; that is, they add more and more integrative elements to the equation, thus
making it less likely to be reversed symmetrically. In order to spot unveiling
disintegration, we are told to await some powerful development to turn integrative
elements around and then induce disintegration in symmetrical manner.
This dissertation calls for change in this thinking. Integrative elements with which
we supply the integration equation change themselves over time or, if we like, they
become different in nature. Reversals of integration forged to assess disintegration don’t
make much sense since this negation is not able to explain disintegration as a positive
process. By reversing symmetrically, we derive some hypothetical, controlled
environment which is poorly grounded in real-world developments.
In Popperian terms, we have less “plastic control” over disintegration than
integration. Located somewhere between a world of cloud-like chaos and clock-like
determinism, the world of social relations is subject to repetitive occurrences and
independent variables with causal properties while simultaneously probability adds
uncertainty to our ability to plan. Integration is easier since we are often able to
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distinguish elements of bargaining games and attach some perceived utility to them.
When withdrawing or seceding, this conduct becomes complicated since many other
elements might have appeared and since some of them might have assumed non-material
form, thus making it difficult for us to translate them into numbers, both on paper or in
our minds. The question of disintegration being qualitatively different from integration is
backed in this dissertation with a very strong statement suggesting that, upon
withdrawing and seceding, actors might perceive costs and benefits as sensations rather
than numbers. This argument should hold especially true with more time lapsed and when
more issue-linkages result in favorable conditions for replication under internal, strategic
and external developments. Sensing that the world is “quite costly” is not the same as
believing that costs are high under some probability. If actors additionally tend to
compare moments of disintegration and integration in pursue of better understanding of
the situation, this quality becomes even more confusing. Researchers in turn try to add
more complexities to the initial, integrative equation, thus missing important elements.
For federalism and functionalism, the European Union will fail if it doesn’t
comply with the concrete rules these approaches impose. Whether or not these conditions
include total subordination to supranational polity, departure from statehood or from
certain aspects of sovereignty under proliferation of task-oriented organizations, the sole
assumption that deviation from some abstract goal would lead not only to a stalemated
process but to its reversal is risky at best. The way the European Union evolved showed
that neither account was accurate and that the EU member states found their own
adaptation to diverging preferences and externalities. The process-like assumptions are
rarely well-grounded in reality.
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Even if assumptions are more concrete, say neofunctional claims that maintaining
national rules in certain areas is too costly due to transnational exchange and transsocietal links, postulating that the demise of these two conditions would lead to European
disintegration appears to be similarly risky. It is more visible in liberal intergovernmental
reasoning where the need for technocratic coordination, planning and credible
commitments make states adjust their strategies often contrarily to their short-term
benefits and in pursue of long-term gains under growing interdependence. In both
accounts, we have some abstract construct, though less evident than in federalism and
functionalism. We have greater integration as a long-term horizon of benefits. This
quality is directly caused by international exchange and interdependence. We can readjust
our policies and bear short-term costs, keeping in mind this long-term certainty. But if the
horizon disappears due to a decline in exchange or interdependence, the whole logic
collapses. The idea of this horizon is not conceptually different from federalist and
functionalist determinism, even if it is less verbatim. Why should an actor be locked in
some quality which determines their goals? Why are they ready to bear short-term
sacrifices to approach this horizon? If the horizon is potentially perishable and if
strategies of other actors may sometimes sway from the linear path towards greater
integration, there is too much room for uncertainty to be ignored. Federalist and
functionalist “horizon” concepts evaporated more quickly but determinism of
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism would probably share the same fate.
The latter is potentially more durable, but what makes it strong as a theory of integration
makes it weak as theory of disintegration: adjustments on the integration path may in fact
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indicate a mitigation of costs in a given disintegration game, but this quality is
indistinguishable as long as greater integration locks in states’ strategies.
This lock-in mechanism should be viewed from a different angle. For example,
the neofunctional premise that disintegration is impossible as long as supranational
institutions continue meeting performance criteria in low politics and thus assuring
spillover is poorly grounded because it once again assumes actors’ a priori subordination
without taking freedom of action into account. However, the sole assumption that states
lose control over the integration process has some power. There is a substantial different
between being locked in and deprived from a set of decisions, and being constrained and
“stalemated” because of certain developments. While the former approach forces us to
believe in certain abstract and determinism, the latter highlights the importance of
uncertainty and costs. The former makes actors passively reactive to the lack of abstract
quality, the latter makes them active, even if this action assumes inaction. For liberal
intergovernmentalism, integrational push prevails as long as it is perceived as beneficial,
while for neofunctionalism it endures because states lose control over the process. The
positive disintegration theory should assume actors’ desired utility in discrete actions
with some subset of strategies being overwhelmed by uncertainty and thus becoming very
difficult to be mapped to a payoffs matrix.
This pursuit of a more robust explanation naturally shifts the discussion on
disintegration towards Rational Choice Theory. If actors are assumed to pursue greater
utility, they are not locked in any process which would deprive them from this quality.
They are similarly not so farsighted to sacrifice their short-term benefits in a belief that
long-term gains would finally prevail. Decisions are discrete, made at certain point in
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time. One can have an impression that states continue to dwell in certain arrangements
because they hope for some determined treasure box at the end of the rainbow. But it is
much more robust to claim that they do so because at every discrete point in time they
freely choose inaction due to unsure alternatives. Withdrawal games indirectly assume
this quality by putting variables like non-policy costs and discounts for further
cooperation and belief in future losses into subgame perfect equilibria. It is convenient to
do so because these variables have the same quality as policy gains in a way of being
potentially quantifiable. It is only an inability to represent them numerically that makes
them qualitatively different. Secession games face the same challenge, plus they
introduce confusion about aggregation of preferences. The positive disintegration theory
must assume that ideal points of the population become elevated and politicized, subject
to developments outside of population’s interest and cognition. What is more, polity itself
is a powerful factor shaping citizens’ preferences; therefore, it is enough to look at
various sovereignty-related campaigns issued by political parties upon referenda.
Withdrawal games often prove to be inconclusive because the number of
additional variables put into equilibria coupled with non-quantifiable nature of many of
them make these games insolvable. Secession games are caught in vicious cycles of a
wrongly-aggregated plethora of dimensions and result in inconclusive equilibria. The
question is thus: should we simplify the payoffs distribution in order to make these games
solvable or focus on producing unsolvable games with unquantifiable variables? The
ideal answer would find the middle path. The positive theory of disintegration should
start from distinguishing actors and their strategies set to achieve goals specified by a
hypothetical distribution of payoffs. The inability to solve the games is an inherent
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quality which makes disintegration conceptually different from integration. The positive
theory should therefore use game-theoretic framework as much as possible while the
hypothetical solution to the games should be conducted in descriptive manner. Case
studies described in chapters IV, V and VI introduced extensive form games, but the
ultimate understanding of outcomes would be impossible without a descriptive
assessment of payoffs distribution.
The reversal of European integration theories doesn’t let us see clear distinction
between players and their strategies. Therefore, the payoffs murkiness is high from the
very beginning of scientific conduct. Over time, this confusion only deepens and leads to
very quick efficiency loss. Complexities seem to be too vast because, without formalized
players and strategies, we are not able to distinguish between true motivations and
consequently between the importance of constraints. Withdrawal and secession games
define players and actions clearly and thus at t0 the payoffs structure is less murky.
However, actors experience a very steep rise in inefficiency along with more and more
variables and dimensions added to potential equilibria. The proposed theory of
disintegration makes a difference. It controls the rise of payoffs murkiness from the very
beginning in order to achieve better explanatory efficiency.
By assumption, issues at the time of integration are quantified in the minds of
actors. This conduct is necessary for them to proceed with bargaining. The process of
negotiations reflects the distribution of power, internal conditions and external
developments. The issues to be included in an integration treaty are often clearly stated
and bargained over. Disintegration is different because, in addition to changed internal,
strategic and external conditions, the issues are usually not the same as upon integration.
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Actors sense that they have to negotiate over something different but they are usually not
sure over what exactly. This quality may indicate why there are relatively more
integration agreements than cases of withdrawals.
Actors proceeding in a game-theoretic manner have difficulty with multiplying
their desired payoffs by Bayesian probability. The innovation introduced by the proposed
theory assumes focusing not on p value itself but rather on multiplicand: a payoff. This is
a preferred way to assess a sensational experience and the vagueness connected with the
type of uncertainty explained in chapter III.
Various findings retrieved from case studies introduced across three chapters
seem to confirm subsequent elements of the proposed theory of disintegration. Upon
integration, Montenegro engaged in bargaining over virtually one salient issue: the
Serbdom. Over time, this particular idea became modified into Yugoslavism, solidified in
its decentralized form. Belgrade’s bid to reinstate this long forgotten centralized identity
faced Montenegrin preferences built around decentralization, which started the
disintegration process.
Quebec faced a more difficult strategic environment upon integration than at the
time of disintegration. What is more, its society evolved on its own and its preferences
shifted from isolation and protection to openness and democracy. Even though additional
links between Quebec and Ottawa did not emerge, the desire for prosperity coupled with
international regimes’ push towards neoliberalism added serious costs to potential
independence. In addition to conventional extensive form games, chapter IV suggested a
strategic-form representation of hypothetical payoffs distribution. This mechanism may
become useful for some researchers in their bid to assess confusion about the payoffs, but
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it has to be kept in mind that virtually nothing can fix the different-quality problem. This
conduct opens door for endless speculation and, yet, once again, a plethora of equilibria
depending on the game’s specification. Another suggested method to understand players’
confusion assumes the adoption of Quantal Response Equilibria since this approach takes
into account certain deviations from rationality. However, it is not irrationality that we try
to prove or base our understanding on. Actors’ choices might be shaped by some
unobservable turbulence, but they consequently converge to Nash equilibria. Inaction
caused by problems with this convergence forces us to look for variables responsible for
stalemate.
The case of Chile showed that even narrow integration schemes have the potential
to replicate to some non-quantifiable “extras” like political coordination, informal
consultations and mutual understanding. Fiji experienced the Pacific Islands Forum’s
evolution from arrangement validating Suva’s leadership into something largely nonreliant on Fiji. What is more, the international regime of democracy put into question
undemocratic Suva’s bid to form an alternative regional cooperation scheme.
In addition to the proliferation of additional issue-linkages, actors in the Greek
game of integration changed their strategies and so did the supranational component of
the European Union. Uncertainty was also added by the fact that the treaties evolved to
codify potential withdrawal but not selective exit: in this case from the European
Monetary Union.
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Bold Statements
The positive theory proposed in this dissertation starts with the assumption that
disintegration is qualitatively different from integration and the inefficiency of current
explanations is blamed on negligence of this fact. In order to build on a solid theoretical
fundament, the positive theory doesn’t reject European integration accounts and Rational
Choice Theory. Rather, it aims to engage in constructive criticism since, to some extent,
both approaches are able to tackle disintegration phenomena. Sensitivity to complexities
and formalization of game setup are the main building blocks. It is assumed that reversal
of integrative elements does not necessarily lead to disintegration because the elements
themselves change under diverging internal, strategic and external conditions, which in
turn may encourage replication and transformation of integrative issue-linkages. Both
game-theoretic conduct and emerging complexities are in force in this case.
The criticism of Rational Choice Theory is weaker than might be perceived at
first glance. In fact, virtually all game-theoretic assumptions are honored in this
dissertation. The only intervention which indeed may be rejected by some orthodox
scholars is a direct questioning of the consistency of payoffs under concrete
circumstances. But the logic behind this intervention resulted from the evident
inconclusiveness of withdrawal and secession games. The positive theory of
disintegration should not waste scholars’ energy on producing solvable setups at any cost.
It is concluded that, in many cases, description is a better fit to assess sensation of costs,
especially after all formal methods have been exhausted.
For example, this dissertation does not support criticism of Rational Choice
Theory issued by historical institutionalism or sociological accounts. Preferences are
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assumed unshaken in their convergence to greater utility. There is no place for routine or
institutional constraints to change this quality. The positive theory of disintegration
therefore faces three choices: to bury itself in narrative explanations without rigid formal
guidance, to contribute to the explanatory stalemate of conventional game theory, or to
modify Rational Choice Theoretic account in the spirit of Analytic Narratives. This
dissertation strongly advocates for the latter option.
The positive theory of disintegration should acknowledge the fact that bargaining
upon integration reveals different qualities than the one at the moment of withdrawal or
secession. When negotiating certain arrangements, bargaining partners usually try to
define clear policy areas they wish to take to the next level. This selected subset of salient
issues can often be formalized, even on a unidimensional space. Disintegration is
different precisely because the reversal of an integration treaty does not only undo what
was done but usually much more. Whereas European integration theories should
encourage us to identify independent variables among complexities, Rational Choice
Theory should force us to at least try to quantify them. In most cases, we will be unable
to do so but the explanatory power of positive disintegration theory should be focused on
understanding why this is the case. This conduct is no less meaningful than subjecting
disintegration to some abstract process. Indeed, this dissertation builds on the belief that
it is much more explanatory.
Disintegration theory offers some tools to avoid a game-theoretic stalemate and
integration-theoretic misfire. It is very challenging to include many dimensions into a
regular, decision-theoretic conduct visible in the case of secession games.The benefits of
size and costs of heterogeneity themselves contain subsets of extra dimensions, each of
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which may behave differently. And we have not even started adding more troublesome
dimensions yet. For example, how does national pride behave? Does it diminish with
ethnic heterogeneity? Then what about the case of Montenegro and its civic
understanding of nation? Without learning stories and context, one is unable to retrieve
crucial independent variables, not to mention supplying them with proper values and
directions. Some if not most of these variables will be qualitative and only supplementing
the conduct with narratives can help in drawing conclusions.
It is essential not to be caught up in the process-thinking tendency. Process is
convenient but often insufficiently explanatory. It does not suffice to say that
decolonization resulted in the proliferation of new states simply because the process
assumed so. Many former colonies chose to remain dependent subjects or engaged in
gradual preparation for independence stretching far beyond the historic timeline of
decolonization. Similarly, it does not suffice to say that the European Union’s member
states continue to dwell in this structure simply because they believe in some concept of
integration which would lead, at some point, to huge benefits. The alternative proposed
by this dissertation is simple yet often ignored. The choice of the unitary actor should be
researched first and foremost. The “process” here should be nothing more than the
gathering of conditions which may influence this choice.
The positive theory of disintegration should add consistency to its contemplation
of choices. Not all strategies have the same impact and it is crucial to assess divergence
or even hierarchy among actors. Game theory offers a simple yet powerful tool serving
this purpose. Privileged players would have the ability to move first and therefore enforce
particular information sets on subsequent players. They also will have more or less
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limited capability to set the game: their primacy dictates, to some point, available
strategies and distributions of payoffs.
The privileged position is assigned to states because they possess certain
characteristics which make them by default more powerful than subnational entities or
organizations. Sovereignty and international recognition let states refer to constitutions
which may ban or restrict secession and thus assume virtually unconstrained freedom of
entering or exiting international organizations. The case of Quebec shows how Ottawa
reset the original disintegration game to include additional costs imposed by unlawful
secession. States’ access to power resources lets them virtually impose serious security
costs on the seceding part, while the need for international recognition leads to great
unknowns about the viability of independent existence. States must of course understand
how their first move and game setting influence their own payoffs distribution. Since the
cognition process is challenged here, states might reveal seemingly contradictory actions.
What is more, if other sovereign states enter the game, they by definition possess nominal
power equal or very close to the one of game-setter. Sometimes this quality will make
them move second, sometimes it will intervene into game-setting process itself. The
proper understanding of context is critical for researchers to be able to apply the desired
framework.
Actors mostly attempt to understand the relative power distribution among them.
In case studies covered in chapter IV-VI, the signaling mechanism to reveal the player’s
type wasn’t really in use. States often make clear what their positions are and potential
uncertainty about their real abilities is often ignorable. If it was only due to strategies and
bargaining power, disintegration would be largely predictable with game-theoretic
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framework. Players of integration games prove to bargain according to the relative power
they possess. They often understand that this distribution is likely to change over time, so
they initiate various schemes to secure themselves from future developments. Withdrawal
clauses and exit restrictions are examples here.
However, players are virtually unable to secure themselves against changes in
internalities and externalities. What is more, restricting the impact of changing strategies
to the balance of power is insufficient as these strategies also influence emerging issuelinkages themselves. Just like it is hard to predict the evolution of internal conditions as
well as the external environment and strategies of others, it is even more challenging to
assess the impact of these changes on policy issues in an agreed upon integration treaty.
One of the most meaningful strengths of the proposed positive disintegration
theory is indeed its focus on choice and action. In contrast to negative accounts offered
by reversals of European integration theories, inaction is perceived here as action.
Negative approaches, when faced with inaction, replace freedom of choice with
subordination to abstract process. When players fail to disintegrate, it is claimed that they
are locked in a process which decides on their behalf. This assumption has serious flaws
since we either need to reverse every integrative element present, or undermine the
abstract process itself by seeking developments that are unlikely to be spotted; that is, a
decrease of interdependence or trans-national linkages. It makes much more sense not to
deprive actors from their ability to act and to look into variables responsible for inaction
in a positive manner.
From a technical point of view, inaction in game-theoretic conduct cannot really
occur. Something similar may be caused not by a payoffs distribution but rather by
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uncertainty about reaching a particular information set. The probability of being located
in a certain position multiplied by available payoffs produces a set of expected utilities
under this uncertainty. Action must always follow, even if strategies are weakly dominant
and under player’s indifference. The only possible solution offered by game theory is
elevating inaction to the form of strategic response: i.e. status quo maintenance. This,
however, doesn’t satisfy assumptions stated in this dissertation because it relies on
revealed payoffs. As it is suggested, actors don’t know the price of maintaining the status
quo and yet often choose to do so.
The proposed solution to this paradox is based on the concept of two types of
uncertainty. The first one corresponds to Bayesian logic and assumes players are unsure
about underlying fact of the matter. Probability and payoffs produce expected utility of
disintegration which might or might not enter subgame perfection. Status quo as a
selected strategy may yield to exit if some appearing fact clears the uncertainty about the
state of the world. The second type of uncertainty relies on vagueness when there is
factual clarity. How can it be that there is no such element on the horizon which could
help actors clear out the uncertainty? This dissertation claims that it is indeed unlikely,
yet the concept of vagueness still holds when the source of uncertainty is located
somewhere else, namely, in payoffs themselves. When they become sensational and nonnumeric due to time progression and emerging complexities, the game-theoretic conduct
can indeed become paralyzed because no calculations can be made.
Sensations should not be avoided if they play so important a role in the world of
disintegration. They should, however, be tackled with proper tools and here this
dissertation advocates for description and narratives. It was revealed that many
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secessionist movements occurred under profound regime changes and transition periods.
While the former introduced extensive mitigation of independence costs for many former
colonies, the latter constituted additional assurance that the benefits would indeed exceed
sacrifices. Decolonization itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to make these payoffs
clear. The case of Montenegro reviewed in chapter IV showed that similar transitions or
gradualness of secession took place in international regimes favoring human rights and
democracy. Montenegro was able to skillfully clear disintegration costs when strategic
conditions became favorable. Slow and cautions “ground testing” stretching for almost
ten years helped to approach and understand the sensational nature of payoffs. During the
duration of joint union with Belgrade, many additional links emerged on virtually all
spheres resulting from a unified statehood structure. Areas of military, economic,
welfare, social scopes solidified over time and posed potentially extensive costs. Social
spheres especially replicated to the joint nationhood ideals, first under Serbdom, then
under Yugoslavism. As it was mentioned, Tito’s death resulted in dissolution of the
concept, whereas Montenegrin civic understanding of national unity helped to escape the
framework imposed by centralized and closed Serbia. Economic inefficiency coupled
with the difficulties of political coordination under joint statehood in the early 2000s
continues to make benefits from disintegration outweigh potential costs.
The case of Quebec outlined in chapter IV is an interesting example of a union
lasting for a relatively long period of time and yet reproducing very few linkages. Since
the political system has been largely decentralized, and Quebeckers have not wished to
open for additional social links, and no real security issues play the role in the region, the
one powerful issue imposing costs on disintegration is the economy. Quebec couldn’t be
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sure of securing its economic well-being after Ottawa rejected the idea of an economic
union being formed after independence. What is really interesting here and what is
possible to be researched with the proposed positive theory of disintegration is the
importance of the non-quantifiable, symbolic concept of nationhood. This purely nonmaterial benefit was contrasted with a largely quantifiable economic cost and almost led
to Quebec’s independence. The problem with contrasting these two qualitatively different
factors posed a cognitive challenge for Ottawa, which ignored the possibility of
secession, counting on economic costs to determine the continuity of the union.
Chile’s case of exit from intergovernmental organizations converges with the
tendency observed in dataset of withdrawals, as mentioned in chapter III. The short
duration of membership coupled with a relatively narrow scope covered in the integration
treaty should make states more prone to withdraw since benefits appearing on the postexit horizon seem to outweigh limited costs of withdrawal. This is exactly what happened
with Chile. Only a few years of membership prevented agreed links to deepen and
replicate. Not only were there few of these links, but also strategies of other member
states didn’t contribute to their replication. The fact that these links were economic and
not symbolic, nor otherwise non-material, additionally made it easier to quantify and
contrast costs with benefits. What is more, the Chilean example shows that permission
for links to replicate is a critical element without which integration cannot really deepen.
Once again, this fact shows a difference in quality between integration and disintegration.
The theory of disintegration applied to the case of Fiji requires taking into account
the initial scope and further extension of Pacific Islands Forum’s framework, as well as
changes in internalities, strategies and externalities. It quickly becomes obvious that
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initial, largely economic cooperation eventually extended to include issues like
telecommunications, shipping, aviation, fisheries, climate change, education and political
coordination. It can be claimed that the Forum helped young island states to develop and
solidify their independence with the limited resources they possessed. The serious
replication in this case would be a symbolic meaning assigned to the organization, the
meaning of independent existence and significance of cooperation for self-sufficiency. It
is thus not surprising that neither Fiji nor other member states with whom Suva wanted to
form an alternative regional organization dared to risk the breakage of these ties. Apart
from additional links and strategies-induced constraints, the example of Fiji shows also
how internalities in the form of resource endowment and size can limit the scope of
beneficial choices.
The case of Greenland introduced in chapter V is different yet may resemble Fiji
internalities-wise. Applying the theory of disintegration reveals other powerful factors in
play. Nuuk didn’t have to worry about Greenland’s future existence because it could
continue its union with Denmark as long as needed. Also, it did not develop many links
with the European Communities because it neither needed nor wanted to do so. Nor did it
needed to fear security consequences since it still remained a member of NATO, plus the
United States had its bases located on Greenland’s territory. In short, societal links had
not emerged, economic uncertainty was mitigated by continued union with Copenhagen,
Nuuk possessed just enough political autonomy and supranational decision-making was
unnecessary, if not harmful. Greenland knew that the fisheries issue was the only sphere
of any importance and it was not afraid of breaking any other ties. Should societal or
symbolic links emerge, the situation might have been different. The case of Nuuk’s

229

withdrawal indicates a potential yet powerful counterfactual: it is really difficult to exit
the European Union unless connected issues are reliably controlled for.
Greece’s debated withdrawal seems to confirm this assumption. Its accession to
the Union brought about full integration and the slow build-up of symbolic meaning
together with strengthening supranationalism. If preferable, one could call it a “taboo of
exit” which holds member states together. The theory of disintegration should make
researchers aware of how time progression contributed to the emergence and replication
of issue linkages. If the exit only from the European Monetary Union is debated, Athens
does nothing else than cognitively try to limit the scope of cooperation only to the area
covered by the EMU. Greece thus wants to secure itself from the breakage of additional
links; that is, it wants them to be controlled for. Member states’ strategies here are of
course to make it clear that withdrawal from EMU alone is not possible, but even if it
was, there is a magnificent fear of how a solidified and replicated the EMU would
respond to Greek exit. There is no guidance for how to manage withdrawal, no mitigation
mechanisms and no precedent. In short, no one knows what would happen and no one
wants to take the risk.

Greater Explanatory Power
The positive theory of disintegration proposed here can be considered a discrete
choice approach. It strives to understand under what conditions a particular set of
strategies - withdrawals and secessions – occurs in world politics. As a positive theory of
discrete choice, it considers disintegration to be like any other action but the factors to
which this action is subject often encourages other approaches to reduce it to assume
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inaction properties. One important mistake replicated by these approaches is elevating
these factors to the role of environment in which only its complete decomposition can
make actors active again and choose to disintegrate. As it was explained, this
decomposition may assume either subsequent reversal of all integrative factors separately
or negation of the process.
It is tempting to attribute disintegration to an abstract process, especially because
two major proliferations of new states occurred under decolonization and the Soviet
Union’s collapse. But the source of this confusion may be located in the neglected
difference between disintegration and decomposition. While the former assumes discrete
choices of particular actors, the latter would be an accumulation of these choices within
some time frame. What seems to be a process is in fact a set of similar conditions faced
by similarly located actors. Each subsequent move to disintegrate would occur under an
increasingly revealed state of the world and the “broken taboo” would add acceleration,
possibly making it easier for following actors to exit. Researchers can use the positive
theory of disintegration first to explain discrete choices and then to describe waves of
decomposition without subjecting the freedom of choice to the impact of process.
Similarly, the European integration “process” may in fact be an accumulation of
discrete choices not to disintegrate. However, every one of these choices has a potential
to be overrun by contrary action and this is something that process-thinking doesn’t
allow, thus limiting our scope of explanation. This dissertation postulates that researching
individual decisions to disintegrate can explain potential waves without relying on
abstract, process-like concepts.
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The proposed theory of disintegration highlights the necessity to avoid
symmetrical thinking when contemplating exits and secessions. This logic has its benefits
extending also beyond this scope. Seeing integration as gradual process is a common
mistake made by integration theorists. Assumed linearity locates intergovernmental
organizations somewhere on the spectrum between disunity and supranational
organization, while state-like apparatus is an ultimate outcome of the integration process.
Turning this statement around symmetrically makes states the least prone to disintegrate,
followed by supranational and intergovernmental organizations. This dissertation claims
that this is of course not the case, although the potential costs indeed rely on initial links
connecting the units.
The theory presented here enforces strict rules on what types of units can enter the
disintegration game. However, there is a potential for actors other than those specified
here to be considered as well. As long as autonomy, aggregation and politicization of
preferences are not an issue, the application of this theory should not be either. One
possible extension would be to assess the dynamics of subnational units’ withdrawal from
intergovernmental organizations or from organizations gathering other subnational
entities. The case of Greenland became, by necessity, something similar. As it was
shown, strategies of privileged states may become of even greater importance in this type
of games while many potential costs may be controlled and mitigated.
This introduced theory challenges researchers to contemplate the impact of time
on cognition. Since sociological accounts and historical institutionalism attack the core of
Rational Choice Theory, they are unacceptable by many formal theorists. But the real
world developments suggest that something is wrong with game-theoretic orthodoxy.
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This dissertation doesn’t aim to be yet another advocacy for irrationality, as its goal is to
join the efforts of Analytic Narratives and encourage researchers to use Rational Choice
Theory as much as possible. It is assumed that the nature of time and the induced
creativity of evolution must pose a challenge to the rational mind set on simplifying and
reducing reality.
In philosophical terms, we observe a clash between the constant demand for
utilitarian actions and complexity induced by time. Recalling Bergson, we expect superhuman intellect to slice and differentiate, to make calculations and draw conclusions,
only to face developments which escape numeric representation. Our intelligence makes
us best fit to function in a world of mechanical determinism, yet our social world is filled
with probability and non-linear relations. Chaos theory found its application also in
political sciences but the middle way of “plastic control” calls for better explanation.
What the proposed theory of disintegration should strive to do is to balance the
insights from the world’s complexities with the largest universality of application
possible. This balance is needed because these two qualities rarely come in pair. For
example, it was suggested that European integration theories are quite successful in
explaining particular cases under ongoing complexity of occurrences but they are not
successful in wider application from case to case. That is, integration theories compel
researchers to study complexities and by this they might be able to explain withdrawal
from the European Union, should such a case occur. However, the power of this
explanation lies in narratives, not in theoretical framework. This fact is reflected in nonuniversality of integration theories and their reversals. Deviations from the integration
path might be seen as a tool to strengthen cooperation but one is unable to group these
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deviations and give them a solid theoretical scope simply because integration theories are
filled with auxiliary hypotheses.
The positive account on disintegration should build on sensitivity to complexities
as their explanatory power becomes applicable to cases. It should also limit auxiliary
additions to the point where the universality of theory reaches a desired point. Game
theory of course adds this boost of replicability. Therefore “just enough” formal methods
and “just enough” narratives is considered the best solution to approach disintegration.
The political world is complex and difficult to theorize about. This dissertation
believes that theory-building in this world must assume a certain dose of narrative
account. Combining that with Rational Choice Theory is considered a proper way to
answer our questions. As researchers, we are located somewhere between Popperian
determinism and chaos. Disintegration in world politics requires more narratives than
integration, but this fact doesn’t justify the abandonment of formal methods. Theoretical
neatness is something to be desired if we want our approaches to be replicable. The
proposed positive theory of disintegration suggests the clear identification of actors, their
hierarchy, internal conditions, strategies and external setting. How these factors
contribute to changes in the scope of an integration treaty is the key to understanding the
logic of disintegration. We can see how and why disintegration becomes qualitatively
different from integration. To research decision, we must enter a player’s mind, a
contemplative yet rational mind which is often forced to choose from sensations toward a
desired greater utility. Knowing the roots of an actor’s dilemma should help us appreciate
the impact of time and understand tough choices faced in day-to-day world politics.
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